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senke
c10d73da4e feat(subscription): webhook handler closes pending_payment state machine (v1.0.9 item G — Phase 2)
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Phase 1 (commit 2a96766a) opened the pending_payment status: a paid-plan
subscribe path creates a UserSubscription row in pending_payment +
subscription_invoices row carrying the Hyperswitch payment_id, then hands
the client_secret back to the SPA. Phase 2 lands the webhook side: the
PSP-driven state transition that closes the loop.

State machine:
  - pending_payment + status=succeeded  →  invoice paid (paid_at=now), sub active
  - pending_payment + status=failed     →  invoice failed,            sub expired
  - already terminal                    →  idempotent no-op (paid_at NOT bumped)
  - payment_id not in subscription_invoices → marketplace.ErrNotASubscription
    (caller falls through to the order webhook flow)

The processor only flips a subscription out of pending_payment. Rows that
have already transitioned (concurrent flow, manual admin action, plan
upgrade) are left alone — the invoice still gets the terminal status
update so the audit trail stays consistent.

New surface:
  - hyperswitch.SubscriptionWebhookProcessor — the actual handler. Reads
    subscription_invoices by hyperswitch_payment_id, looks up the parent
    user_subscriptions row, applies the transition in a single tx.
  - hyperswitch.IsSubscriptionEventType — exported helper for callers
    that want to skip the DB hit on clearly non-subscription events.
  - marketplace.SubscriptionWebhookHandler (interface) +
    marketplace.ErrNotASubscription (sentinel) — keeps marketplace from
    importing the hyperswitch package while still allowing
    ProcessPaymentWebhook to dispatch typed.
  - marketplace.WithSubscriptionWebhookHandler (option) — wired by
    routes_webhooks.getMarketplaceService so the prod webhook handler
    routes subscription events instead of swallowing them as "order not
    found".

Dispatcher in ProcessPaymentWebhook: try subscription first, fall through
to the order flow on ErrNotASubscription. Order events are unchanged.

Tests (4, sqlite in-memory, all green):
  - Succeeded: pending_payment → active+paid, paid_at set
  - Failed:    pending_payment → expired+failed
  - Idempotent replay: second succeeded webhook is a no-op, paid_at NOT
    re-stamped (locks down Hyperswitch's at-least-once delivery contract)
  - Unknown payment_id: returns marketplace.ErrNotASubscription so the
    dispatcher falls through to ProcessPaymentWebhook's order flow

Removes the v1.0.6.2 "active row without PSP linkage" fantôme pattern
that hasEffectivePayment had to filter retroactively — the Phase 1 +
Phase 2 pair is now the canonical paid-plan creation path.

E2E + recovery endpoint (POST /api/v1/subscriptions/complete/:id) +
distribution gate land in Phase 3 (Day 3 of ROADMAP_V1.0_LAUNCH.md).

SKIP_TESTS=1 rationale: this commit is backend-only (Go); the husky
pre-commit hook only runs frontend typecheck/lint/vitest. Backend tests
verified manually:
  $ go test -short -count=1 ./internal/services/hyperswitch/... ./internal/core/marketplace/... ./internal/core/subscription/...
  ok  veza-backend-api/internal/services/hyperswitch
  ok  veza-backend-api/internal/core/marketplace
  ok  veza-backend-api/internal/core/subscription

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-27 05:39:59 +02:00
senke
3c4d0148be feat(webhooks): persist raw hyperswitch payloads to audit log — v1.0.7 item E
Every POST /webhooks/hyperswitch delivery now writes a row to
`hyperswitch_webhook_log` regardless of signature-valid or
processing outcome. Captures both legitimate deliveries and attack
probes — a forensics query now has the actual bytes to read, not
just a "webhook rejected" log line. Disputes (axis-1 P1.6) ride
along: the log captures dispute.* events alongside payment and
refund events, ready for when disputes get a handler.

Table shape (migration 984):
  * payload TEXT — readable in psql, invalid UTF-8 replaced with
    empty (forensics value is in headers + ip + timing for those
    attacks, not the binary body).
  * signature_valid BOOLEAN + partial index for "show me attack
    attempts" being instantaneous.
  * processing_result TEXT — 'ok' / 'error: <msg>' /
    'signature_invalid' / 'skipped'. Matches the P1.5 action
    semantic exactly.
  * source_ip, user_agent, request_id — forensics essentials.
    request_id is captured from Hyperswitch's X-Request-Id header
    when present, else a server-side UUID so every row correlates
    to VEZA's structured logs.
  * event_type — best-effort extract from the JSON payload, NULL
    on malformed input.

Hardening:
  * 64KB body cap via io.LimitReader rejects oversize with 413
    before any INSERT — prevents log-spam DoS.
  * Single INSERT per delivery with final state; no two-phase
    update race on signature-failure path. signature_invalid and
    processing-error rows both land.
  * DB persistence failures are logged but swallowed — the
    endpoint's contract is to ack Hyperswitch, not perfect audit.

Retention sweep:
  * CleanupHyperswitchWebhookLog in internal/jobs, daily tick,
    batched DELETE (10k rows + 100ms pause) so a large backlog
    doesn't lock the table.
  * HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90).
  * Same goroutine-ticker pattern as ScheduleOrphanTracksCleanup.
  * Wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside the existing cleanup jobs.

Tests: 5 in webhook_log_test.go (persistence, request_id auto-gen,
invalid-JSON leaves event_type empty, invalid-signature capture,
extractEventType 5 sub-cases) + 4 in cleanup_hyperswitch_webhook_
log_test.go (deletes-older-than, noop, default-on-zero,
context-cancel). Migration 984 applied cleanly to local Postgres;
all indexes present.

Also (v107-plan.md):
  * Item G acceptance gains an explicit Idempotency-Key threading
    requirement with an empty-key loud-fail test — "literally
    copy-paste D's 4-line test skeleton". Closes the risk that
    item G silently reopens the HTTP-retry duplicate-charge
    exposure D closed.

Out of scope for E (noted in CHANGELOG):
  * Rate limit on the endpoint — pre-existing middleware covers
    it at the router level; adding a per-endpoint limit is
    separate scope.
  * Readable-payload SQL view — deferred, the TEXT column is
    already human-readable; a convenience view is a nice-to-have
    not a ship-blocker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 02:44:58 +02:00
senke
92cf6d6f76 feat(backend,marketplace): refund reverse-charge with idempotent webhook
Fourth item of the v1.0.6 backlog, and the structuring one — the pre-
v1.0.6 RefundOrder wrote `status='refunded'` to the DB and called
Hyperswitch synchronously in the same transaction, treating the API
ack as terminal confirmation. In reality Hyperswitch returns `pending`
and only finalizes via webhook. Customers could see "refunded" in the
UI while their bank was still uncredited, and the seller balance
stayed credited even on successful refunds.

v1.0.6 flow
  Phase 1 — open a pending refund (short row-locked transaction):
    * validate permissions + 14-day window + double-submit guard
    * persist Refund{status=pending}
    * flip order to `refund_pending` (not `refunded` — that's the
      webhook's job)
  Phase 2 — call PSP outside the transaction:
    * Provider.CreateRefund returns (refund_id, status, err). The
      refund_id is the unique idempotency key for the webhook.
    * on PSP error: mark Refund{status=failed}, roll order back to
      `completed` so the buyer can retry.
    * on success: persist hyperswitch_refund_id, stay in `pending`
      even if the sync status is "succeeded". The webhook is the only
      authoritative signal. (Per customer guidance: "ne jamais flipper
      à succeeded sur la réponse synchrone du POST".)
  Phase 3 — webhook drives terminal state:
    * ProcessRefundWebhook looks up by hyperswitch_refund_id (UNIQUE
      constraint in the new `refunds` table guarantees idempotency).
    * terminal-state short-circuit: IsTerminal() returns 200 without
      mutating anything, so a Hyperswitch retry storm is safe.
    * on refund.succeeded: flip refund + order to succeeded/refunded,
      revoke licenses, debit seller balance, mark every SellerTransfer
      for the order as `reversed`. All within a row-locked tx.
    * on refund.failed: flip refund to failed, order back to
      `completed`.

Seller-side reconciliation
  * SellerBalance.DebitSellerBalance was using Postgres-only GREATEST,
    which silently failed on SQLite tests. Ported to a portable
    CASE WHEN that clamps at zero in both DBs.
  * SellerTransfer.Status = "reversed" captures the refund event in
    the ledger. The actual Stripe Connect Transfers:reversal call is
    flagged TODO(v1.0.7) — requires wiring through TransferService
    with connected-account context that the current transfer worker
    doesn't expose. The internal balance is corrected here so the
    buyer and seller views match as soon as the PSP confirms; the
    missing piece is purely the money-movement round-trip at Stripe.

Webhook routing
  * HyperswitchWebhookPayload extended with event_type + refund_id +
    error_message, with flat and nested (object.*) shapes supported
    (same tolerance as the existing payment fields).
  * New IsRefundEvent() discriminator: matches any event_type
    containing "refund" (case-insensitive) or presence of refund_id.
    routes_webhooks.go peeks the payload once and dispatches to
    ProcessRefundWebhook or ProcessPaymentWebhook.
  * No signature-verification changes — the same HMAC-SHA512 check
    protects both paths.

Handler response
  * POST /marketplace/orders/:id/refund now returns
    `{ refund: { id, status: "pending" }, message }` so the UI can
    surface the in-flight state. A new ErrRefundAlreadyRequested maps
    to 400 with a "already in progress" message instead of silently
    creating a duplicate row (the double-submit guard checks order
    status = `refund_pending` *before* the existing-row check so the
    error is explicit).

Schema
  * Migration 978_refunds_table.sql adds the `refunds` table with
    UNIQUE(hyperswitch_refund_id). The uniqueness constraint is the
    load-bearing idempotency guarantee — a duplicate PSP notification
    lands on the same DB row, and the webhook handler's
    FOR UPDATE + IsTerminal() check turns it into a no-op.
  * hyperswitch_refund_id is nullable (NULL between Phase 1 and
    Phase 2) so the UNIQUE index ignores rows that haven't been
    assigned a PSP id yet.

Partial refunds
  * The Provider.CreateRefund signature carries `amount *int64`
    already (nil = full), but the service call-site passes nil. Full
    refunds only for v1.0.6 — partial-refund UX needs a product
    decision and is deferred to v1.0.7. Flagged in the ErrRefund*
    section.

Tests (15 cases, all sqlite-in-memory + httptest-style mock provider)
  * RefundOrder phase 1
      - OpensPendingRefund: pending state, refund_id captured, order
        → refund_pending, licenses untouched
      - PSPErrorRollsBack: failed state, order reverts to completed
      - DoubleRequestRejected: second call returns
        ErrRefundAlreadyRequested, not a generic ErrOrderNotRefundable
      - NotCompleted / NoPaymentID / Forbidden / SellerCanRefund
      - ExpiredRefundWindow / FallbackExpiredNoDeadline
  * ProcessRefundWebhook
      - SucceededFinalizesState: refund + order + licenses + seller
        balance + seller transfer all reconciled in one tx
      - FailedRollsOrderBack: order returns to completed for retry
      - IsRefundEventIdempotentOnReplay: second webhook asserts
        succeeded_at timestamp is *unchanged*, proving the second
        invocation bailed out on IsTerminal (not re-ran)
      - UnknownRefundIDReturnsOK: never-issued refund_id → 200 silent
        (avoids a Hyperswitch retry storm on stale events)
      - MissingRefundID: explicit 400 error
      - NonTerminalStatusIgnored: pending/processing leave the row
        alone
  * HyperswitchWebhookPayload.IsRefundEvent: 6 dispatcher cases
    (flat event_type, mixed case, payment event, refund_id alone,
    empty, nested object.refund_id)

Backward compat
  * hyperswitch.Provider still exposes the old Refund(ctx,...) error
    method for any call-site that only cared about success/failure.
  * Old mockRefundPaymentProvider replaced; external mocks need to
    add CreateRefund — the interface is now (refundID, status, err).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 02:02:57 +02:00
senke
7cb4ef56e1 feat(v0.912): Cashflow - payment E2E integration tests
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- Add MarketplaceServiceOverride and AuthMiddlewareOverride to config for tests
- Wire overrides in routes_webhooks and routes_marketplace (authForMarketplaceInterface)
- payment_flow_test: cart -> checkout -> webhook -> order completed, license, transfer
- webhook_idempotency_test: 3 identical webhooks -> 1 order, 1 license
- webhook_security_test: empty secret 500, invalid sig 401, valid sig 200
- refund_flow_test: completed order -> refund -> order refunded, license revoked
- Shared computeWebhookSignature helper in webhook_test_helpers.go
- SetMaxOpenConns(1) for sqlite :memory: in idempotency test to avoid flakiness

Ref: docs/ROADMAP_V09XX_TO_V1.md v0.912 Cashflow
2026-02-27 20:00:51 +01:00
senke
51984e9a1f feat(security): v0.901 Ironclad - fix 5 critical/high vulnerabilities
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- OAuth: use JWTService+SessionService, httpOnly cookies (VEZA-SEC-001)
- Remove PasswordService.GenerateJWT (VEZA-SEC-002)
- Hyperswitch webhook: mandatory verification, 500 if secret empty (VEZA-SEC-005)
- Auth middleware: TokenBlacklist.IsBlacklisted check (VEZA-SEC-006)
- Waveform: ValidateExecPath before exec (VEZA-SEC-007)
2026-02-26 19:34:45 +01:00
senke
6d1d861a52 feat(commerce): wire TransferService in marketplace and webhook routes 2026-02-23 22:55:39 +01:00
senke
92f432fb9e chore: consolidate pending changes (Hyperswitch, PostCard, dashboard, stream server, etc.) 2026-02-14 21:45:15 +01:00
senke
d1bbd23936 refactor(api): extract route setup functions into dedicated files 2026-02-14 18:04:37 +01:00