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22 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
senke
5530267287 feat(workers): hourly cleanup of orphan tracks stuck in processing
Upload flow: POST creates a track row with `status=processing` and
writes the file at `file_path`. If the uploader process dies (OOM,
SIGKILL during deploy, disk wipe) between row-create and status-update,
the row stays in `processing` forever with a `file_path` that doesn't
exist. The library UI shows a ghost track the user can never play,
never reach, and only partially delete.

New worker:

  * `jobs/cleanup_orphan_tracks.go` — `CleanupOrphanTracks` queries
    tracks with `status=processing AND created_at < NOW()-1h`, stats
    the `file_path`, and flips the row to `status=failed` with
    `status_message = "orphan cleanup: file missing on disk after >1h
    in processing"`. Never deletes; never touches present files or
    rows already in another state. Safe to run repeatedly.
  * `ScheduleOrphanTracksCleanup(db, logger)` runs once at boot and
    then every hour thereafter. Wired in `cmd/api/main.go` right after
    route setup so restarts trigger an immediate scan.
  * Threshold exported as `OrphanTrackAgeThreshold` constant so tests
    and future tuning don't need to edit the worker.

Tests: 5 cases in `cleanup_orphan_tracks_test.go`:
  - `_FlipsStuckMissingFile` happy path
  - `_LeavesFilePresent` (slow uploads must not be failed)
  - `_LeavesRecent` (below threshold)
  - `_IgnoresAlreadyFailed` (idempotent)
  - `_NilDatabaseIsNoop` (safety)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 14:57:24 +02:00
senke
ebb28c77a0 fix(backend): J4 — GDPR-compliant hard delete with Redis and ES cleanup
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Closes TODO(HIGH-007). When the hard-delete worker anonymizes a user past
their recovery deadline, it now also cleans the user's residual data from
Redis and Elasticsearch, not just PostgreSQL. Without this, a user who
invoked their right to erasure would still appear in cached feed/profile
responses and in ES search results for up to the next reindex cycle.

Worker changes (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker.go):

  WithRedis / WithElasticsearch builder methods inject the clients. Both
  are optional: if either is nil (feature disabled or unreachable), the
  corresponding cleanup is skipped with a debug log and the worker keeps
  going. Partial progress beats panic.

  cleanRedisKeys uses SCAN with a cursor loop (COUNT 100), NEVER KEYS —
  KEYS would block the Redis server on multi-million-key deployments.
  Pattern is user:{id}:*. Transient SCAN errors retry up to 3 times with
  100ms * retry linear backoff; persistent errors return without panic.
  DEL errors on a batch are logged but non-fatal so subsequent batches
  are still attempted.

  cleanESDocs hits three indices independently:
    - users index: DELETE doc by _id (the user UUID); 404 treated as
      success (already gone = desired state)
    - tracks index: DeleteByQuery with a terms filter on _id, using the
      list of track IDs collected from PostgreSQL BEFORE anonymization
    - playlists index: same pattern as tracks
  A failure on one index does not prevent the others from being tried;
  the first error is returned so the caller can log.

  Track/playlist IDs are pre-collected (collectTrackIDs, collectPlaylistIDs)
  before the UPDATE anonymization runs, because the anonymization does NOT
  cascade (no DELETE on users), so tracks and playlists rows remain with
  their creator_id / user_id intact and resolvable at query time.

Wiring (cmd/api/main.go):

  The worker now receives cfg.RedisClient directly, and an optional ES
  client built from elasticsearch.LoadConfig() + NewClient. If ES is
  disabled or unreachable at startup, the worker logs a warning and
  proceeds with Redis-only cleanup.

Tests (internal/workers/hard_delete_worker_test.go, +260 lines):

  Pure-function unit tests:
    - TestUUIDsToStrings
    - TestEsIndexNameFor
  Nil-client safety tests:
    - TestCleanRedisKeys_NilClientIsNoop
    - TestCleanESDocs_NilClientIsNoop
  ES mock-server tests (httptest.Server mimicking /_doc and
  /_delete_by_query endpoints with valid ES 8.11 responses):
    - TestCleanESDocs_CallsAllThreeIndices — verifies the three expected
      HTTP calls land with the right paths and request bodies containing
      the provided UUIDs
    - TestCleanESDocs_SkipsEmptyIDLists — verifies no DeleteByQuery is
      issued when the ID lists are empty
  Redis testcontainer integration test (gated by VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION):
    - TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration — seeds 154 keys (4 fixed + 150 bulk
      to force the SCAN loop past a single batch) plus 4 unrelated keys
      from another user / global, runs cleanRedisKeys, asserts all 154
      own keys are gone and all 4 unrelated keys remain.

Verification:
  go build ./...                                                OK
  go vet ./...                                                  OK
  VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION=1 go test ./internal/workers/... short  OK
  go test ./internal/workers/ -run TestCleanRedisKeys_Integration
    → testcontainers spins redis:7-alpine, test passes in 1.34s

Out of J4 scope (noted for a follow-up):
  - No "activity" ES index exists in the codebase today (the audit plan
    mentioned it as a possible target). The three real indices with user
    data — users, tracks, playlists — are all now cleaned.
  - Track artist strings (free-form) may still contain the user's
    display name as a cached value in the tracks index after this
    cleanup. Actual user-owned tracks are deleted here, but if a third
    party's track referenced the removed user in its artist field, that
    reference is not touched. Strict RGPD on that edge case is a
    separate ticket.

Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §8.5, §10 P5, §12 item 1
2026-04-15 12:25:39 +02:00
senke
24af2f72bc ci: bump Go to 1.25 and fix goimports drift in 3 files
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golangci-lint v2.11.4 requires Go >= 1.25. With the workflow on 1.24,
setup-go would silently trigger an in-job auto-toolchain download
(observed in run #71: 'go: github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2@v2.11.4
requires go >= 1.25.0; switching to go1.25.9') adding ~3 min to every
Backend (Go) run.

Bump setup-go to 1.25 in ci.yml, backend-ci.yml, go-fuzz.yml so the
prebuilt Go is already the right version.

Also lint-fix three files that golangci-lint's goimports checker
flagged — goimports sorts/groups imports and removes unused ones,
which plain gofmt leaves alone:
  - veza-backend-api/cmd/api/main.go
  - veza-backend-api/internal/api/handlers/chat_handlers.go
  - veza-backend-api/internal/handlers/auth_integration_test.go
2026-04-14 17:02:09 +02:00
senke
7b2f873736 feat: backend, stream server & infra improvements
Backend (Go):
- Config: CORS, RabbitMQ, rate limit, main config updates
- Routes: core, distribution, tracks routing changes
- Middleware: rate limiter, endpoint limiter, response cache hardening
- Handlers: distribution, search handler fixes
- Workers: job worker improvements
- Upload validator and logging config additions
- New migrations: products, orders, performance indexes
- Seed tooling and data

Stream Server (Rust):
- Audio processing, config, routes, simple stream server updates
- Dockerfile improvements

Infrastructure:
- docker-compose.yml updates
- nginx-rtmp config changes
- Makefile improvements (config, dev, high, infra)
- Root package.json and lock file updates
- .env.example updates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 11:36:06 +01:00
senke
249fd99730 fix(v0.12.6): apply all pentest remediations — 36 findings across 36 files
CRITICAL fixes:
- Race condition (TOCTOU) in payout/refund with SELECT FOR UPDATE (CRITICAL-001/002)
- IDOR on analytics endpoint — ownership check enforced (CRITICAL-003)
- CSWSH on all WebSocket endpoints — origin whitelist (CRITICAL-004)
- Mass assignment on user self-update — strip privileged fields (CRITICAL-005)

HIGH fixes:
- Path traversal in marketplace upload — UUID filenames (HIGH-001)
- IP spoofing — use Gin trusted proxy c.ClientIP() (HIGH-002)
- Popularity metrics (followers, likes) set to json:"-" (HIGH-003)
- bcrypt cost hardened to 12 everywhere (HIGH-004)
- Refresh token lock made mandatory (HIGH-005)
- Stream token replay prevention with access_count (HIGH-006)
- Subscription trial race condition fixed (HIGH-007)
- License download expiration check (HIGH-008)
- Webhook amount validation (HIGH-009)
- pprof endpoint removed from production (HIGH-010)

MEDIUM fixes:
- WebSocket message size limit 64KB (MEDIUM-010)
- HSTS header in nginx production (MEDIUM-001)
- CORS origin restricted in nginx-rtmp (MEDIUM-002)
- Docker alpine pinned to 3.21 (MEDIUM-003/004)
- Redis authentication enforced (MEDIUM-005)
- GDPR account deletion expanded (MEDIUM-006)
- .gitignore hardened (MEDIUM-007)

LOW/INFO fixes:
- GitHub Actions SHA pinning on all workflows (LOW-001)
- .env.example security documentation (INFO-001)
- Production CORS set to HTTPS (LOW-002)

All tests pass. Go and Rust compile clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-14 00:44:46 +01:00
senke
99d609bfae feat(v0.12.8): documentation & API publique — rate limiting, scopes, OpenAPI
- API key rate limiting middleware (1000 reads/h, 200 writes/h par clé)
  — tracking séparé read/write, par API key ID (pas par IP)
  — headers X-RateLimit-Limit/Remaining/Reset sur chaque réponse
- API key scope enforcement middleware (read → GET, write → POST/PUT/DELETE)
  — admin scope permet tout, CSRF skip pour API key auth
- OpenAPI spec: ajout securityDefinition ApiKeyAuth (X-API-Key header)
- Swagger annotations: ajout ApiKeyAuth dans cmd/api/main.go
- Wiring dans router.go: middlewares appliqués sur tout le groupe /api/v1
- Tests: 10 tests (5 rate limiter + 5 scope enforcement), tous PASS

Backend existant déjà en place (pré-v0.12.8):
- Swagger UI (gin-swagger + frontend SwaggerUIDoc component)
- API key CRUD (create/list/delete + X-API-Key auth dans AuthMiddleware)
- Developer Dashboard frontend (API keys, webhooks, playground)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 18:44:09 +01:00
senke
71c15c2590 fix(v0.12.6.1): remediate 2 CRITICAL + 10 HIGH + 1 MEDIUM pentest findings
Security fixes implemented:

CRITICAL:
- CRIT-001: IDOR on chat rooms — added IsRoomMember check before
  returning room data or message history (returns 404, not 403)
- CRIT-002: play_count/like_count exposed publicly — changed JSON
  tags to "-" so they are never serialized in API responses

HIGH:
- HIGH-001: TOCTOU race on marketplace downloads — transaction +
  SELECT FOR UPDATE on GetDownloadURL
- HIGH-002: HS256 in production docker-compose — replaced JWT_SECRET
  with JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH (RS256)
- HIGH-003: context.Background() bypass in user repository — full
  context propagation from handlers → services → repository (29 files)
- HIGH-004: Race condition on promo codes — SELECT FOR UPDATE
- HIGH-005: Race condition on exclusive licenses — SELECT FOR UPDATE
- HIGH-006: Rate limiter IP spoofing — SetTrustedProxies(nil) default
- HIGH-007: RGPD hard delete incomplete — added cleanup for sessions,
  settings, follows, notifications, audit_logs anonymization
- HIGH-008: RTMP callback auth weak — fail-closed when unconfigured,
  header-only (no query param), constant-time compare
- HIGH-009: Co-listening host hijack — UpdateHostState now takes *Conn
  and verifies IsHost before processing
- HIGH-010: Moderator self-strike — added issuedBy != userID check

MEDIUM:
- MEDIUM-001: Recovery codes used math/rand — replaced with crypto/rand
- MEDIUM-005: Stream token forgeable — resolved by HIGH-002 (RS256)

Updated REMEDIATION_MATRIX: 14 findings marked  CORRIGÉ.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 05:40:53 +01:00
senke
f2881ad865 feat(gdpr): v0.10.8 portabilité données - export ZIP async, suppression compte, hard delete cron
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- Export: table data_exports, POST /me/export (202), GET /me/exports, messages+playback_history
- Notification email quand ZIP prêt, rate limit 3/jour
- Suppression: keep_public_tracks, anonymisation PII complète (users, user_profiles)
- HardDeleteWorker: final anonymization après 30 jours
- Frontend: POST export, checkbox keep_public_tracks
- MSW handlers pour Storybook
2026-03-10 13:57:04 +01:00
senke
c2b3a68fd5 feat(v0.10.5): Notifications complètes — F551-F555
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F555: Backend pagination/filter GetNotifications (type, page, limit) + frontend pagination
F551: WebSocket real-time — backend inject chat hub, send on CreateNotification; frontend useChat invalidates
F553: Quiet hours — migration 132, CreateNotification skips push/WS, UI in PushPreferencesSection
F554: Notification grouping — migration 133, group_key/actor_count for like/comment, UI format
F552: Weekly digest — migration 134, NotificationDigestWorker, email template, prefs UI

Acceptance: no gamification notif; defaults unchanged; individual toggles for marketing
2026-03-10 10:02:21 +01:00
senke
a3624ce4b3 feat(v0.802): frontend Cloud/Gear, MSW, docs, scope v0.803, archive
- Cloud: CloudFileVersions, CloudShareModal, versions/share in CloudView
- Gear: GearDocumentsTab, GearRepairsTab, warranty badge, initialTab
- MSW: cloud versions/share, gear documents/repairs, tags suggest
- Stories: CloudFileVersions, CloudShareModal, GearDetailModal variants
- gearService: listDocuments, uploadDocument, deleteDocument, listRepairs, createRepair, deleteRepair
- cloudService: listVersions, restoreVersion, shareFile, getSharedFile
- gear_warranty_notifier: 24h ticker, notifications for expiring warranty
- tag_handler_test: unit tests
- docs: API_REFERENCE, CHANGELOG, PROJECT_STATE, FEATURE_STATUS v0.802
- SCOPE_CONTROL, .cursorrules: scope v0.803
- archive: V0_802_RELEASE_SCOPE, RETROSPECTIVE_V0802
2026-02-25 14:00:58 +01:00
senke
e303e33dfc feat(cloud): GDPR data export and automatic backup cron 2026-02-25 13:35:16 +01:00
senke
1b66260c22 feat(server): start TransferRetryWorker on boot (v0.701) 2026-02-23 23:32:23 +01:00
senke
8ab391dd73 fix(backend): replace panic/Fatal with graceful error when Redis down (audit 1.4, P0)
- Add early validation in Setup() returning error if Redis nil in production
- Remove panic/Fatal from routes_core.go and router.go applyCSRFProtection
- Handle Setup() error in cmd/api/main.go and cmd/modern-server/main.go
- Mark audit item 1.4 as done
2026-02-15 14:05:20 +01:00
senke
1ed6e7f07b state-ownership: delete unused optimisticStoreUpdates.ts file
- Deleted apps/web/src/utils/optimisticStoreUpdates.ts (unused file)
- File was unused - no imports found in codebase
- Mutations already use React Query's onMutate pattern
- No TypeScript errors after deletion
- Actions 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.1.3 complete
2026-01-15 19:26:53 +01:00
senke
39f7967e1e incus deployement fully implemented, Makefile updated and make fmt ran 2026-01-13 19:47:57 +01:00
senke
a73c36b3e6 [LOGGING] Fix #10: Erreurs silencieuses - Ajout de logs avec contexte pour toutes les erreurs dans core/auth et core/track 2026-01-04 01:44:15 +01:00
senke
f6a40c9ec6 [BE-SVC-017] be-svc: Implement graceful shutdown
- Created ShutdownManager for coordinated graceful shutdown of all services
- Added Shutdowner interface for services that need graceful shutdown
- Implemented parallel shutdown with individual timeouts (10s per service)
- Added global shutdown timeout (30s total)
- Integrated shutdown manager in main.go for:
  - HTTP server shutdown
  - JobWorker cancellation
  - Config.Close() (DB, Redis, RabbitMQ)
  - Logger sync
  - Sentry flush
- Added comprehensive unit tests for shutdown manager
- Prevents registration of new services during shutdown

Phase: PHASE-6
Priority: P2
Progress: 113/267 (42.32%)
2025-12-24 17:03:11 +01:00
senke
a7d463b8fd stabilizing veza-backend-api: P1 & P2 2025-12-16 13:34:08 -05:00
senke
d33c351ac6 refonte: backend-api go first; phase 1 2025-12-12 21:34:34 -05:00
okinrev
8caa2fd7ca STABILISATION: phase 3–5 – API contract, tests & chat-server hardening 2025-12-06 17:21:59 +01:00
okinrev
5ffcd50e0a P0: stabilisation backend/chat/stream + nouvelle base migrations v1
Backend Go:
- Remplacement complet des anciennes migrations par la base V1 alignée sur ORIGIN.
- Durcissement global du parsing JSON (BindAndValidateJSON + RespondWithAppError).
- Sécurisation de config.go, CORS, statuts de santé et monitoring.
- Implémentation des transactions P0 (RBAC, duplication de playlists, social toggles).
- Ajout d’un job worker structuré (emails, analytics, thumbnails) + tests associés.
- Nouvelle doc backend : AUDIT_CONFIG, BACKEND_CONFIG, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESET, JOB_WORKER_*.

Chat server (Rust):
- Refonte du pipeline JWT + sécurité, audit et rate limiting avancé.
- Implémentation complète du cycle de message (read receipts, delivered, edit/delete, typing).
- Nettoyage des panics, gestion d’erreurs robuste, logs structurés.
- Migrations chat alignées sur le schéma UUID et nouvelles features.

Stream server (Rust):
- Refonte du moteur de streaming (encoding pipeline + HLS) et des modules core.
- Transactions P0 pour les jobs et segments, garanties d’atomicité.
- Documentation détaillée de la pipeline (AUDIT_STREAM_*, DESIGN_STREAM_PIPELINE, TRANSACTIONS_P0_IMPLEMENTATION).

Documentation & audits:
- TRIAGE.md et AUDIT_STABILITY.md à jour avec l’état réel des 3 services.
- Cartographie complète des migrations et des transactions (DB_MIGRATIONS_*, DB_TRANSACTION_PLAN, AUDIT_DB_TRANSACTIONS, TRANSACTION_TESTS_PHASE3).
- Scripts de reset et de cleanup pour la lab DB et la V1.

Ce commit fige l’ensemble du travail de stabilisation P0 (UUID, backend, chat et stream) avant les phases suivantes (Coherence Guardian, WS hardening, etc.).
2025-12-06 11:14:38 +01:00
okinrev
2425c15b09 adding initial backend API (Go) 2025-12-03 20:29:37 +01:00