Commit graph

4 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
senke
d4fbf2bf84 feat(marketplace): seller transfer state machine matrix — v1.0.7 item B day 1
Some checks failed
Veza CI / Backend (Go) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Frontend (Web) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Rust (Stream Server) (push) Failing after 0s
Security Scan / Secret Scanning (gitleaks) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Notify on failure (push) Failing after 0s
Day-1 foundation for item B (async Stripe Connect reversal worker).
No worker code, no runtime enforcement yet — just the authoritative
state machine that day 2's code will route through. Before writing
the worker we want a single place where the legal transitions are
defined and tested, so the worker's behavior can be argued against
the matrix rather than implicitly codified across call sites.

transfer_transitions.go:
  * SellerTransferStatus constants (Pending, Completed, Failed,
    ReversalPending [new], Reversed [new], PermanentlyFailed).
  * AllowedTransferTransitions map: pending → {completed, failed};
    completed → {reversal_pending}; failed → {completed,
    permanently_failed}; reversal_pending → {reversed,
    permanently_failed}; reversed and permanently_failed as dead ends.
  * CanTransitionTransferStatus(from, to) — same-state always OK
    (idempotent bumps of retry_count / next_retry_at); unknown from
    fails conservatively (typos in call sites become visible).

transfer_transitions_test.go:
  * TestTransferStateTransitions iterates the full 6×6 matrix (36
    pairs) and asserts every pair against the expected outcome.
  * TestTransferStateTransitions_TerminalStatesHaveNoOutgoing
    double-locks Reversed + PermanentlyFailed as dead ends at the
    map level (not just at the caller level).
  * TestTransferStateTransitions_MatrixKeysAreAccountedFor keeps the
    canonical status list in sync with the map; a new status added
    to one but not the other fails the test.
  * TestCanTransitionTransferStatus_UnknownFromIsConservative
    documents the "unknown from → always false" policy so a future
    reader sees the intent.

Migration 982 adds a partial composite index on (status,
next_retry_at) WHERE status='reversal_pending', sibling to the
existing idx_seller_transfers_retry (scoped to failed). Two parallel
partial indexes cost less than widening the existing one (which
would need a table-level lock) and keep the worker query planner-
friendly.

Day 2 routes processSellerTransfers, TransferRetryWorker,
reverseSellerAccounting, admin_transfer_handler through
CanTransitionTransferStatus at every Status mutation, and writes
StripeReversalWorker. Day 3 exercises the end-to-end flow
(refund → reversal_pending → worker → reversed) in a smoke probe.

Checkpoint: ping user at end of day 1 before day 2 per discipline
agreed upfront.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 14:13:02 +02:00
senke
2583c92d4f refactor(connect): persist stripe_transfer_id on create + retry — v1.0.7 item A
Some checks failed
Veza CI / Backend (Go) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Frontend (Web) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Rust (Stream Server) (push) Failing after 0s
Security Scan / Secret Scanning (gitleaks) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Notify on failure (push) Failing after 0s
TransferService.CreateTransfer signature changes from (...) error to
(...) (string, error) — the caller now captures the Stripe transfer
identifier and persists it on the SellerTransfer row. Pre-v1.0.7 the
stripe_transfer_id column was declared on the model and table but
never written to, which blocked the reversal worker (v1.0.7 item B)
from identifying which transfer to reverse on refund.

Changes:
  * `TransferService` interface and `StripeConnectService.CreateTransfer`
    both return the Stripe transfer id alongside the error.
  * `processSellerTransfers` (marketplace service) persists the id on
    success before `tx.Create(&st)` so a crash between Stripe ACK and
    DB commit leaves no inconsistency.
  * `TransferRetryWorker.retryOne` persists on retry success — a row
    that failed on first attempt and succeeded via the worker is
    reversal-ready all the same.
  * `admin_transfer_handler.RetryTransfer` (manual retry) persists too.
  * `SellerPayout.ExternalPayoutID` is populated by the Connect payout
    flow (`payout.go`) — the field existed but was never written.
  * Four test mocks updated; two tests assert the id is persisted on
    the happy path, one on the failure path confirms we don't write a
    fake id when the provider errors.

Migration `981_seller_transfers_stripe_reversal_id.sql`:
  * Adds nullable `stripe_reversal_id` column for item B.
  * Partial UNIQUE indexes on both stripe_transfer_id and
    stripe_reversal_id (WHERE IS NOT NULL AND <> ''), mirroring the
    v1.0.6.1 pattern for refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id.
  * Logs a count of historical completed transfers that lack an id —
    these are candidates for the backfill CLI follow-up task.

Backfill for historical rows is a separate follow-up (cmd/tools/
backfill_stripe_transfer_ids, calling Stripe's transfers.List with
Destination + Metadata[order_id]). Pre-v1.0.7 transfers without a
backfilled id cannot be auto-reversed on refund — document in P2.9
admin-recovery when it lands. Acceptable scope per v107-plan.

Migration number bumped 980 → 981 because v1.0.6.2 used 980 for the
unpaid-subscription cleanup; v107-plan updated with the note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 13:08:39 +02:00
senke
d31f5733d6 chore(release): v1.0.6.2 — subscription payment-gate bypass hotfix
Some checks failed
Veza CI / Backend (Go) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Frontend (Web) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Rust (Stream Server) (push) Failing after 0s
Security Scan / Secret Scanning (gitleaks) (push) Failing after 0s
Veza CI / Notify on failure (push) Failing after 0s
Closes a bypass surfaced by the 2026-04 audit probe (axis-1 Q2): any
authenticated user could POST /api/v1/subscriptions/subscribe on a paid
plan and receive 201 active without the payment provider ever being
invoked. The resulting row satisfied `checkEligibility()` in the
distribution service via `can_sell_on_marketplace=true` on the Creator
plan — effectively free access to /api/v1/distribution/submit, which
dispatches to external partners.

Fix is centralised in `GetUserSubscription` so there is no code path
that can grant subscription-gated access without routing through the
payment check. Effective-payment = free plan OR unexpired trial OR
invoice with non-empty hyperswitch_payment_id. Migration 980 sweeps
pre-existing fantôme rows into `expired`, preserving the tuple in a
dated audit table for support outreach.

Subscribe and subscribeToFreePlan treat the new ErrSubscriptionNoPayment
as equivalent to ErrNoActiveSubscription so re-subscription works
cleanly post-cleanup. GET /me/subscription surfaces needs_payment=true
with a support-contact message rather than a misleading "you're on
free" or an opaque 500. TODO(v1.0.7-item-G) annotation marks where the
`if s.paymentProvider != nil` short-circuit needs to become a mandatory
pending_payment state.

Probe script `scripts/probes/subscription-unpaid-activation.sh` kept as
a versioned regression test — dry-run by default, --destructive logs in
and attempts the exploit against a live backend with automatic cleanup.
8-case unit test matrix covers the full hasEffectivePayment predicate.

Smoke validated end-to-end against local v1.0.6.2: POST /subscribe
returns 201 (by design — item G closes the creation path), but
GET /me/subscription returns subscription=null + needs_payment=true,
distribution eligibility returns false.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 12:21:53 +02:00
senke
6039a26a99 chore: cleanup old e2e tests, playwright configs, reorganize down migrations
- Remove old apps/web/e2e/ test suite (replaced by tests/e2e/)
- Remove old playwright configs (smoke, storybook, visual, root)
- Move down migrations to veza-backend-api/migrations/rollback/
- Remove stale test results and playwright report artifacts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 11:35:26 +01:00