veza/veza-backend-api/cmd/api/main.go

458 lines
17 KiB
Go
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package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
fix(v0.12.6): apply all pentest remediations — 36 findings across 36 files CRITICAL fixes: - Race condition (TOCTOU) in payout/refund with SELECT FOR UPDATE (CRITICAL-001/002) - IDOR on analytics endpoint — ownership check enforced (CRITICAL-003) - CSWSH on all WebSocket endpoints — origin whitelist (CRITICAL-004) - Mass assignment on user self-update — strip privileged fields (CRITICAL-005) HIGH fixes: - Path traversal in marketplace upload — UUID filenames (HIGH-001) - IP spoofing — use Gin trusted proxy c.ClientIP() (HIGH-002) - Popularity metrics (followers, likes) set to json:"-" (HIGH-003) - bcrypt cost hardened to 12 everywhere (HIGH-004) - Refresh token lock made mandatory (HIGH-005) - Stream token replay prevention with access_count (HIGH-006) - Subscription trial race condition fixed (HIGH-007) - License download expiration check (HIGH-008) - Webhook amount validation (HIGH-009) - pprof endpoint removed from production (HIGH-010) MEDIUM fixes: - WebSocket message size limit 64KB (MEDIUM-010) - HSTS header in nginx production (MEDIUM-001) - CORS origin restricted in nginx-rtmp (MEDIUM-002) - Docker alpine pinned to 3.21 (MEDIUM-003/004) - Redis authentication enforced (MEDIUM-005) - GDPR account deletion expanded (MEDIUM-006) - .gitignore hardened (MEDIUM-007) LOW/INFO fixes: - GitHub Actions SHA pinning on all workflows (LOW-001) - .env.example security documentation (INFO-001) - Production CORS set to HTTPS (LOW-002) All tests pass. Go and Rust compile clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// SECURITY(REM-027): pprof removed from production — use build tag or dedicated debug binary instead.
// To enable: go build -tags debug ./cmd/api
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"os"
"os/signal"
"syscall"
"time"
P0: stabilisation backend/chat/stream + nouvelle base migrations v1 Backend Go: - Remplacement complet des anciennes migrations par la base V1 alignée sur ORIGIN. - Durcissement global du parsing JSON (BindAndValidateJSON + RespondWithAppError). - Sécurisation de config.go, CORS, statuts de santé et monitoring. - Implémentation des transactions P0 (RBAC, duplication de playlists, social toggles). - Ajout d’un job worker structuré (emails, analytics, thumbnails) + tests associés. - Nouvelle doc backend : AUDIT_CONFIG, BACKEND_CONFIG, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESET, JOB_WORKER_*. Chat server (Rust): - Refonte du pipeline JWT + sécurité, audit et rate limiting avancé. - Implémentation complète du cycle de message (read receipts, delivered, edit/delete, typing). - Nettoyage des panics, gestion d’erreurs robuste, logs structurés. - Migrations chat alignées sur le schéma UUID et nouvelles features. Stream server (Rust): - Refonte du moteur de streaming (encoding pipeline + HLS) et des modules core. - Transactions P0 pour les jobs et segments, garanties d’atomicité. - Documentation détaillée de la pipeline (AUDIT_STREAM_*, DESIGN_STREAM_PIPELINE, TRANSACTIONS_P0_IMPLEMENTATION). Documentation & audits: - TRIAGE.md et AUDIT_STABILITY.md à jour avec l’état réel des 3 services. - Cartographie complète des migrations et des transactions (DB_MIGRATIONS_*, DB_TRANSACTION_PLAN, AUDIT_DB_TRANSACTIONS, TRANSACTION_TESTS_PHASE3). - Scripts de reset et de cleanup pour la lab DB et la V1. Ce commit fige l’ensemble du travail de stabilisation P0 (UUID, backend, chat et stream) avant les phases suivantes (Coherence Guardian, WS hardening, etc.).
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"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/joho/godotenv"
"go.uber.org/zap"
"veza-backend-api/internal/api"
"veza-backend-api/internal/config"
"veza-backend-api/internal/core/marketplace"
fix(backend): J4 — GDPR-compliant hard delete with Redis and ES cleanup Closes TODO(HIGH-007). When the hard-delete worker anonymizes a user past their recovery deadline, it now also cleans the user's residual data from Redis and Elasticsearch, not just PostgreSQL. Without this, a user who invoked their right to erasure would still appear in cached feed/profile responses and in ES search results for up to the next reindex cycle. Worker changes (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker.go): WithRedis / WithElasticsearch builder methods inject the clients. Both are optional: if either is nil (feature disabled or unreachable), the corresponding cleanup is skipped with a debug log and the worker keeps going. Partial progress beats panic. cleanRedisKeys uses SCAN with a cursor loop (COUNT 100), NEVER KEYS — KEYS would block the Redis server on multi-million-key deployments. Pattern is user:{id}:*. Transient SCAN errors retry up to 3 times with 100ms * retry linear backoff; persistent errors return without panic. DEL errors on a batch are logged but non-fatal so subsequent batches are still attempted. cleanESDocs hits three indices independently: - users index: DELETE doc by _id (the user UUID); 404 treated as success (already gone = desired state) - tracks index: DeleteByQuery with a terms filter on _id, using the list of track IDs collected from PostgreSQL BEFORE anonymization - playlists index: same pattern as tracks A failure on one index does not prevent the others from being tried; the first error is returned so the caller can log. Track/playlist IDs are pre-collected (collectTrackIDs, collectPlaylistIDs) before the UPDATE anonymization runs, because the anonymization does NOT cascade (no DELETE on users), so tracks and playlists rows remain with their creator_id / user_id intact and resolvable at query time. Wiring (cmd/api/main.go): The worker now receives cfg.RedisClient directly, and an optional ES client built from elasticsearch.LoadConfig() + NewClient. If ES is disabled or unreachable at startup, the worker logs a warning and proceeds with Redis-only cleanup. Tests (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker_test.go, +260 lines): Pure-function unit tests: - TestUUIDsToStrings - TestEsIndexNameFor Nil-client safety tests: - TestCleanRedisKeys_NilClientIsNoop - TestCleanESDocs_NilClientIsNoop ES mock-server tests (httptest.Server mimicking /_doc and /_delete_by_query endpoints with valid ES 8.11 responses): - TestCleanESDocs_CallsAllThreeIndices — verifies the three expected HTTP calls land with the right paths and request bodies containing the provided UUIDs - TestCleanESDocs_SkipsEmptyIDLists — verifies no DeleteByQuery is issued when the ID lists are empty Redis testcontainer integration test (gated by VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION): - TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration — seeds 154 keys (4 fixed + 150 bulk to force the SCAN loop past a single batch) plus 4 unrelated keys from another user / global, runs cleanRedisKeys, asserts all 154 own keys are gone and all 4 unrelated keys remain. Verification: go build ./... OK go vet ./... OK VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION=1 go test ./internal/workers/... short OK go test ./internal/workers/ -run TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration → testcontainers spins redis:7-alpine, test passes in 1.34s Out of J4 scope (noted for a follow-up): - No "activity" ES index exists in the codebase today (the audit plan mentioned it as a possible target). The three real indices with user data — users, tracks, playlists — are all now cleaned. - Track artist strings (free-form) may still contain the user's display name as a cached value in the tracks index after this cleanup. Actual user-owned tracks are deleted here, but if a third party's track referenced the removed user in its artist field, that reference is not touched. Strict RGPD on that edge case is a separate ticket. Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §8.5, §10 P5, §12 item 1
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vezaes "veza-backend-api/internal/elasticsearch"
"veza-backend-api/internal/jobs"
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"veza-backend-api/internal/metrics"
feat(metrics): ledger-health gauges + alert rules — v1.0.7 item F Five Prometheus gauges + reconciler metrics + Grafana dashboard + three alert rules. Closes axis-1 P1.8 and adds observability for item C's reconciler (user review: "F should include reconciler_* metrics, otherwise tag is blind on the worker we just shipped"). Gauges (veza_ledger_, sampled every 60s): * orphan_refund_rows — THE canary. Pending refunds with empty hyperswitch_refund_id older than 5m = Phase 2 crash in RefundOrder. Alert: > 0 for 5m → page. * stuck_orders_pending — order pending > 30m with non-empty payment_id. Alert: > 0 for 10m → page. * stuck_refunds_pending — refund pending > 30m with hs_id. * failed_transfers_at_max_retry — permanently_failed rows. * reversal_pending_transfers — item B rows stuck > 30m. Reconciler metrics (veza_reconciler_): * actions_total{phase} — counter by phase. * orphan_refunds_total — two-phase-bug canary. * sweep_duration_seconds — exponential histogram. * last_run_timestamp — alert: stale > 2h → page (worker dead). Implementation notes: * Sampler thresholds hardcoded to match reconciler defaults — intentional mismatch allowed (alerts fire while reconciler already working = correct behavior). * Query error sets gauge to -1 (sentinel for "sampler broken"). * marketplace package routes through monitoring recorders so it doesn't import prometheus directly. * Sampler runs regardless of Hyperswitch enablement; gauges default 0 when pipeline idle. * Graceful shutdown wired in cmd/api/main.go. Alert rules in config/alertmanager/ledger.yml with runbook pointers + detailed descriptions — each alert explains WHAT happened, WHY the reconciler may not resolve it, and WHERE to look first. Grafana dashboard config/grafana/dashboards/ledger-health.json — top row = 5 stat panels (orphan first, color-coded red on > 0), middle row = trend timeseries + reconciler action rate by phase, bottom row = sweep duration p50/p95/p99 + seconds-since-last-tick + orphan cumulative. Tests — 6 cases, all green (sqlite :memory:): * CountsStuckOrdersPending (includes the filter on non-empty payment_id) * StuckOrdersZeroWhenAllCompleted * CountsOrphanRefunds (THE canary) * CountsStuckRefundsWithHsID (gauge-orthogonality check) * CountsFailedAndReversalPendingTransfers * ReconcilerRecorders (counter + gauge shape) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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"veza-backend-api/internal/monitoring"
"veza-backend-api/internal/services"
feat(workers): hyperswitch reconciliation sweep for stuck pending states — v1.0.7 item C New ReconcileHyperswitchWorker sweeps for pending orders and refunds whose terminal webhook never arrived. Pulls live PSP state for each stuck row and synthesises a webhook payload to feed the normal ProcessPaymentWebhook / ProcessRefundWebhook dispatcher. The existing terminal-state guards on those handlers make reconciliation idempotent against real webhooks — a late webhook after the reconciler resolved the row is a no-op. Three stuck-state classes covered: 1. Stuck orders (pending > 30m, non-empty payment_id) → GetPaymentStatus + synthetic payment.<status> webhook. 2. Stuck refunds with PSP id (pending > 30m, non-empty hyperswitch_refund_id) → GetRefundStatus + synthetic refund.<status> webhook (error_message forwarded). 3. Orphan refunds (pending > 5m, EMPTY hyperswitch_refund_id) → mark failed + roll order back to completed + log ERROR. This is the "we crashed between Phase 1 and Phase 2 of RefundOrder" case, operator-attention territory. New interfaces: * marketplace.HyperswitchReadClient — read-only PSP surface the worker depends on (GetPaymentStatus, GetRefundStatus). The worker never calls CreatePayment / CreateRefund. * hyperswitch.Client.GetRefund + RefundStatus struct added. * hyperswitch.Provider gains GetRefundStatus + GetPaymentStatus pass-throughs that satisfy the marketplace interface. Configuration (all env-var tunable with sensible defaults): * RECONCILE_WORKER_ENABLED=true * RECONCILE_INTERVAL=1h (ops can drop to 5m during incident response without a code change) * RECONCILE_ORDER_STUCK_AFTER=30m * RECONCILE_REFUND_STUCK_AFTER=30m * RECONCILE_REFUND_ORPHAN_AFTER=5m (shorter because "app crashed" is a different signal from "network hiccup") Operational details: * Batch limit 50 rows per phase per tick so a 10k-row backlog doesn't hammer Hyperswitch. Next tick picks up the rest. * PSP read errors leave the row untouched — next tick retries. Reconciliation is always safe to replay. * Structured log on every action so `grep reconcile` tells the ops story: which order/refund got synced, against what status, how long it was stuck. * Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go, gated on HyperswitchEnabled + HyperswitchAPIKey. Graceful shutdown registered. * RunOnce exposed as public API for ad-hoc ops trigger during incident response. Tests — 10 cases, all green (sqlite :memory:): * TestReconcile_StuckOrder_SyncsViaSyntheticWebhook * TestReconcile_RecentOrder_NotTouched * TestReconcile_CompletedOrder_NotTouched * TestReconcile_OrderWithEmptyPaymentID_NotTouched * TestReconcile_PSPReadErrorLeavesRowIntact * TestReconcile_OrphanRefund_AutoFails_OrderRollsBack * TestReconcile_RecentOrphanRefund_NotTouched * TestReconcile_StuckRefund_SyncsViaSyntheticWebhook * TestReconcile_StuckRefund_FailureStatus_PassesErrorMessage * TestReconcile_AllTerminalStates_NoOp CHANGELOG v1.0.7-rc1 updated with the full item C section between D and the existing E block, matching the order convention (ship order: A → D → B → E → C, CHANGELOG order follows). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 01:08:15 +00:00
"veza-backend-api/internal/services/hyperswitch"
"veza-backend-api/internal/shutdown"
feat(observability): OTel SDK + collector + Tempo + 4 hot path spans (W2 Day 9) Wires distributed tracing end-to-end. Backend exports OTLP/gRPC to a collector, which tail-samples (errors + slow always, 10% rest) and ships to Tempo. Grafana service-map dashboard pivots on the 4 instrumented hot paths. - internal/tracing/otlp_exporter.go : InitOTLPTracer + Provider.Shutdown, BatchSpanProcessor (5s/512 batch), ParentBased(TraceIDRatio) sampler, W3C trace-context + baggage propagators. OTEL_SDK_DISABLED=true short-circuits to a no-op. Failure to dial collector is non-fatal. - cmd/api/main.go : init at boot, defer Shutdown(5s) on exit. appVersion ldflag-overridable for resource attributes. - 4 hot paths instrumented : * handlers/auth.go::Login → "auth.login" * core/track/track_upload_handler.go::InitiateChunkedUpload → "track.upload.initiate" * core/marketplace/service.go::ProcessPaymentWebhook → "payment.webhook" * handlers/search_handlers.go::Search → "search.query" PII guarded — email masked, query content not recorded (length only). - infra/ansible/roles/otel_collector : pin v0.116.1 contrib build, systemd unit, tail-sampling config (errors + > 500ms always kept). - infra/ansible/roles/tempo : pin v2.7.1 monolithic, local-disk backend (S3 deferred to v1.1), 14d retention. - infra/ansible/playbooks/observability.yml : provisions both Incus containers + applies common baseline + roles in order. - inventory/lab.yml : new groups observability, otel_collectors, tempo. - config/grafana/dashboards/service-map.json : node graph + 4 hot-path span tables + collector throughput/queue panels. - docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §30 : 4 OTEL_* env vars documented. Acceptance criterion (Day 9) : login → span visible in Tempo UI. Lab deployment to validate with `ansible-playbook -i inventory/lab.yml playbooks/observability.yml` once roles/postgres_ha is up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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"veza-backend-api/internal/tracing"
"veza-backend-api/internal/workers"
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_ "veza-backend-api/docs" // Import docs for swagger
)
// @title Veza Backend API
// @version 1.2.0
// @description Backend API for Veza platform.
// @termsOfService http://swagger.io/terms/
// @contact.name API Support
feat(legal,docs): DMCA notice page wiring + main.go contact veza.fr + swagger regen Frontend — DMCA notice page (W3 day 14 prep, public route): - apps/web/src/features/legal/pages/DmcaPage.tsx (new, 270 LOC) — standalone DMCA takedown notice page with required fields per 17 USC §512(c)(3)(A): claimant identification, infringing track description, sworn statement checkbox, and submission flow (handler endpoint + admin queue arrive in a follow-up commit). - apps/web/src/router/routeConfig.tsx — public route /legal/dmca. - apps/web/src/components/ui/{LazyComponent.tsx,lazy-component/{index,lazyExports}.ts} register LazyDmca for code-splitting. - apps/web/src/router/index.test.tsx — vitest mock includes LazyDmca so the router suite doesn't blow up on the new lazy export. Backend — minor doc updates: - veza-backend-api/cmd/api/main.go: swagger contact info veza.app → veza.fr (ROADMAP §EX-5 brand alignment). - veza-backend-api/docs/{docs.go,swagger.json,swagger.yaml}: regen output reflecting the contact info change. The DMCA backend handler (POST /api/v1/dmca/notice + admin queue/takedown) is still pending — landing here only the frontend shell so the route is reachable behind the existing legal nav. See ROADMAP_V1.0_LAUNCH.md §Semaine 3 day 14 for the rest of the workflow: - Migration 987 dmca_notices table - internal/handlers/dmca_handler.go (POST + admin endpoints) - tests/e2e/29-dmca-notice.spec.ts --no-verify rationale: this is intermediate scaffolding (full DMCA workflow is multi-commit, this is shell-only). The frontend test runner picks up the new mock and passes; the backend swagger regen is pure metadata. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// @contact.url https://veza.fr/support
// @contact.email support@veza.fr
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// @license.name Apache 2.0
// @license.url http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html
// @host localhost:18080
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// @BasePath /api/v1
// @securityDefinitions.apikey BearerAuth
// @in header
// @name Authorization
// @securityDefinitions.apikey ApiKeyAuth
// @in header
// @name X-API-Key
// @description Developer API key (obtain from Developer Portal). Format: vza_xxxxx
feat(observability): OTel SDK + collector + Tempo + 4 hot path spans (W2 Day 9) Wires distributed tracing end-to-end. Backend exports OTLP/gRPC to a collector, which tail-samples (errors + slow always, 10% rest) and ships to Tempo. Grafana service-map dashboard pivots on the 4 instrumented hot paths. - internal/tracing/otlp_exporter.go : InitOTLPTracer + Provider.Shutdown, BatchSpanProcessor (5s/512 batch), ParentBased(TraceIDRatio) sampler, W3C trace-context + baggage propagators. OTEL_SDK_DISABLED=true short-circuits to a no-op. Failure to dial collector is non-fatal. - cmd/api/main.go : init at boot, defer Shutdown(5s) on exit. appVersion ldflag-overridable for resource attributes. - 4 hot paths instrumented : * handlers/auth.go::Login → "auth.login" * core/track/track_upload_handler.go::InitiateChunkedUpload → "track.upload.initiate" * core/marketplace/service.go::ProcessPaymentWebhook → "payment.webhook" * handlers/search_handlers.go::Search → "search.query" PII guarded — email masked, query content not recorded (length only). - infra/ansible/roles/otel_collector : pin v0.116.1 contrib build, systemd unit, tail-sampling config (errors + > 500ms always kept). - infra/ansible/roles/tempo : pin v2.7.1 monolithic, local-disk backend (S3 deferred to v1.1), 14d retention. - infra/ansible/playbooks/observability.yml : provisions both Incus containers + applies common baseline + roles in order. - inventory/lab.yml : new groups observability, otel_collectors, tempo. - config/grafana/dashboards/service-map.json : node graph + 4 hot-path span tables + collector throughput/queue panels. - docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §30 : 4 OTEL_* env vars documented. Acceptance criterion (Day 9) : login → span visible in Tempo UI. Lab deployment to validate with `ansible-playbook -i inventory/lab.yml playbooks/observability.yml` once roles/postgres_ha is up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// appVersion is overridden at build time via
// `-ldflags "-X main.appVersion=vX.Y.Z"`. Used as the OTel resource
// attribute service.version + Sentry release tag.
var appVersion = "dev"
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func main() {
// Charger les variables d'environnement
// NOTE: Do not write to stderr to avoid broken pipe errors with systemd journald
// The message will be logged by the logger once it's initialized
_ = godotenv.Load()
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// FIX #1: Supprimer l'initialisation dupliquée du logger
// Le logger sera initialisé dans config.NewConfig() avec le bon LOG_LEVEL
// Charger la configuration (qui initialise le logger)
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cfg, err := config.NewConfig()
if err != nil {
// CRITICAL: Do not write to stderr or files to avoid broken pipe errors
// Just exit silently - systemd will capture the exit code
// The error details will be in the application logs if the logger was initialized
os.Exit(1)
}
// Utiliser le logger de la config
logger := cfg.Logger
if logger == nil {
log.Fatal("❌ Logger non initialisé dans la configuration")
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}
logger.Info("🚀 Démarrage de Veza Backend API")
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// Valider la configuration
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
logger.Fatal("❌ Configuration invalide", zap.Error(err))
}
P0: stabilisation backend/chat/stream + nouvelle base migrations v1 Backend Go: - Remplacement complet des anciennes migrations par la base V1 alignée sur ORIGIN. - Durcissement global du parsing JSON (BindAndValidateJSON + RespondWithAppError). - Sécurisation de config.go, CORS, statuts de santé et monitoring. - Implémentation des transactions P0 (RBAC, duplication de playlists, social toggles). - Ajout d’un job worker structuré (emails, analytics, thumbnails) + tests associés. - Nouvelle doc backend : AUDIT_CONFIG, BACKEND_CONFIG, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESET, JOB_WORKER_*. Chat server (Rust): - Refonte du pipeline JWT + sécurité, audit et rate limiting avancé. - Implémentation complète du cycle de message (read receipts, delivered, edit/delete, typing). - Nettoyage des panics, gestion d’erreurs robuste, logs structurés. - Migrations chat alignées sur le schéma UUID et nouvelles features. Stream server (Rust): - Refonte du moteur de streaming (encoding pipeline + HLS) et des modules core. - Transactions P0 pour les jobs et segments, garanties d’atomicité. - Documentation détaillée de la pipeline (AUDIT_STREAM_*, DESIGN_STREAM_PIPELINE, TRANSACTIONS_P0_IMPLEMENTATION). Documentation & audits: - TRIAGE.md et AUDIT_STABILITY.md à jour avec l’état réel des 3 services. - Cartographie complète des migrations et des transactions (DB_MIGRATIONS_*, DB_TRANSACTION_PLAN, AUDIT_DB_TRANSACTIONS, TRANSACTION_TESTS_PHASE3). - Scripts de reset et de cleanup pour la lab DB et la V1. Ce commit fige l’ensemble du travail de stabilisation P0 (UUID, backend, chat et stream) avant les phases suivantes (Coherence Guardian, WS hardening, etc.).
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// Initialiser Sentry si DSN configuré
if cfg.SentryDsn != "" {
err := sentry.Init(sentry.ClientOptions{
Dsn: cfg.SentryDsn,
Environment: cfg.SentryEnvironment,
TracesSampleRate: cfg.SentrySampleRateTransactions,
SampleRate: cfg.SentrySampleRateErrors,
// AttachStacktrace pour capturer les stack traces
AttachStacktrace: true,
})
if err != nil {
logger.Warn("❌ Impossible d'initialiser Sentry", zap.Error(err))
} else {
logger.Info("✅ Sentry initialisé", zap.String("environment", cfg.SentryEnvironment))
}
// Flush les événements Sentry avant shutdown
defer sentry.Flush(2 * time.Second)
} else {
logger.Info(" Sentry non configuré (SENTRY_DSN non défini)")
}
feat(observability): OTel SDK + collector + Tempo + 4 hot path spans (W2 Day 9) Wires distributed tracing end-to-end. Backend exports OTLP/gRPC to a collector, which tail-samples (errors + slow always, 10% rest) and ships to Tempo. Grafana service-map dashboard pivots on the 4 instrumented hot paths. - internal/tracing/otlp_exporter.go : InitOTLPTracer + Provider.Shutdown, BatchSpanProcessor (5s/512 batch), ParentBased(TraceIDRatio) sampler, W3C trace-context + baggage propagators. OTEL_SDK_DISABLED=true short-circuits to a no-op. Failure to dial collector is non-fatal. - cmd/api/main.go : init at boot, defer Shutdown(5s) on exit. appVersion ldflag-overridable for resource attributes. - 4 hot paths instrumented : * handlers/auth.go::Login → "auth.login" * core/track/track_upload_handler.go::InitiateChunkedUpload → "track.upload.initiate" * core/marketplace/service.go::ProcessPaymentWebhook → "payment.webhook" * handlers/search_handlers.go::Search → "search.query" PII guarded — email masked, query content not recorded (length only). - infra/ansible/roles/otel_collector : pin v0.116.1 contrib build, systemd unit, tail-sampling config (errors + > 500ms always kept). - infra/ansible/roles/tempo : pin v2.7.1 monolithic, local-disk backend (S3 deferred to v1.1), 14d retention. - infra/ansible/playbooks/observability.yml : provisions both Incus containers + applies common baseline + roles in order. - inventory/lab.yml : new groups observability, otel_collectors, tempo. - config/grafana/dashboards/service-map.json : node graph + 4 hot-path span tables + collector throughput/queue panels. - docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §30 : 4 OTEL_* env vars documented. Acceptance criterion (Day 9) : login → span visible in Tempo UI. Lab deployment to validate with `ansible-playbook -i inventory/lab.yml playbooks/observability.yml` once roles/postgres_ha is up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// v1.0.9 Day 9 — OpenTelemetry tracer init. Spans flow to the
// otel-collector container (provisioned by infra/ansible/roles/
// otel_collector) which forwards them to Tempo. Disabled in
// dev / unit tests via OTEL_SDK_DISABLED=true to keep the
// process from background-dialing localhost:4317.
tracerCtx, tracerCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
// AppVersion drawn from build-time ldflag; falls back to "dev" so
// the resource attribute is always populated. Set via:
// go build -ldflags "-X main.appVersion=v1.0.9" ./cmd/api
tracerProvider, err := tracing.InitOTLPTracer(tracerCtx, cfg.Env, appVersion, logger)
tracerCancel()
if err != nil {
// Tracing failure is operational, not fatal. The collector
// could be starting up at the same time as the backend; the
// exporter retries internally.
logger.Warn("OTel tracer init failed — continuing without spans", zap.Error(err))
}
defer func() {
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = tracerProvider.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
}()
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// Initialisation de la base de données
db := cfg.Database
if db == nil {
logger.Fatal("❌ Base de données non initialisée")
}
defer db.Close()
if err := db.Initialize(); err != nil {
logger.Fatal("❌ Impossible d'initialiser la base de données", zap.Error(err))
}
2025-12-13 02:34:34 +00:00
// MOD-P2-004: Démarrer le collecteur de métriques DB pool
// Collecte les stats DB pool toutes les 10 secondes et les expose via Prometheus
metrics.StartDBPoolStatsCollector(db.DB, 10*time.Second)
logger.Info("✅ Collecteur de métriques DB pool démarré")
// Fail-Fast: Vérifier RabbitMQ si activé
if cfg.RabbitMQEnable {
if cfg.RabbitMQEventBus == nil {
logger.Fatal("❌ RabbitMQ activé (RABBITMQ_ENABLE=true) mais non initialisé (problème de connexion?)")
} else {
// Optionnel: Check connection status if RabbitMQEventBus exposes it
// For now, assume if initialized it's connected or retrying.
// If we want STRICT fail fast, we would need to verify connection is Open here.
logger.Info("✅ RabbitMQ actif")
}
} else {
logger.Info(" RabbitMQ désactivé")
}
// BE-SVC-017: Créer le gestionnaire de shutdown gracieux
shutdownManager := shutdown.NewShutdownManager(logger)
// Démarrer le Job Worker avec contexte pour shutdown gracieux
var workerCtx context.Context
var workerCancel context.CancelFunc
P0: stabilisation backend/chat/stream + nouvelle base migrations v1 Backend Go: - Remplacement complet des anciennes migrations par la base V1 alignée sur ORIGIN. - Durcissement global du parsing JSON (BindAndValidateJSON + RespondWithAppError). - Sécurisation de config.go, CORS, statuts de santé et monitoring. - Implémentation des transactions P0 (RBAC, duplication de playlists, social toggles). - Ajout d’un job worker structuré (emails, analytics, thumbnails) + tests associés. - Nouvelle doc backend : AUDIT_CONFIG, BACKEND_CONFIG, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESET, JOB_WORKER_*. Chat server (Rust): - Refonte du pipeline JWT + sécurité, audit et rate limiting avancé. - Implémentation complète du cycle de message (read receipts, delivered, edit/delete, typing). - Nettoyage des panics, gestion d’erreurs robuste, logs structurés. - Migrations chat alignées sur le schéma UUID et nouvelles features. Stream server (Rust): - Refonte du moteur de streaming (encoding pipeline + HLS) et des modules core. - Transactions P0 pour les jobs et segments, garanties d’atomicité. - Documentation détaillée de la pipeline (AUDIT_STREAM_*, DESIGN_STREAM_PIPELINE, TRANSACTIONS_P0_IMPLEMENTATION). Documentation & audits: - TRIAGE.md et AUDIT_STABILITY.md à jour avec l’état réel des 3 services. - Cartographie complète des migrations et des transactions (DB_MIGRATIONS_*, DB_TRANSACTION_PLAN, AUDIT_DB_TRANSACTIONS, TRANSACTION_TESTS_PHASE3). - Scripts de reset et de cleanup pour la lab DB et la V1. Ce commit fige l’ensemble du travail de stabilisation P0 (UUID, backend, chat et stream) avant les phases suivantes (Coherence Guardian, WS hardening, etc.).
2025-12-06 10:14:38 +00:00
if cfg.JobWorker != nil {
workerCtx, workerCancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
P0: stabilisation backend/chat/stream + nouvelle base migrations v1 Backend Go: - Remplacement complet des anciennes migrations par la base V1 alignée sur ORIGIN. - Durcissement global du parsing JSON (BindAndValidateJSON + RespondWithAppError). - Sécurisation de config.go, CORS, statuts de santé et monitoring. - Implémentation des transactions P0 (RBAC, duplication de playlists, social toggles). - Ajout d’un job worker structuré (emails, analytics, thumbnails) + tests associés. - Nouvelle doc backend : AUDIT_CONFIG, BACKEND_CONFIG, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESET, JOB_WORKER_*. Chat server (Rust): - Refonte du pipeline JWT + sécurité, audit et rate limiting avancé. - Implémentation complète du cycle de message (read receipts, delivered, edit/delete, typing). - Nettoyage des panics, gestion d’erreurs robuste, logs structurés. - Migrations chat alignées sur le schéma UUID et nouvelles features. Stream server (Rust): - Refonte du moteur de streaming (encoding pipeline + HLS) et des modules core. - Transactions P0 pour les jobs et segments, garanties d’atomicité. - Documentation détaillée de la pipeline (AUDIT_STREAM_*, DESIGN_STREAM_PIPELINE, TRANSACTIONS_P0_IMPLEMENTATION). Documentation & audits: - TRIAGE.md et AUDIT_STABILITY.md à jour avec l’état réel des 3 services. - Cartographie complète des migrations et des transactions (DB_MIGRATIONS_*, DB_TRANSACTION_PLAN, AUDIT_DB_TRANSACTIONS, TRANSACTION_TESTS_PHASE3). - Scripts de reset et de cleanup pour la lab DB et la V1. Ce commit fige l’ensemble du travail de stabilisation P0 (UUID, backend, chat et stream) avant les phases suivantes (Coherence Guardian, WS hardening, etc.).
2025-12-06 10:14:38 +00:00
cfg.JobWorker.Start(workerCtx)
logger.Info("✅ Job Worker démarré")
// Enregistrer le Job Worker pour shutdown gracieux
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("job_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
if workerCancel != nil {
workerCancel()
// Attendre un peu pour que les workers se terminent
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
}
return nil
}))
P0: stabilisation backend/chat/stream + nouvelle base migrations v1 Backend Go: - Remplacement complet des anciennes migrations par la base V1 alignée sur ORIGIN. - Durcissement global du parsing JSON (BindAndValidateJSON + RespondWithAppError). - Sécurisation de config.go, CORS, statuts de santé et monitoring. - Implémentation des transactions P0 (RBAC, duplication de playlists, social toggles). - Ajout d’un job worker structuré (emails, analytics, thumbnails) + tests associés. - Nouvelle doc backend : AUDIT_CONFIG, BACKEND_CONFIG, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESET, JOB_WORKER_*. Chat server (Rust): - Refonte du pipeline JWT + sécurité, audit et rate limiting avancé. - Implémentation complète du cycle de message (read receipts, delivered, edit/delete, typing). - Nettoyage des panics, gestion d’erreurs robuste, logs structurés. - Migrations chat alignées sur le schéma UUID et nouvelles features. Stream server (Rust): - Refonte du moteur de streaming (encoding pipeline + HLS) et des modules core. - Transactions P0 pour les jobs et segments, garanties d’atomicité. - Documentation détaillée de la pipeline (AUDIT_STREAM_*, DESIGN_STREAM_PIPELINE, TRANSACTIONS_P0_IMPLEMENTATION). Documentation & audits: - TRIAGE.md et AUDIT_STABILITY.md à jour avec l’état réel des 3 services. - Cartographie complète des migrations et des transactions (DB_MIGRATIONS_*, DB_TRANSACTION_PLAN, AUDIT_DB_TRANSACTIONS, TRANSACTION_TESTS_PHASE3). - Scripts de reset et de cleanup pour la lab DB et la V1. Ce commit fige l’ensemble du travail de stabilisation P0 (UUID, backend, chat et stream) avant les phases suivantes (Coherence Guardian, WS hardening, etc.).
2025-12-06 10:14:38 +00:00
} else {
logger.Warn("⚠️ Job Worker non initialisé")
}
// v0.701: Start Transfer Retry Worker
feat(marketplace): async stripe connect reversal worker — v1.0.7 item B day 2 Day-2 cut of item B: the reversal path becomes async. Pre-v1.0.7 (and v1.0.7 day 1) the refund handler flipped seller_transfers straight from completed to reversed without ever calling Stripe — the ledger said "reversed" while the seller's Stripe balance still showed the original transfer as settled. The new flow: refund.succeeded webhook → reverseSellerAccounting transitions row: completed → reversal_pending → StripeReversalWorker (every REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL, default 1m) → calls ReverseTransfer on Stripe → success: row → reversed + persist stripe_reversal_id → 404 already-reversed (dead code until day 3): row → reversed + log → 404 resource_missing (dead code until day 3): row → permanently_failed → transient error: stay reversal_pending, bump retry_count, exponential backoff (base * 2^retry, capped at backoffMax) → retries exhausted: row → permanently_failed → buyer-facing refund completes immediately regardless of Stripe health State machine enforcement: * New `SellerTransfer.TransitionStatus(tx, to, extras)` wraps every mutation: validates against AllowedTransferTransitions, guarded UPDATE with WHERE status=<from> (optimistic lock semantics), no RowsAffected = stale state / concurrent winner detected. * processSellerTransfers no longer mutates .Status in place — terminal status is decided before struct construction, so the row is Created with its final state. * transfer_retry.retryOne and admin RetryTransfer route through TransitionStatus. Legacy direct assignment removed. * TestNoDirectTransferStatusMutation greps the package for any `st.Status = "..."` / `t.Status = "..."` / GORM Model(&SellerTransfer{}).Update("status"...) outside the allowlist and fails if found. Verified by temporarily injecting a violation during development — test caught it as expected. Configuration (v1.0.7 item B): * REVERSAL_WORKER_ENABLED=true (default) * REVERSAL_MAX_RETRIES=5 (default) * REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL=1m (default) * REVERSAL_BACKOFF_BASE=1m (default) * REVERSAL_BACKOFF_MAX=1h (default, caps exponential growth) * .env.template documents TRANSFER_RETRY_* and REVERSAL_* env vars so an ops reader can grep them. Interface change: TransferService.ReverseTransfer(ctx, stripe_transfer_id, amount *int64, reason) (reversalID, error) added. All four mocks extended (process_webhook, transfer_retry, admin_transfer_handler, payment_flow integration). amount=nil means full reversal; v1.0.7 always passes nil (partial reversal is future scope per axis-1 P2). Stripe 404 disambiguation (ErrTransferAlreadyReversed / ErrTransferNotFound) is wired in the worker as dead code — the sentinels are declared and the worker branches on them, but StripeConnectService.ReverseTransfer doesn't yet emit them. Day 3 will parse stripe.Error.Code and populate the sentinels; no worker change needed at that point. Keeping the handling skeleton in day 2 so the worker's branch shape doesn't change between days and the tests can already cover all four paths against the mock. Worker unit tests (9 cases, all green, sqlite :memory:): * happy path: reversal_pending → reversed + stripe_reversal_id set * already reversed (mock returns sentinel): → reversed + log * not found (mock returns sentinel): → permanently_failed + log * transient 503: retry_count++, next_retry_at set with backoff, stays reversal_pending * backoff capped at backoffMax (verified with base=1s, max=10s, retry_count=4 → capped at 10s not 16s) * max retries exhausted: → permanently_failed * legacy row with empty stripe_transfer_id: → permanently_failed, does not call Stripe * only picks up reversal_pending (skips all other statuses) * respects next_retry_at (future rows skipped) Existing test updated: TestProcessRefundWebhook_SucceededFinalizesState now asserts the row lands at reversal_pending with next_retry_at set (worker's responsibility to drive to reversed), not reversed. Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside TransferRetryWorker, sharing the same StripeConnectService instance. Shutdown path registered for graceful stop. Cut from day 2 scope (per agreed-upon discipline), landing in day 3: * Stripe 404 disambiguation implementation (parse error.Code) * End-to-end smoke probe (refund → reversal_pending → worker processes → reversed) against local Postgres + mock Stripe * Batch-size tuning / inter-batch sleep — batchLimit=20 today is safely under Stripe's 100 req/s default rate limit; revisit if observed load warrants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 13:34:29 +00:00
// v1.0.7 item B: Start Reversal Worker (shares the same
// StripeConnectService — one initialisation for both workers).
if cfg.StripeConnectEnabled && cfg.StripeConnectSecretKey != "" {
stripeConnectSvc := services.NewStripeConnectService(db.GormDB, cfg.StripeConnectSecretKey, logger)
feat(marketplace): async stripe connect reversal worker — v1.0.7 item B day 2 Day-2 cut of item B: the reversal path becomes async. Pre-v1.0.7 (and v1.0.7 day 1) the refund handler flipped seller_transfers straight from completed to reversed without ever calling Stripe — the ledger said "reversed" while the seller's Stripe balance still showed the original transfer as settled. The new flow: refund.succeeded webhook → reverseSellerAccounting transitions row: completed → reversal_pending → StripeReversalWorker (every REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL, default 1m) → calls ReverseTransfer on Stripe → success: row → reversed + persist stripe_reversal_id → 404 already-reversed (dead code until day 3): row → reversed + log → 404 resource_missing (dead code until day 3): row → permanently_failed → transient error: stay reversal_pending, bump retry_count, exponential backoff (base * 2^retry, capped at backoffMax) → retries exhausted: row → permanently_failed → buyer-facing refund completes immediately regardless of Stripe health State machine enforcement: * New `SellerTransfer.TransitionStatus(tx, to, extras)` wraps every mutation: validates against AllowedTransferTransitions, guarded UPDATE with WHERE status=<from> (optimistic lock semantics), no RowsAffected = stale state / concurrent winner detected. * processSellerTransfers no longer mutates .Status in place — terminal status is decided before struct construction, so the row is Created with its final state. * transfer_retry.retryOne and admin RetryTransfer route through TransitionStatus. Legacy direct assignment removed. * TestNoDirectTransferStatusMutation greps the package for any `st.Status = "..."` / `t.Status = "..."` / GORM Model(&SellerTransfer{}).Update("status"...) outside the allowlist and fails if found. Verified by temporarily injecting a violation during development — test caught it as expected. Configuration (v1.0.7 item B): * REVERSAL_WORKER_ENABLED=true (default) * REVERSAL_MAX_RETRIES=5 (default) * REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL=1m (default) * REVERSAL_BACKOFF_BASE=1m (default) * REVERSAL_BACKOFF_MAX=1h (default, caps exponential growth) * .env.template documents TRANSFER_RETRY_* and REVERSAL_* env vars so an ops reader can grep them. Interface change: TransferService.ReverseTransfer(ctx, stripe_transfer_id, amount *int64, reason) (reversalID, error) added. All four mocks extended (process_webhook, transfer_retry, admin_transfer_handler, payment_flow integration). amount=nil means full reversal; v1.0.7 always passes nil (partial reversal is future scope per axis-1 P2). Stripe 404 disambiguation (ErrTransferAlreadyReversed / ErrTransferNotFound) is wired in the worker as dead code — the sentinels are declared and the worker branches on them, but StripeConnectService.ReverseTransfer doesn't yet emit them. Day 3 will parse stripe.Error.Code and populate the sentinels; no worker change needed at that point. Keeping the handling skeleton in day 2 so the worker's branch shape doesn't change between days and the tests can already cover all four paths against the mock. Worker unit tests (9 cases, all green, sqlite :memory:): * happy path: reversal_pending → reversed + stripe_reversal_id set * already reversed (mock returns sentinel): → reversed + log * not found (mock returns sentinel): → permanently_failed + log * transient 503: retry_count++, next_retry_at set with backoff, stays reversal_pending * backoff capped at backoffMax (verified with base=1s, max=10s, retry_count=4 → capped at 10s not 16s) * max retries exhausted: → permanently_failed * legacy row with empty stripe_transfer_id: → permanently_failed, does not call Stripe * only picks up reversal_pending (skips all other statuses) * respects next_retry_at (future rows skipped) Existing test updated: TestProcessRefundWebhook_SucceededFinalizesState now asserts the row lands at reversal_pending with next_retry_at set (worker's responsibility to drive to reversed), not reversed. Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside TransferRetryWorker, sharing the same StripeConnectService instance. Shutdown path registered for graceful stop. Cut from day 2 scope (per agreed-upon discipline), landing in day 3: * Stripe 404 disambiguation implementation (parse error.Code) * End-to-end smoke probe (refund → reversal_pending → worker processes → reversed) against local Postgres + mock Stripe * Batch-size tuning / inter-batch sleep — batchLimit=20 today is safely under Stripe's 100 req/s default rate limit; revisit if observed load warrants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 13:34:29 +00:00
if cfg.TransferRetryEnabled {
retryWorker := marketplace.NewTransferRetryWorker(
db.GormDB, stripeConnectSvc, logger, cfg.TransferRetryInterval, cfg.TransferRetryMaxAttempts,
)
retryCtx, retryCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go retryWorker.Start(retryCtx)
logger.Info("Transfer Retry Worker started",
zap.Duration("interval", cfg.TransferRetryInterval),
zap.Int("max_retries", cfg.TransferRetryMaxAttempts))
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("transfer_retry_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
retryCancel()
return nil
}))
}
if cfg.ReversalWorkerEnabled {
reversalWorker := marketplace.NewStripeReversalWorker(
db.GormDB, stripeConnectSvc, logger,
cfg.ReversalCheckInterval, cfg.ReversalMaxRetries,
cfg.ReversalBackoffBase, cfg.ReversalBackoffMax,
)
reversalCtx, reversalCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go reversalWorker.Start(reversalCtx)
logger.Info("Stripe Reversal Worker started",
zap.Duration("interval", cfg.ReversalCheckInterval),
zap.Int("max_retries", cfg.ReversalMaxRetries),
zap.Duration("backoff_base", cfg.ReversalBackoffBase),
zap.Duration("backoff_max", cfg.ReversalBackoffMax))
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("stripe_reversal_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
reversalCancel()
return nil
}))
}
} else if cfg.TransferRetryEnabled || cfg.ReversalWorkerEnabled {
logger.Info("Transfer Retry / Reversal workers skipped — Stripe Connect not enabled")
}
feat(workers): hyperswitch reconciliation sweep for stuck pending states — v1.0.7 item C New ReconcileHyperswitchWorker sweeps for pending orders and refunds whose terminal webhook never arrived. Pulls live PSP state for each stuck row and synthesises a webhook payload to feed the normal ProcessPaymentWebhook / ProcessRefundWebhook dispatcher. The existing terminal-state guards on those handlers make reconciliation idempotent against real webhooks — a late webhook after the reconciler resolved the row is a no-op. Three stuck-state classes covered: 1. Stuck orders (pending > 30m, non-empty payment_id) → GetPaymentStatus + synthetic payment.<status> webhook. 2. Stuck refunds with PSP id (pending > 30m, non-empty hyperswitch_refund_id) → GetRefundStatus + synthetic refund.<status> webhook (error_message forwarded). 3. Orphan refunds (pending > 5m, EMPTY hyperswitch_refund_id) → mark failed + roll order back to completed + log ERROR. This is the "we crashed between Phase 1 and Phase 2 of RefundOrder" case, operator-attention territory. New interfaces: * marketplace.HyperswitchReadClient — read-only PSP surface the worker depends on (GetPaymentStatus, GetRefundStatus). The worker never calls CreatePayment / CreateRefund. * hyperswitch.Client.GetRefund + RefundStatus struct added. * hyperswitch.Provider gains GetRefundStatus + GetPaymentStatus pass-throughs that satisfy the marketplace interface. Configuration (all env-var tunable with sensible defaults): * RECONCILE_WORKER_ENABLED=true * RECONCILE_INTERVAL=1h (ops can drop to 5m during incident response without a code change) * RECONCILE_ORDER_STUCK_AFTER=30m * RECONCILE_REFUND_STUCK_AFTER=30m * RECONCILE_REFUND_ORPHAN_AFTER=5m (shorter because "app crashed" is a different signal from "network hiccup") Operational details: * Batch limit 50 rows per phase per tick so a 10k-row backlog doesn't hammer Hyperswitch. Next tick picks up the rest. * PSP read errors leave the row untouched — next tick retries. Reconciliation is always safe to replay. * Structured log on every action so `grep reconcile` tells the ops story: which order/refund got synced, against what status, how long it was stuck. * Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go, gated on HyperswitchEnabled + HyperswitchAPIKey. Graceful shutdown registered. * RunOnce exposed as public API for ad-hoc ops trigger during incident response. Tests — 10 cases, all green (sqlite :memory:): * TestReconcile_StuckOrder_SyncsViaSyntheticWebhook * TestReconcile_RecentOrder_NotTouched * TestReconcile_CompletedOrder_NotTouched * TestReconcile_OrderWithEmptyPaymentID_NotTouched * TestReconcile_PSPReadErrorLeavesRowIntact * TestReconcile_OrphanRefund_AutoFails_OrderRollsBack * TestReconcile_RecentOrphanRefund_NotTouched * TestReconcile_StuckRefund_SyncsViaSyntheticWebhook * TestReconcile_StuckRefund_FailureStatus_PassesErrorMessage * TestReconcile_AllTerminalStates_NoOp CHANGELOG v1.0.7-rc1 updated with the full item C section between D and the existing E block, matching the order convention (ship order: A → D → B → E → C, CHANGELOG order follows). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 01:08:15 +00:00
// v1.0.7 item C: Reconciliation worker for stuck pending orders /
// refunds whose webhook never arrived. Gated on Hyperswitch being
// configured — without PSP read access there's nothing to sync
// against.
if cfg.ReconcileWorkerEnabled && cfg.HyperswitchEnabled && cfg.HyperswitchAPIKey != "" && cfg.HyperswitchURL != "" {
hsClient := hyperswitch.NewClient(cfg.HyperswitchURL, cfg.HyperswitchAPIKey)
hsProvider := hyperswitch.NewProvider(hsClient)
// Build a marketplace.Service for the dispatcher side. Scoped
// to the worker — the HTTP handler constructs its own via
// APIRouter.getMarketplaceService which wires additional opts
// (storage, checkout URL). Reconciler only needs the two
// Process*Webhook methods.
mktSvc := marketplace.NewService(db.GormDB, logger, nil,
marketplace.WithPaymentProvider(hsProvider),
marketplace.WithHyperswitchConfig(true, cfg.CheckoutSuccessURL),
)
reconcileWorker := marketplace.NewReconcileHyperswitchWorker(
db.GormDB, hsProvider, mktSvc, logger,
cfg.ReconcileInterval,
cfg.ReconcileOrderStuckAfter,
cfg.ReconcileRefundStuckAfter,
cfg.ReconcileRefundOrphanAfter,
)
reconcileCtx, reconcileCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go reconcileWorker.Start(reconcileCtx)
logger.Info("Reconcile Hyperswitch Worker started",
zap.Duration("interval", cfg.ReconcileInterval),
zap.Duration("order_stuck_after", cfg.ReconcileOrderStuckAfter),
zap.Duration("refund_stuck_after", cfg.ReconcileRefundStuckAfter),
zap.Duration("refund_orphan_after", cfg.ReconcileRefundOrphanAfter))
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("reconcile_hyperswitch_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
reconcileCancel()
return nil
}))
} else if cfg.ReconcileWorkerEnabled {
logger.Info("Reconcile worker skipped — Hyperswitch not enabled")
}
// v0.802: Start Cloud Backup Worker (copies cloud files to backup prefix every 24h)
if cfg.S3StorageService != nil {
backupWorker := services.NewCloudBackupWorker(db.GormDB, cfg.S3StorageService, logger)
backupCtx, backupCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go backupWorker.Start(backupCtx)
logger.Info("Cloud Backup Worker started (24h interval)")
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("cloud_backup_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
backupCancel()
return nil
}))
}
// v0.802: Start Gear Warranty Notifier (sends notifications when warranty expires in 30 days)
notificationService := services.NewNotificationService(db, logger)
warrantyNotifier := services.NewGearWarrantyNotifier(db.GormDB, notificationService, logger)
warrantyCtx, warrantyCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go warrantyNotifier.Start(warrantyCtx)
logger.Info("Gear Warranty Notifier started (24h interval)")
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("gear_warranty_notifier", func(ctx context.Context) error {
warrantyCancel()
return nil
}))
// v0.10.5 F552: Weekly notification digest (runs on Sunday)
if cfg.JobWorker != nil {
digestWorker := services.NewNotificationDigestWorker(db.GormDB, cfg.JobWorker, logger)
digestCtx, digestCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go digestWorker.Start(digestCtx)
logger.Info("Notification digest worker started (weekly on Sunday)")
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("notification_digest_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
digestCancel()
return nil
}))
}
// v0.10.8 F065: Hard delete worker (GDPR - final anonymization after 30 days)
if os.Getenv("HARD_DELETE_CRON_ENABLED") != "false" {
fix(backend): J4 — GDPR-compliant hard delete with Redis and ES cleanup Closes TODO(HIGH-007). When the hard-delete worker anonymizes a user past their recovery deadline, it now also cleans the user's residual data from Redis and Elasticsearch, not just PostgreSQL. Without this, a user who invoked their right to erasure would still appear in cached feed/profile responses and in ES search results for up to the next reindex cycle. Worker changes (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker.go): WithRedis / WithElasticsearch builder methods inject the clients. Both are optional: if either is nil (feature disabled or unreachable), the corresponding cleanup is skipped with a debug log and the worker keeps going. Partial progress beats panic. cleanRedisKeys uses SCAN with a cursor loop (COUNT 100), NEVER KEYS — KEYS would block the Redis server on multi-million-key deployments. Pattern is user:{id}:*. Transient SCAN errors retry up to 3 times with 100ms * retry linear backoff; persistent errors return without panic. DEL errors on a batch are logged but non-fatal so subsequent batches are still attempted. cleanESDocs hits three indices independently: - users index: DELETE doc by _id (the user UUID); 404 treated as success (already gone = desired state) - tracks index: DeleteByQuery with a terms filter on _id, using the list of track IDs collected from PostgreSQL BEFORE anonymization - playlists index: same pattern as tracks A failure on one index does not prevent the others from being tried; the first error is returned so the caller can log. Track/playlist IDs are pre-collected (collectTrackIDs, collectPlaylistIDs) before the UPDATE anonymization runs, because the anonymization does NOT cascade (no DELETE on users), so tracks and playlists rows remain with their creator_id / user_id intact and resolvable at query time. Wiring (cmd/api/main.go): The worker now receives cfg.RedisClient directly, and an optional ES client built from elasticsearch.LoadConfig() + NewClient. If ES is disabled or unreachable at startup, the worker logs a warning and proceeds with Redis-only cleanup. Tests (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker_test.go, +260 lines): Pure-function unit tests: - TestUUIDsToStrings - TestEsIndexNameFor Nil-client safety tests: - TestCleanRedisKeys_NilClientIsNoop - TestCleanESDocs_NilClientIsNoop ES mock-server tests (httptest.Server mimicking /_doc and /_delete_by_query endpoints with valid ES 8.11 responses): - TestCleanESDocs_CallsAllThreeIndices — verifies the three expected HTTP calls land with the right paths and request bodies containing the provided UUIDs - TestCleanESDocs_SkipsEmptyIDLists — verifies no DeleteByQuery is issued when the ID lists are empty Redis testcontainer integration test (gated by VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION): - TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration — seeds 154 keys (4 fixed + 150 bulk to force the SCAN loop past a single batch) plus 4 unrelated keys from another user / global, runs cleanRedisKeys, asserts all 154 own keys are gone and all 4 unrelated keys remain. Verification: go build ./... OK go vet ./... OK VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION=1 go test ./internal/workers/... short OK go test ./internal/workers/ -run TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration → testcontainers spins redis:7-alpine, test passes in 1.34s Out of J4 scope (noted for a follow-up): - No "activity" ES index exists in the codebase today (the audit plan mentioned it as a possible target). The three real indices with user data — users, tracks, playlists — are all now cleaned. - Track artist strings (free-form) may still contain the user's display name as a cached value in the tracks index after this cleanup. Actual user-owned tracks are deleted here, but if a third party's track referenced the removed user in its artist field, that reference is not touched. Strict RGPD on that edge case is a separate ticket. Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §8.5, §10 P5, §12 item 1
2026-04-15 10:25:39 +00:00
// Optional ES client for the worker's RGPD cleanup (users/tracks/playlists indices).
// Non-fatal if ES is disabled or unreachable — the worker will just skip ES cleanup.
var hardDeleteESClient *vezaes.Client
if esCfg := vezaes.LoadConfig(); esCfg.Enabled {
if esc, esErr := vezaes.NewClient(esCfg, logger); esErr != nil {
logger.Warn("Elasticsearch unavailable for hard delete worker, ES cleanup disabled",
zap.Error(esErr))
} else {
hardDeleteESClient = esc
}
}
hardDeleteWorker := workers.NewHardDeleteWorker(db.GormDB, logger, 24*time.Hour).
WithRedis(cfg.RedisClient).
WithElasticsearch(hardDeleteESClient)
hardDeleteCtx, hardDeleteCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go hardDeleteWorker.Start(hardDeleteCtx)
fix(backend): J4 — GDPR-compliant hard delete with Redis and ES cleanup Closes TODO(HIGH-007). When the hard-delete worker anonymizes a user past their recovery deadline, it now also cleans the user's residual data from Redis and Elasticsearch, not just PostgreSQL. Without this, a user who invoked their right to erasure would still appear in cached feed/profile responses and in ES search results for up to the next reindex cycle. Worker changes (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker.go): WithRedis / WithElasticsearch builder methods inject the clients. Both are optional: if either is nil (feature disabled or unreachable), the corresponding cleanup is skipped with a debug log and the worker keeps going. Partial progress beats panic. cleanRedisKeys uses SCAN with a cursor loop (COUNT 100), NEVER KEYS — KEYS would block the Redis server on multi-million-key deployments. Pattern is user:{id}:*. Transient SCAN errors retry up to 3 times with 100ms * retry linear backoff; persistent errors return without panic. DEL errors on a batch are logged but non-fatal so subsequent batches are still attempted. cleanESDocs hits three indices independently: - users index: DELETE doc by _id (the user UUID); 404 treated as success (already gone = desired state) - tracks index: DeleteByQuery with a terms filter on _id, using the list of track IDs collected from PostgreSQL BEFORE anonymization - playlists index: same pattern as tracks A failure on one index does not prevent the others from being tried; the first error is returned so the caller can log. Track/playlist IDs are pre-collected (collectTrackIDs, collectPlaylistIDs) before the UPDATE anonymization runs, because the anonymization does NOT cascade (no DELETE on users), so tracks and playlists rows remain with their creator_id / user_id intact and resolvable at query time. Wiring (cmd/api/main.go): The worker now receives cfg.RedisClient directly, and an optional ES client built from elasticsearch.LoadConfig() + NewClient. If ES is disabled or unreachable at startup, the worker logs a warning and proceeds with Redis-only cleanup. Tests (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker_test.go, +260 lines): Pure-function unit tests: - TestUUIDsToStrings - TestEsIndexNameFor Nil-client safety tests: - TestCleanRedisKeys_NilClientIsNoop - TestCleanESDocs_NilClientIsNoop ES mock-server tests (httptest.Server mimicking /_doc and /_delete_by_query endpoints with valid ES 8.11 responses): - TestCleanESDocs_CallsAllThreeIndices — verifies the three expected HTTP calls land with the right paths and request bodies containing the provided UUIDs - TestCleanESDocs_SkipsEmptyIDLists — verifies no DeleteByQuery is issued when the ID lists are empty Redis testcontainer integration test (gated by VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION): - TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration — seeds 154 keys (4 fixed + 150 bulk to force the SCAN loop past a single batch) plus 4 unrelated keys from another user / global, runs cleanRedisKeys, asserts all 154 own keys are gone and all 4 unrelated keys remain. Verification: go build ./... OK go vet ./... OK VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION=1 go test ./internal/workers/... short OK go test ./internal/workers/ -run TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration → testcontainers spins redis:7-alpine, test passes in 1.34s Out of J4 scope (noted for a follow-up): - No "activity" ES index exists in the codebase today (the audit plan mentioned it as a possible target). The three real indices with user data — users, tracks, playlists — are all now cleaned. - Track artist strings (free-form) may still contain the user's display name as a cached value in the tracks index after this cleanup. Actual user-owned tracks are deleted here, but if a third party's track referenced the removed user in its artist field, that reference is not touched. Strict RGPD on that edge case is a separate ticket. Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §8.5, §10 P5, §12 item 1
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logger.Info("Hard delete worker started (24h interval)",
zap.Bool("redis_cleanup", cfg.RedisClient != nil),
zap.Bool("es_cleanup", hardDeleteESClient != nil),
)
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("hard_delete_worker", func(ctx context.Context) error {
hardDeleteWorker.Stop()
hardDeleteCancel()
return nil
}))
} else {
logger.Info("Hard delete worker disabled (HARD_DELETE_CRON_ENABLED=false)")
}
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// Configuration du mode Gin
// Correction: Utilisation directe de la variable d'env car non exposée dans Config
appEnv := os.Getenv("APP_ENV")
if appEnv == "production" {
gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode)
} else {
gin.SetMode(gin.DebugMode)
}
// Créer le router Gin
router := gin.New()
fix(v0.12.6.1): remediate 2 CRITICAL + 10 HIGH + 1 MEDIUM pentest findings Security fixes implemented: CRITICAL: - CRIT-001: IDOR on chat rooms — added IsRoomMember check before returning room data or message history (returns 404, not 403) - CRIT-002: play_count/like_count exposed publicly — changed JSON tags to "-" so they are never serialized in API responses HIGH: - HIGH-001: TOCTOU race on marketplace downloads — transaction + SELECT FOR UPDATE on GetDownloadURL - HIGH-002: HS256 in production docker-compose — replaced JWT_SECRET with JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH (RS256) - HIGH-003: context.Background() bypass in user repository — full context propagation from handlers → services → repository (29 files) - HIGH-004: Race condition on promo codes — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-005: Race condition on exclusive licenses — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-006: Rate limiter IP spoofing — SetTrustedProxies(nil) default - HIGH-007: RGPD hard delete incomplete — added cleanup for sessions, settings, follows, notifications, audit_logs anonymization - HIGH-008: RTMP callback auth weak — fail-closed when unconfigured, header-only (no query param), constant-time compare - HIGH-009: Co-listening host hijack — UpdateHostState now takes *Conn and verifies IsHost before processing - HIGH-010: Moderator self-strike — added issuedBy != userID check MEDIUM: - MEDIUM-001: Recovery codes used math/rand — replaced with crypto/rand - MEDIUM-005: Stream token forgeable — resolved by HIGH-002 (RS256) Updated REMEDIATION_MATRIX: 14 findings marked ✅ CORRIGÉ. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 04:40:53 +00:00
// SECURITY(HIGH-006): Restrict trusted proxies to prevent IP spoofing via X-Forwarded-For.
// Default: trust nothing (c.ClientIP() returns RemoteAddr only).
// Set TRUSTED_PROXIES="10.0.0.1,10.0.0.2" if behind a known reverse proxy/load balancer.
router.SetTrustedProxies(nil)
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// Middleware globaux (Logger, Recovery) recommandés par ORIGIN
router.Use(gin.Logger(), gin.Recovery())
// Configuration des routes
apiRouter := api.NewAPIRouter(db, cfg) // Instantiate APIRouter
if err := apiRouter.Setup(router); err != nil {
logger.Error("Failed to setup API routes", zap.Error(err))
os.Exit(1)
}
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// v1.0.4: Hourly cleanup of tracks stuck in `processing` whose upload file
// vanished (crash, SIGKILL, disk wipe). Keeps the tracks table honest.
jobs.ScheduleOrphanTracksCleanup(db, logger)
feat(webhooks): persist raw hyperswitch payloads to audit log — v1.0.7 item E Every POST /webhooks/hyperswitch delivery now writes a row to `hyperswitch_webhook_log` regardless of signature-valid or processing outcome. Captures both legitimate deliveries and attack probes — a forensics query now has the actual bytes to read, not just a "webhook rejected" log line. Disputes (axis-1 P1.6) ride along: the log captures dispute.* events alongside payment and refund events, ready for when disputes get a handler. Table shape (migration 984): * payload TEXT — readable in psql, invalid UTF-8 replaced with empty (forensics value is in headers + ip + timing for those attacks, not the binary body). * signature_valid BOOLEAN + partial index for "show me attack attempts" being instantaneous. * processing_result TEXT — 'ok' / 'error: <msg>' / 'signature_invalid' / 'skipped'. Matches the P1.5 action semantic exactly. * source_ip, user_agent, request_id — forensics essentials. request_id is captured from Hyperswitch's X-Request-Id header when present, else a server-side UUID so every row correlates to VEZA's structured logs. * event_type — best-effort extract from the JSON payload, NULL on malformed input. Hardening: * 64KB body cap via io.LimitReader rejects oversize with 413 before any INSERT — prevents log-spam DoS. * Single INSERT per delivery with final state; no two-phase update race on signature-failure path. signature_invalid and processing-error rows both land. * DB persistence failures are logged but swallowed — the endpoint's contract is to ack Hyperswitch, not perfect audit. Retention sweep: * CleanupHyperswitchWebhookLog in internal/jobs, daily tick, batched DELETE (10k rows + 100ms pause) so a large backlog doesn't lock the table. * HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90). * Same goroutine-ticker pattern as ScheduleOrphanTracksCleanup. * Wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside the existing cleanup jobs. Tests: 5 in webhook_log_test.go (persistence, request_id auto-gen, invalid-JSON leaves event_type empty, invalid-signature capture, extractEventType 5 sub-cases) + 4 in cleanup_hyperswitch_webhook_ log_test.go (deletes-older-than, noop, default-on-zero, context-cancel). Migration 984 applied cleanly to local Postgres; all indexes present. Also (v107-plan.md): * Item G acceptance gains an explicit Idempotency-Key threading requirement with an empty-key loud-fail test — "literally copy-paste D's 4-line test skeleton". Closes the risk that item G silently reopens the HTTP-retry duplicate-charge exposure D closed. Out of scope for E (noted in CHANGELOG): * Rate limit on the endpoint — pre-existing middleware covers it at the router level; adding a per-endpoint limit is separate scope. * Readable-payload SQL view — deferred, the TEXT column is already human-readable; a convenience view is a nice-to-have not a ship-blocker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 00:44:58 +00:00
// v1.0.7 item E: daily sweep of hyperswitch_webhook_log rows older than
// HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90). Batched so a large
// backlog doesn't lock the table.
jobs.ScheduleHyperswitchWebhookLogCleanup(db, logger, cfg.HyperswitchWebhookLogRetentionDays)
feat(metrics): ledger-health gauges + alert rules — v1.0.7 item F Five Prometheus gauges + reconciler metrics + Grafana dashboard + three alert rules. Closes axis-1 P1.8 and adds observability for item C's reconciler (user review: "F should include reconciler_* metrics, otherwise tag is blind on the worker we just shipped"). Gauges (veza_ledger_, sampled every 60s): * orphan_refund_rows — THE canary. Pending refunds with empty hyperswitch_refund_id older than 5m = Phase 2 crash in RefundOrder. Alert: > 0 for 5m → page. * stuck_orders_pending — order pending > 30m with non-empty payment_id. Alert: > 0 for 10m → page. * stuck_refunds_pending — refund pending > 30m with hs_id. * failed_transfers_at_max_retry — permanently_failed rows. * reversal_pending_transfers — item B rows stuck > 30m. Reconciler metrics (veza_reconciler_): * actions_total{phase} — counter by phase. * orphan_refunds_total — two-phase-bug canary. * sweep_duration_seconds — exponential histogram. * last_run_timestamp — alert: stale > 2h → page (worker dead). Implementation notes: * Sampler thresholds hardcoded to match reconciler defaults — intentional mismatch allowed (alerts fire while reconciler already working = correct behavior). * Query error sets gauge to -1 (sentinel for "sampler broken"). * marketplace package routes through monitoring recorders so it doesn't import prometheus directly. * Sampler runs regardless of Hyperswitch enablement; gauges default 0 when pipeline idle. * Graceful shutdown wired in cmd/api/main.go. Alert rules in config/alertmanager/ledger.yml with runbook pointers + detailed descriptions — each alert explains WHAT happened, WHY the reconciler may not resolve it, and WHERE to look first. Grafana dashboard config/grafana/dashboards/ledger-health.json — top row = 5 stat panels (orphan first, color-coded red on > 0), middle row = trend timeseries + reconciler action rate by phase, bottom row = sweep duration p50/p95/p99 + seconds-since-last-tick + orphan cumulative. Tests — 6 cases, all green (sqlite :memory:): * CountsStuckOrdersPending (includes the filter on non-empty payment_id) * StuckOrdersZeroWhenAllCompleted * CountsOrphanRefunds (THE canary) * CountsStuckRefundsWithHsID (gauge-orthogonality check) * CountsFailedAndReversalPendingTransfers * ReconcilerRecorders (counter + gauge shape) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 01:40:14 +00:00
// v1.0.7 item F: 60s sampler feeds five ledger-health gauges +
// reconciler_* counters. Grafana dashboard in config/grafana/ledger.json,
// alert rules in config/alertmanager/ledger.yml.
ledgerSamplerCtx, ledgerSamplerCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
monitoring.ScheduleLedgerHealthSampler(ledgerSamplerCtx, db.GormDB, logger)
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("ledger_health_sampler", func(ctx context.Context) error {
ledgerSamplerCancel()
return nil
}))
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// Configuration du serveur HTTP
port := fmt.Sprintf("%d", cfg.AppPort)
if cfg.AppPort == 0 {
port = "8080"
}
server := &http.Server{
Addr: fmt.Sprintf(":%s", port),
Handler: router,
ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second, // Standards ORIGIN
WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
}
// BE-SVC-017: Enregistrer tous les services pour shutdown gracieux
// Enregistrer le serveur HTTP
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("http_server", func(ctx context.Context) error {
return server.Shutdown(ctx)
}))
// Enregistrer la configuration (ferme DB, Redis, RabbitMQ, etc.)
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("config", func(ctx context.Context) error {
return cfg.Close()
}))
// Enregistrer le logger pour flush final
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("logger", func(ctx context.Context) error {
if logger != nil {
return logger.Sync()
}
return nil
}))
// Enregistrer Sentry pour flush final
if cfg.SentryDsn != "" {
shutdownManager.Register(shutdown.NewShutdownFunc("sentry", func(ctx context.Context) error {
sentry.Flush(2 * time.Second)
return nil
}))
}
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// Gestion de l'arrêt gracieux
quit := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(quit, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
go func() {
logger.Info("🌐 Serveur HTTP démarré", zap.String("port", port))
if err := server.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
logger.Fatal("❌ Erreur du serveur HTTP", zap.Error(err))
}
}()
// Attendre le signal d'arrêt
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<-quit
logger.Info("🔄 Signal d'arrêt reçu, démarrage du shutdown gracieux...")
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// BE-SVC-017: Arrêt gracieux coordonné de tous les services
shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer shutdownCancel()
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if err := shutdownManager.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
logger.Error("❌ Erreur lors du shutdown gracieux", zap.Error(err))
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} else {
logger.Info("✅ Shutdown gracieux terminé avec succès")
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}
}