veza/docker-compose.prod.yml

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version: '3.8'
services:
# ============================================================================
# INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
# ============================================================================
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: veza_postgres
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: ${DB_USER:-veza}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASS:?DB_PASS must be set for production}
POSTGRES_DB: ${DB_NAME:-veza}
volumes:
- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${DB_USER:-veza}"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
networks:
- veza-network
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: '0.50'
memory: 256M
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
container_name: veza_redis
restart: unless-stopped
command: ["redis-server", "--requirepass", "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set for production}", "--appendonly", "yes"]
volumes:
- redis_data:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "-a", "${REDIS_PASSWORD}", "ping"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
networks:
- veza-network
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: '0.25'
memory: 64M
# SECURITY(MEDIUM-008): Use rabbitmq:3-alpine (no management UI) in production.
# Management UI exposes internal metrics/config and is unnecessary in prod.
rabbitmq:
image: rabbitmq:3-alpine
container_name: veza_rabbitmq
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_USER: ${DB_USER:-veza}
RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_PASS: ${RABBITMQ_PASS:?RABBITMQ_PASS must be set for production}
volumes:
- rabbitmq_data:/var/lib/rabbitmq
healthcheck:
test: rabbitmq-diagnostics -q ping
interval: 10s
timeout: 10s
retries: 5
networks:
- veza-network
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: '0.50'
memory: 256M
# SECURITY(MEDIUM-003): Pin ClamAV image to specific version instead of :latest
clamav:
image: clamav/clamav:1.4
container_name: veza_clamav
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "clamdscan", "--ping", "1"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 5
start_period: 180s
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: '0.5'
memory: 1G
# ============================================================================
# PAYMENT ROUTER (Hyperswitch)
# ============================================================================
hyperswitch_postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: veza_hyperswitch_postgres
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: ${HYPERSWITCH_DB_USER:-hyperswitch}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${HYPERSWITCH_DB_PASS:?HYPERSWITCH_DB_PASS must be set for production}
POSTGRES_DB: ${HYPERSWITCH_DB_NAME:-hyperswitch}
volumes:
- hyperswitch_postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${HYPERSWITCH_DB_USER:-hyperswitch}"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
networks:
- veza-network
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: "0.25"
memory: 128M
# SECURITY(LOW-002): Pin to specific Hyperswitch version. Check https://github.com/juspay/hyperswitch/releases for updates.
hyperswitch:
image: juspaydotin/hyperswitch-router:2026.03.11.0-standalone
container_name: veza_hyperswitch
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://${HYPERSWITCH_DB_USER:-hyperswitch}:${HYPERSWITCH_DB_PASS:?HYPERSWITCH_DB_PASS must be set}@hyperswitch_postgres:5432/${HYPERSWITCH_DB_NAME:-hyperswitch}?sslmode=require
REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379
depends_on:
hyperswitch_postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:8080/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: "0.5"
memory: 256M
# ============================================================================
# APPLICATION SERVICES - Blue-Green Deployment
# STACK_COLOR=blue|green. Use scripts/deploy-blue-green.sh to switch.
# ============================================================================
backend-api-blue:
build:
context: ./veza-backend-api
dockerfile: Dockerfile.production
image: veza-backend-api:latest
container_name: veza_backend_api_blue
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- APP_ENV=production
- STACK_COLOR=blue
- DATABASE_URL=postgres://${DB_USER:-veza}:${DB_PASS:?DB_PASS must be set}@postgres:5432/${DB_NAME:-veza}?sslmode=require
- REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set}@redis:6379
- AMQP_URL=amqp://${DB_USER:-veza}:${RABBITMQ_PASS:?RABBITMQ_PASS must be set}@rabbitmq:5672
fix(v0.12.6.1): remediate 2 CRITICAL + 10 HIGH + 1 MEDIUM pentest findings Security fixes implemented: CRITICAL: - CRIT-001: IDOR on chat rooms — added IsRoomMember check before returning room data or message history (returns 404, not 403) - CRIT-002: play_count/like_count exposed publicly — changed JSON tags to "-" so they are never serialized in API responses HIGH: - HIGH-001: TOCTOU race on marketplace downloads — transaction + SELECT FOR UPDATE on GetDownloadURL - HIGH-002: HS256 in production docker-compose — replaced JWT_SECRET with JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH (RS256) - HIGH-003: context.Background() bypass in user repository — full context propagation from handlers → services → repository (29 files) - HIGH-004: Race condition on promo codes — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-005: Race condition on exclusive licenses — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-006: Rate limiter IP spoofing — SetTrustedProxies(nil) default - HIGH-007: RGPD hard delete incomplete — added cleanup for sessions, settings, follows, notifications, audit_logs anonymization - HIGH-008: RTMP callback auth weak — fail-closed when unconfigured, header-only (no query param), constant-time compare - HIGH-009: Co-listening host hijack — UpdateHostState now takes *Conn and verifies IsHost before processing - HIGH-010: Moderator self-strike — added issuedBy != userID check MEDIUM: - MEDIUM-001: Recovery codes used math/rand — replaced with crypto/rand - MEDIUM-005: Stream token forgeable — resolved by HIGH-002 (RS256) Updated REMEDIATION_MATRIX: 14 findings marked ✅ CORRIGÉ. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 04:40:53 +00:00
# SECURITY(HIGH-002): Use RS256 asymmetric keys in production instead of HS256 shared secret.
# Generate: openssl genrsa -out jwt_private.pem 2048 && openssl rsa -in jwt_private.pem -pubout -out jwt_public.pem
- JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=${JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH:-/secrets/jwt_private.pem}
- JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH=${JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH:-/secrets/jwt_public.pem}
- COOKIE_SECURE=true
- COOKIE_SAME_SITE=strict
- COOKIE_HTTP_ONLY=true
- CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${CORS_ORIGINS:-http://veza.fr}
- HYPERSWITCH_URL=http://hyperswitch:8080
- HYPERSWITCH_API_KEY=${HYPERSWITCH_API_KEY:-}
- HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_SECRET=${HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_SECRET:-}
- HYPERSWITCH_ENABLED=${HYPERSWITCH_ENABLED:-false}
- HYPERSWITCH_LIVE_MODE=${HYPERSWITCH_LIVE_MODE:-false}
- CHECKOUT_SUCCESS_URL=${CHECKOUT_SUCCESS_URL:-https://veza.fr/purchases}
- ENABLE_CLAMAV=true
- CLAMAV_REQUIRED=true
- CLAMAV_ADDRESS=clamav:3310
- AWS_S3_ENDPOINT=http://minio:9000
- AWS_S3_BUCKET=veza-files
- AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=${S3_ACCESS_KEY:?S3_ACCESS_KEY must be set}
- AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=${S3_SECRET_KEY:?S3_SECRET_KEY must be set}
- AWS_REGION=${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}
# v1.0.10 polish: enable the S3 stack and route track uploads through
# MinIO end-to-end. Without these two flags, defaults (local +
# disabled) win and the AWS_S3_* credentials above are inert. With
# blue/green active/active behind HAProxy, local-disk uploads on
# one pod are invisible to the other — S3 is required for HA.
- AWS_S3_ENABLED=true
- TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND=s3
feat(infra): add coturn service + wire WEBRTC_TURN_* envs in compose WebRTC 1:1 calls were silently broken behind symmetric NAT (corporate firewalls, mobile CGNAT, Incus default networking) because no TURN relay was deployed. The /api/v1/config/webrtc endpoint and the useWebRTC frontend hook were both wired correctly from v1.0.9 Day 1, but with no TURN box on the network the handler returned STUN-only and the SPA's `nat.hasTurn` flag stayed false. Added : * docker-compose.prod.yml: new `coturn` service using the official coturn/coturn:4.6.2 image, network_mode: host (UDP relay range 49152-65535 doesn't survive Docker NAT), config passed entirely via CLI args so no template render is needed. TLS cert volume points at /etc/letsencrypt/live/turn.veza.fr by default; override with TURN_CERT_DIR for non-LE setups. Healthcheck uses nc -uz to catch crashed/unbound listeners. * Both backend services (blue + green): WEBRTC_STUN_URLS, WEBRTC_TURN_URLS, WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME, WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL pulled from env with `:?` strict-fail markers so a misconfigured deploy crashes loudly instead of degrading silently to STUN-only. * docker-compose.staging.yml: same 4 env vars but with safe fallback defaults (Google STUN, no TURN) so staging boots without a coturn box. Operators can flip to relay by setting the envs externally. Operator must set the following secrets at deploy time : WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP the host's public IP (used both by coturn --external-ip and by the backend STUN/TURN URLs the SPA receives) WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME static long-term credential username WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL static long-term credential password WEBRTC_TURN_REALM optional, defaults to turn.veza.fr Smoke test : turnutils_uclient -u $USER -w $CRED -p 3478 $PUBLIC_IP should return a relay allocation within ~1s. From the SPA, watch chrome://webrtc-internals during a call and confirm the selected candidate pair is `relay` when both peers are on symmetric NAT. The Ansible role under infra/coturn/ is the canonical Incus-native deploy path documented in infra/coturn/README.md; this compose service is the simpler single-host option that unblocks calls today. v1.1 will switch from static to ephemeral REST-shared-secret credentials per ORIGIN_SECURITY_FRAMEWORK.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 13:44:12 +00:00
# WebRTC ICE servers — populated from the coturn service above.
# Empty TURN vars degrade to STUN-only (calls work peer-to-peer
# but fail behind symmetric NAT); the all-or-nothing rule in
# webrtc_config_handler.go means partial config is rejected.
- WEBRTC_STUN_URLS=stun:${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP:?WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP must be set}:3478
- WEBRTC_TURN_URLS=turn:${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP}:3478,turns:${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP}:5349
- WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME=${WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME:?WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME must be set}
- WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL=${WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL:?WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL must be set}
- HLS_STREAMING=true
- HLS_STORAGE_DIR=/data/hls
volumes:
- hls_prod_data:/data/hls
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
rabbitmq:
condition: service_healthy
clamav:
condition: service_started
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
backend-api-green:
build:
context: ./veza-backend-api
dockerfile: Dockerfile.production
image: veza-backend-api:latest
container_name: veza_backend_api_green
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- APP_ENV=production
- STACK_COLOR=green
- DATABASE_URL=postgres://${DB_USER:-veza}:${DB_PASS:?DB_PASS must be set}@postgres:5432/${DB_NAME:-veza}?sslmode=require
- REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set}@redis:6379
- AMQP_URL=amqp://${DB_USER:-veza}:${RABBITMQ_PASS:?RABBITMQ_PASS must be set}@rabbitmq:5672
fix(v0.12.6.1): remediate 2 CRITICAL + 10 HIGH + 1 MEDIUM pentest findings Security fixes implemented: CRITICAL: - CRIT-001: IDOR on chat rooms — added IsRoomMember check before returning room data or message history (returns 404, not 403) - CRIT-002: play_count/like_count exposed publicly — changed JSON tags to "-" so they are never serialized in API responses HIGH: - HIGH-001: TOCTOU race on marketplace downloads — transaction + SELECT FOR UPDATE on GetDownloadURL - HIGH-002: HS256 in production docker-compose — replaced JWT_SECRET with JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH (RS256) - HIGH-003: context.Background() bypass in user repository — full context propagation from handlers → services → repository (29 files) - HIGH-004: Race condition on promo codes — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-005: Race condition on exclusive licenses — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-006: Rate limiter IP spoofing — SetTrustedProxies(nil) default - HIGH-007: RGPD hard delete incomplete — added cleanup for sessions, settings, follows, notifications, audit_logs anonymization - HIGH-008: RTMP callback auth weak — fail-closed when unconfigured, header-only (no query param), constant-time compare - HIGH-009: Co-listening host hijack — UpdateHostState now takes *Conn and verifies IsHost before processing - HIGH-010: Moderator self-strike — added issuedBy != userID check MEDIUM: - MEDIUM-001: Recovery codes used math/rand — replaced with crypto/rand - MEDIUM-005: Stream token forgeable — resolved by HIGH-002 (RS256) Updated REMEDIATION_MATRIX: 14 findings marked ✅ CORRIGÉ. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 04:40:53 +00:00
# SECURITY(HIGH-002): RS256 asymmetric keys for production
- JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=${JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH:-/secrets/jwt_private.pem}
- JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH=${JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH:-/secrets/jwt_public.pem}
- COOKIE_SECURE=true
- COOKIE_SAME_SITE=strict
- COOKIE_HTTP_ONLY=true
- CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${CORS_ORIGINS:-http://veza.fr}
- HYPERSWITCH_URL=http://hyperswitch:8080
- HYPERSWITCH_API_KEY=${HYPERSWITCH_API_KEY:-}
- HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_SECRET=${HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_SECRET:-}
- HYPERSWITCH_ENABLED=${HYPERSWITCH_ENABLED:-false}
- HYPERSWITCH_LIVE_MODE=${HYPERSWITCH_LIVE_MODE:-false}
- CHECKOUT_SUCCESS_URL=${CHECKOUT_SUCCESS_URL:-https://veza.fr/purchases}
- ENABLE_CLAMAV=true
- CLAMAV_REQUIRED=true
- CLAMAV_ADDRESS=clamav:3310
- AWS_S3_ENDPOINT=http://minio:9000
- AWS_S3_BUCKET=veza-files
- AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=${S3_ACCESS_KEY:?S3_ACCESS_KEY must be set}
- AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=${S3_SECRET_KEY:?S3_SECRET_KEY must be set}
- AWS_REGION=${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}
# v1.0.10 polish: enable the S3 stack and route track uploads through
# MinIO end-to-end. Without these two flags, defaults (local +
# disabled) win and the AWS_S3_* credentials above are inert. With
# blue/green active/active behind HAProxy, local-disk uploads on
# one pod are invisible to the other — S3 is required for HA.
- AWS_S3_ENABLED=true
- TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND=s3
feat(infra): add coturn service + wire WEBRTC_TURN_* envs in compose WebRTC 1:1 calls were silently broken behind symmetric NAT (corporate firewalls, mobile CGNAT, Incus default networking) because no TURN relay was deployed. The /api/v1/config/webrtc endpoint and the useWebRTC frontend hook were both wired correctly from v1.0.9 Day 1, but with no TURN box on the network the handler returned STUN-only and the SPA's `nat.hasTurn` flag stayed false. Added : * docker-compose.prod.yml: new `coturn` service using the official coturn/coturn:4.6.2 image, network_mode: host (UDP relay range 49152-65535 doesn't survive Docker NAT), config passed entirely via CLI args so no template render is needed. TLS cert volume points at /etc/letsencrypt/live/turn.veza.fr by default; override with TURN_CERT_DIR for non-LE setups. Healthcheck uses nc -uz to catch crashed/unbound listeners. * Both backend services (blue + green): WEBRTC_STUN_URLS, WEBRTC_TURN_URLS, WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME, WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL pulled from env with `:?` strict-fail markers so a misconfigured deploy crashes loudly instead of degrading silently to STUN-only. * docker-compose.staging.yml: same 4 env vars but with safe fallback defaults (Google STUN, no TURN) so staging boots without a coturn box. Operators can flip to relay by setting the envs externally. Operator must set the following secrets at deploy time : WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP the host's public IP (used both by coturn --external-ip and by the backend STUN/TURN URLs the SPA receives) WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME static long-term credential username WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL static long-term credential password WEBRTC_TURN_REALM optional, defaults to turn.veza.fr Smoke test : turnutils_uclient -u $USER -w $CRED -p 3478 $PUBLIC_IP should return a relay allocation within ~1s. From the SPA, watch chrome://webrtc-internals during a call and confirm the selected candidate pair is `relay` when both peers are on symmetric NAT. The Ansible role under infra/coturn/ is the canonical Incus-native deploy path documented in infra/coturn/README.md; this compose service is the simpler single-host option that unblocks calls today. v1.1 will switch from static to ephemeral REST-shared-secret credentials per ORIGIN_SECURITY_FRAMEWORK.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 13:44:12 +00:00
# WebRTC ICE servers — populated from the coturn service above.
# Empty TURN vars degrade to STUN-only (calls work peer-to-peer
# but fail behind symmetric NAT); the all-or-nothing rule in
# webrtc_config_handler.go means partial config is rejected.
- WEBRTC_STUN_URLS=stun:${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP:?WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP must be set}:3478
- WEBRTC_TURN_URLS=turn:${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP}:3478,turns:${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP}:5349
- WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME=${WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME:?WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME must be set}
- WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL=${WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL:?WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL must be set}
- HLS_STREAMING=true
- HLS_STORAGE_DIR=/data/hls
volumes:
- hls_prod_data:/data/hls
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
rabbitmq:
condition: service_healthy
clamav:
condition: service_started
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
stream-server-blue:
build:
context: ./veza-stream-server
dockerfile: Dockerfile.production
image: veza-stream-server:latest
container_name: veza_stream_server_blue
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- DATABASE_URL=postgres://${DB_USER:-veza}:${DB_PASS:?DB_PASS must be set}@postgres:5432/${DB_NAME:-veza}?sslmode=require
- REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set}@redis:6379
fix(v0.12.6.1): remediate 2 CRITICAL + 10 HIGH + 1 MEDIUM pentest findings Security fixes implemented: CRITICAL: - CRIT-001: IDOR on chat rooms — added IsRoomMember check before returning room data or message history (returns 404, not 403) - CRIT-002: play_count/like_count exposed publicly — changed JSON tags to "-" so they are never serialized in API responses HIGH: - HIGH-001: TOCTOU race on marketplace downloads — transaction + SELECT FOR UPDATE on GetDownloadURL - HIGH-002: HS256 in production docker-compose — replaced JWT_SECRET with JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH (RS256) - HIGH-003: context.Background() bypass in user repository — full context propagation from handlers → services → repository (29 files) - HIGH-004: Race condition on promo codes — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-005: Race condition on exclusive licenses — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-006: Rate limiter IP spoofing — SetTrustedProxies(nil) default - HIGH-007: RGPD hard delete incomplete — added cleanup for sessions, settings, follows, notifications, audit_logs anonymization - HIGH-008: RTMP callback auth weak — fail-closed when unconfigured, header-only (no query param), constant-time compare - HIGH-009: Co-listening host hijack — UpdateHostState now takes *Conn and verifies IsHost before processing - HIGH-010: Moderator self-strike — added issuedBy != userID check MEDIUM: - MEDIUM-001: Recovery codes used math/rand — replaced with crypto/rand - MEDIUM-005: Stream token forgeable — resolved by HIGH-002 (RS256) Updated REMEDIATION_MATRIX: 14 findings marked ✅ CORRIGÉ. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 04:40:53 +00:00
# SECURITY(HIGH-002): Stream server uses public key only (verification)
- JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH=${JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH:-/secrets/jwt_public.pem}
- PORT=3001
- HLS_OUTPUT_DIR=/data/hls
volumes:
- hls_prod_data:/data/hls
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:3001/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
stream-server-green:
build:
context: ./veza-stream-server
dockerfile: Dockerfile.production
image: veza-stream-server:latest
container_name: veza_stream_server_green
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- DATABASE_URL=postgres://${DB_USER:-veza}:${DB_PASS:?DB_PASS must be set}@postgres:5432/${DB_NAME:-veza}?sslmode=require
- REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set}@redis:6379
fix(v0.12.6.1): remediate 2 CRITICAL + 10 HIGH + 1 MEDIUM pentest findings Security fixes implemented: CRITICAL: - CRIT-001: IDOR on chat rooms — added IsRoomMember check before returning room data or message history (returns 404, not 403) - CRIT-002: play_count/like_count exposed publicly — changed JSON tags to "-" so they are never serialized in API responses HIGH: - HIGH-001: TOCTOU race on marketplace downloads — transaction + SELECT FOR UPDATE on GetDownloadURL - HIGH-002: HS256 in production docker-compose — replaced JWT_SECRET with JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH (RS256) - HIGH-003: context.Background() bypass in user repository — full context propagation from handlers → services → repository (29 files) - HIGH-004: Race condition on promo codes — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-005: Race condition on exclusive licenses — SELECT FOR UPDATE - HIGH-006: Rate limiter IP spoofing — SetTrustedProxies(nil) default - HIGH-007: RGPD hard delete incomplete — added cleanup for sessions, settings, follows, notifications, audit_logs anonymization - HIGH-008: RTMP callback auth weak — fail-closed when unconfigured, header-only (no query param), constant-time compare - HIGH-009: Co-listening host hijack — UpdateHostState now takes *Conn and verifies IsHost before processing - HIGH-010: Moderator self-strike — added issuedBy != userID check MEDIUM: - MEDIUM-001: Recovery codes used math/rand — replaced with crypto/rand - MEDIUM-005: Stream token forgeable — resolved by HIGH-002 (RS256) Updated REMEDIATION_MATRIX: 14 findings marked ✅ CORRIGÉ. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 04:40:53 +00:00
# SECURITY(HIGH-002): Stream server uses public key only (verification)
- JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH=${JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH:-/secrets/jwt_public.pem}
- PORT=3001
- HLS_OUTPUT_DIR=/data/hls
volumes:
- hls_prod_data:/data/hls
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:3001/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
minio:
image: minio/minio:RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z
container_name: veza_minio
restart: unless-stopped
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
environment:
MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${S3_ACCESS_KEY:?S3_ACCESS_KEY must be set}
MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${S3_SECRET_KEY:?S3_SECRET_KEY must be set}
volumes:
- minio_data:/data
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "mc", "ready", "local"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
minio-init:
image: minio/mc:RELEASE.2025-09-07T05-25-40Z
depends_on:
minio:
condition: service_healthy
entrypoint: >
/bin/sh -c "
mc alias set veza http://minio:9000 $${MINIO_ROOT_USER} $${MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD};
mc mb --ignore-existing veza/veza-files;
exit 0;
"
environment:
MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${S3_ACCESS_KEY:?S3_ACCESS_KEY must be set}
MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${S3_SECRET_KEY:?S3_SECRET_KEY must be set}
networks:
- veza-network
# ============================================================================
feat(infra): add coturn service + wire WEBRTC_TURN_* envs in compose WebRTC 1:1 calls were silently broken behind symmetric NAT (corporate firewalls, mobile CGNAT, Incus default networking) because no TURN relay was deployed. The /api/v1/config/webrtc endpoint and the useWebRTC frontend hook were both wired correctly from v1.0.9 Day 1, but with no TURN box on the network the handler returned STUN-only and the SPA's `nat.hasTurn` flag stayed false. Added : * docker-compose.prod.yml: new `coturn` service using the official coturn/coturn:4.6.2 image, network_mode: host (UDP relay range 49152-65535 doesn't survive Docker NAT), config passed entirely via CLI args so no template render is needed. TLS cert volume points at /etc/letsencrypt/live/turn.veza.fr by default; override with TURN_CERT_DIR for non-LE setups. Healthcheck uses nc -uz to catch crashed/unbound listeners. * Both backend services (blue + green): WEBRTC_STUN_URLS, WEBRTC_TURN_URLS, WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME, WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL pulled from env with `:?` strict-fail markers so a misconfigured deploy crashes loudly instead of degrading silently to STUN-only. * docker-compose.staging.yml: same 4 env vars but with safe fallback defaults (Google STUN, no TURN) so staging boots without a coturn box. Operators can flip to relay by setting the envs externally. Operator must set the following secrets at deploy time : WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP the host's public IP (used both by coturn --external-ip and by the backend STUN/TURN URLs the SPA receives) WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME static long-term credential username WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL static long-term credential password WEBRTC_TURN_REALM optional, defaults to turn.veza.fr Smoke test : turnutils_uclient -u $USER -w $CRED -p 3478 $PUBLIC_IP should return a relay allocation within ~1s. From the SPA, watch chrome://webrtc-internals during a call and confirm the selected candidate pair is `relay` when both peers are on symmetric NAT. The Ansible role under infra/coturn/ is the canonical Incus-native deploy path documented in infra/coturn/README.md; this compose service is the simpler single-host option that unblocks calls today. v1.1 will switch from static to ephemeral REST-shared-secret credentials per ORIGIN_SECURITY_FRAMEWORK.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 13:44:12 +00:00
# COTURN — TURN/STUN relay for WebRTC NAT traversal (v1.0.10 polish)
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Calls (1:1 audio/video) signal through chat WebSocket but the actual
# media stream needs a relay when both peers are behind symmetric NAT.
# Without this service, every call between users on corporate firewalls,
# mobile CGNAT or Incus default networking will silently fail with
# iceConnectionState=failed after ~30s.
#
# network_mode: host is REQUIRED — coturn allocates UDP ports in the
# 49152-65535 range for media relay, and Docker's NAT layer drops them.
# Host networking exposes the host's public IP directly, which is what
# WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP must point at (so coturn advertises the right
# candidate to remote peers).
#
# The infra/coturn/README.md describes a parallel Incus-native deploy
# path; this compose service is the simpler dev/single-host option.
# If you run prod on multiple hosts behind a load balancer, prefer the
# Ansible/Incus path so coturn lives on a host with a stable public IP.
# ============================================================================
coturn:
image: coturn/coturn:4.6.2
container_name: veza_coturn
restart: unless-stopped
network_mode: host
command:
- "-n"
- "--listening-port=3478"
- "--tls-listening-port=5349"
- "--external-ip=${WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP:?WEBRTC_TURN_PUBLIC_IP must be set (the public IP coturn advertises to peers)}"
- "--realm=${WEBRTC_TURN_REALM:-turn.veza.fr}"
- "--lt-cred-mech"
- "--user=${WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME:?WEBRTC_TURN_USERNAME must be set}:${WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL:?WEBRTC_TURN_CREDENTIAL must be set}"
- "--min-port=49152"
- "--max-port=65535"
- "--no-cli"
- "--no-tlsv1"
- "--no-tlsv1_1"
- "--cert=/etc/coturn/cert.pem"
- "--pkey=/etc/coturn/key.pem"
volumes:
# Map the TLS cert dir read-only. Default points at a Let's Encrypt
# rotation managed outside this compose (certbot on the host or
# similar). Override TURN_CERT_DIR for self-signed dev certs.
- ${TURN_CERT_DIR:-/etc/letsencrypt/live/turn.veza.fr}:/etc/coturn:ro
healthcheck:
# nc -uz checks UDP/3478 is bound; doesn't validate auth but catches
# crashes / cert-load failures cleanly.
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "nc -zu localhost 3478 || exit 1"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
# ============================================================================
# MONITORING - Alertmanager
# Set SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL for Slack notifications. Works with Prometheus.
# ============================================================================
alertmanager:
image: prom/alertmanager:v0.26.0
container_name: veza_alertmanager
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "9093:9093"
volumes:
- ./config/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml:/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml:ro
command:
- '--config.file=/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml'
- '--storage.path=/alertmanager'
environment:
- SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL=${SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL:-}
networks:
- veza-network
web-blue:
build:
context: ./apps/web
dockerfile: Dockerfile.production
image: veza-web:latest
container_name: veza_web_blue
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- VITE_API_URL=http://haproxy/api/v1
- VITE_STREAM_URL=ws://haproxy/stream
- VITE_UPLOAD_URL=http://haproxy/api/v1/uploads
depends_on:
- backend-api-blue
- stream-server-blue
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:5173"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
web-green:
build:
context: ./apps/web
dockerfile: Dockerfile.production
image: veza-web:latest
container_name: veza_web_green
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- VITE_API_URL=http://haproxy/api/v1
- VITE_STREAM_URL=ws://haproxy/stream
- VITE_UPLOAD_URL=http://haproxy/api/v1/uploads
depends_on:
- backend-api-green
- stream-server-green
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--quiet", "--tries=1", "--spider", "http://localhost:5173"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
# ============================================================================
# REVERSE PROXY - HAProxy (Blue-Green)
# ============================================================================
haproxy:
image: haproxy:2.8-alpine
container_name: veza_haproxy
restart: unless-stopped
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: '0.5'
memory: 128M
ports:
- "${PORT_HAPROXY:-80}:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- ./config/haproxy/haproxy.cfg:/usr/local/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg:ro
- ./config/ssl:/etc/ssl/veza:ro
depends_on:
- backend-api-blue
- backend-api-green
- stream-server-blue
- stream-server-green
- web-blue
- web-green
networks:
- veza-network
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "haproxy", "-c", "-f", "/usr/local/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
networks:
veza-network:
driver: bridge
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 172.20.0.0/16
volumes:
postgres_data:
redis_data:
rabbitmq_data:
hyperswitch_postgres_data:
minio_data:
hls_prod_data: