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Author SHA1 Message Date
senke
3cd82ba5be fix(hyperswitch): idempotency-key on create-payment and create-refund — v1.0.7 item D
Every outbound POST /payments and POST /refunds from the Hyperswitch
client now carries an Idempotency-Key HTTP header. Key values are
explicit parameters at every call site — no context-carrier magic,
no auto-generation. An empty key is a loud error from the client
(not silent header omission) so a future new call site that forgets
to supply one fails immediately, not months later under an obscure
replay scenario.

Key choices, both stable across HTTP retries of the same logical
call:
  * CreatePayment → order.ID.String() (GORM BeforeCreate populates
    order.ID before the PSP call in ConfirmOrder).
  * CreateRefund → pendingRefund.ID.String() (populated by the
    Phase 1 tx.Create in RefundOrder, available for the Phase 2 PSP
    call).

Scope note (reproduced here for the next reader who grep-s the
commit log for "Idempotency-Key"):

  Idempotency-Key covers HTTP-transport retry (TLS reconnect,
  proxy retry, DNS flap) within a single CreatePayment /
  CreateRefund invocation. It does NOT cover application-level
  replay (user double-click, form double-submit, retry after crash
  before DB write). That class of bug requires state-machine
  preconditions on VEZA side — already addressed by the order
  state machine + the handler-level guards on POST
  /api/v1/payments (for payments) and the partial UNIQUE on
  `refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id` landed in v1.0.6.1 (for refunds).

  Hyperswitch TTL on Idempotency-Key: typically 24h-7d server-side
  (verify against current PSP docs). Beyond TTL, a retry with the
  same key is treated as a new request. Not a concern at current
  volumes; document if retry logic ever extends beyond 1 hour.

Explicitly out of scope: item D does NOT add application-level
retry logic. The current "try once, fail loudly" behavior on PSP
errors is preserved. Adding retries is a separate design exercise
(backoff, max attempts, circuit breaker) not part of this commit.

Interfaces changed:
  * hyperswitch.Client.CreatePayment(ctx, idempotencyKey, ...)
  * hyperswitch.Client.CreatePaymentSimple(...) convenience wrapper
  * hyperswitch.Client.CreateRefund(ctx, idempotencyKey, ...)
  * hyperswitch.Provider.CreatePayment threads through
  * hyperswitch.Provider.CreateRefund threads through
  * marketplace.PaymentProvider interface — first param after ctx
  * marketplace.refundProvider interface — first param after ctx

Removed:
  * hyperswitch.Provider.Refund (zero callers, superseded by
    CreateRefund which returns (refund_id, status, err) and is the
    only method marketplace's refundProvider cares about).

Tests:
  * Two new httptest.Server-backed tests (client_test.go) pin the
    Idempotency-Key header value for CreatePayment and CreateRefund.
  * Two new empty-key tests confirm the client errors rather than
    silently sending no header.
  * TestRefundOrder_OpensPendingRefund gains an assertion that
    f.provider.lastIdempotencyKey == refund.ID.String() — if a
    future refactor threads the key from somewhere else (paymentID,
    uuid.New() per call, etc.) the test fails loudly.
  * Four pre-existing test mocks updated for the new signature
    (mockRefundPaymentProvider in marketplace, mockPaymentProvider
    in tests/integration and tests/contract, mockRefundPayment
    Provider in tests/integration/refund_flow).

Subscription's CreateSubscriptionPayment interface declares its own
shape and has no live Hyperswitch-backed implementation today —
v1.0.6.2 noted this as the payment-gate bypass surface, v1.0.7
item G will ship the real provider. When that lands, item G's
implementation threads the idempotency key through in the same
pattern (documented in v107-plan.md item G acceptance).

CHANGELOG v1.0.7-rc1 entry updated with the full item D scope note
and the "out of scope: retries" caveat.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 02:30:02 +02:00
senke
d2bb9c0e78 feat(marketplace): async stripe connect reversal worker — v1.0.7 item B day 2
Day-2 cut of item B: the reversal path becomes async. Pre-v1.0.7
(and v1.0.7 day 1) the refund handler flipped seller_transfers
straight from completed to reversed without ever calling Stripe —
the ledger said "reversed" while the seller's Stripe balance still
showed the original transfer as settled. The new flow:

  refund.succeeded webhook
    → reverseSellerAccounting transitions row: completed → reversal_pending
    → StripeReversalWorker (every REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL, default 1m)
      → calls ReverseTransfer on Stripe
      → success: row → reversed + persist stripe_reversal_id
      → 404 already-reversed (dead code until day 3): row → reversed + log
      → 404 resource_missing (dead code until day 3): row → permanently_failed
      → transient error: stay reversal_pending, bump retry_count,
        exponential backoff (base * 2^retry, capped at backoffMax)
      → retries exhausted: row → permanently_failed
    → buyer-facing refund completes immediately regardless of Stripe health

State machine enforcement:
  * New `SellerTransfer.TransitionStatus(tx, to, extras)` wraps every
    mutation: validates against AllowedTransferTransitions, guarded
    UPDATE with WHERE status=<from> (optimistic lock semantics), no
    RowsAffected = stale state / concurrent winner detected.
  * processSellerTransfers no longer mutates .Status in place —
    terminal status is decided before struct construction, so the
    row is Created with its final state.
  * transfer_retry.retryOne and admin RetryTransfer route through
    TransitionStatus. Legacy direct assignment removed.
  * TestNoDirectTransferStatusMutation greps the package for any
    `st.Status = "..."` / `t.Status = "..."` / GORM
    Model(&SellerTransfer{}).Update("status"...) outside the
    allowlist and fails if found. Verified by temporarily injecting
    a violation during development — test caught it as expected.

Configuration (v1.0.7 item B):
  * REVERSAL_WORKER_ENABLED=true (default)
  * REVERSAL_MAX_RETRIES=5 (default)
  * REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL=1m (default)
  * REVERSAL_BACKOFF_BASE=1m (default)
  * REVERSAL_BACKOFF_MAX=1h (default, caps exponential growth)
  * .env.template documents TRANSFER_RETRY_* and REVERSAL_* env vars
    so an ops reader can grep them.

Interface change: TransferService.ReverseTransfer(ctx,
stripe_transfer_id, amount *int64, reason) (reversalID, error)
added. All four mocks extended (process_webhook, transfer_retry,
admin_transfer_handler, payment_flow integration). amount=nil means
full reversal; v1.0.7 always passes nil (partial reversal is future
scope per axis-1 P2).

Stripe 404 disambiguation (ErrTransferAlreadyReversed /
ErrTransferNotFound) is wired in the worker as dead code — the
sentinels are declared and the worker branches on them, but
StripeConnectService.ReverseTransfer doesn't yet emit them. Day 3
will parse stripe.Error.Code and populate the sentinels; no worker
change needed at that point. Keeping the handling skeleton in day 2
so the worker's branch shape doesn't change between days and the
tests can already cover all four paths against the mock.

Worker unit tests (9 cases, all green, sqlite :memory:):
  * happy path: reversal_pending → reversed + stripe_reversal_id set
  * already reversed (mock returns sentinel): → reversed + log
  * not found (mock returns sentinel): → permanently_failed + log
  * transient 503: retry_count++, next_retry_at set with backoff,
    stays reversal_pending
  * backoff capped at backoffMax (verified with base=1s, max=10s,
    retry_count=4 → capped at 10s not 16s)
  * max retries exhausted: → permanently_failed
  * legacy row with empty stripe_transfer_id: → permanently_failed,
    does not call Stripe
  * only picks up reversal_pending (skips all other statuses)
  * respects next_retry_at (future rows skipped)

Existing test updated: TestProcessRefundWebhook_SucceededFinalizesState
now asserts the row lands at reversal_pending with next_retry_at
set (worker's responsibility to drive to reversed), not reversed.

Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside TransferRetryWorker,
sharing the same StripeConnectService instance. Shutdown path
registered for graceful stop.

Cut from day 2 scope (per agreed-upon discipline), landing in day 3:
  * Stripe 404 disambiguation implementation (parse error.Code)
  * End-to-end smoke probe (refund → reversal_pending → worker
    processes → reversed) against local Postgres + mock Stripe
  * Batch-size tuning / inter-batch sleep — batchLimit=20 today is
    safely under Stripe's 100 req/s default rate limit; revisit if
    observed load warrants

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 15:34:29 +02:00
senke
eedaad9f83 refactor(connect): persist stripe_transfer_id on create + retry — v1.0.7 item A
TransferService.CreateTransfer signature changes from (...) error to
(...) (string, error) — the caller now captures the Stripe transfer
identifier and persists it on the SellerTransfer row. Pre-v1.0.7 the
stripe_transfer_id column was declared on the model and table but
never written to, which blocked the reversal worker (v1.0.7 item B)
from identifying which transfer to reverse on refund.

Changes:
  * `TransferService` interface and `StripeConnectService.CreateTransfer`
    both return the Stripe transfer id alongside the error.
  * `processSellerTransfers` (marketplace service) persists the id on
    success before `tx.Create(&st)` so a crash between Stripe ACK and
    DB commit leaves no inconsistency.
  * `TransferRetryWorker.retryOne` persists on retry success — a row
    that failed on first attempt and succeeded via the worker is
    reversal-ready all the same.
  * `admin_transfer_handler.RetryTransfer` (manual retry) persists too.
  * `SellerPayout.ExternalPayoutID` is populated by the Connect payout
    flow (`payout.go`) — the field existed but was never written.
  * Four test mocks updated; two tests assert the id is persisted on
    the happy path, one on the failure path confirms we don't write a
    fake id when the provider errors.

Migration `981_seller_transfers_stripe_reversal_id.sql`:
  * Adds nullable `stripe_reversal_id` column for item B.
  * Partial UNIQUE indexes on both stripe_transfer_id and
    stripe_reversal_id (WHERE IS NOT NULL AND <> ''), mirroring the
    v1.0.6.1 pattern for refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id.
  * Logs a count of historical completed transfers that lack an id —
    these are candidates for the backfill CLI follow-up task.

Backfill for historical rows is a separate follow-up (cmd/tools/
backfill_stripe_transfer_ids, calling Stripe's transfers.List with
Destination + Metadata[order_id]). Pre-v1.0.7 transfers without a
backfilled id cannot be auto-reversed on refund — document in P2.9
admin-recovery when it lands. Acceptable scope per v107-plan.

Migration number bumped 980 → 981 because v1.0.6.2 used 980 for the
unpaid-subscription cleanup; v107-plan updated with the note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 13:08:39 +02:00
senke
a1000ce7fb style(backend): gofmt -w on 85 files (whitespace only)
backend-ci.yml's `test -z "$(gofmt -l .)"` strict gate (added in
13c21ac11) failed on a backlog of unformatted files. None of the
85 files in this commit had been edited since the gate was added
because no push touched veza-backend-api/** in between, so the
gate never fired until today's CI fixes triggered it.

The diff is exclusively whitespace alignment in struct literals
and trailing-space comments. `go build ./...` and the full test
suite (with VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION=1 -short) pass identically.
2026-04-14 12:22:14 +02:00
senke
7cfd48a82a fix(release): v1.0.1 — Conformité complète ROADMAP checklist
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- Sécurité: npm 0 CRITICAL, cargo audit 0 vulnérabilités
- OpenAPI: @Param id corrigé pour /tracks/quota/{id}
- Tests: Payment E2E passe, OAuth DATABASE_URL fallback
- Migrations: 000_mark_consolidated.sql
- veza-stream-server: prometheus 0.14, validator 0.19
- docs: SECURITY_SCAN_RC1, V1_SIGNOFF, PROJECT_STATE
2026-03-03 20:17:54 +01:00
senke
7cb4ef56e1 feat(v0.912): Cashflow - payment E2E integration tests
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- Add MarketplaceServiceOverride and AuthMiddlewareOverride to config for tests
- Wire overrides in routes_webhooks and routes_marketplace (authForMarketplaceInterface)
- payment_flow_test: cart -> checkout -> webhook -> order completed, license, transfer
- webhook_idempotency_test: 3 identical webhooks -> 1 order, 1 license
- webhook_security_test: empty secret 500, invalid sig 401, valid sig 200
- refund_flow_test: completed order -> refund -> order refunded, license revoked
- Shared computeWebhookSignature helper in webhook_test_helpers.go
- SetMaxOpenConns(1) for sqlite :memory: in idempotency test to avoid flakiness

Ref: docs/ROADMAP_V09XX_TO_V1.md v0.912 Cashflow
2026-02-27 20:00:51 +01:00