622 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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senke
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d5152d89a2 |
feat(stream): HLS default on + marketplace 30s pre-listen + FLAC tier checkbox (W4 Day 17)
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Three pieces shipping under one banner since they're the day's
deliverables and share no review-time coupling :
1. HLS_STREAMING default flipped true
- config.go : getEnvBool default true (was false). Operators wanting
a lightweight dev / unit-test env explicitly set HLS_STREAMING=false
to skip the transcoder pipeline.
- .env.template : default flipped + comment explaining the opt-out.
- Effect : every new track upload routes through the HLS transcoder
by default ; ABR ladder served via /tracks/:id/master.m3u8.
2. Marketplace 30s pre-listen (creator opt-in)
- migrations/989 : adds products.preview_enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL
DEFAULT FALSE + partial index on TRUE values. Default off so
adoption is opt-in.
- core/marketplace/models.go : PreviewEnabled field on Product.
- handlers/marketplace.go : StreamProductPreview gains a fall-through.
When no file-based ProductPreview exists AND the product is a
track product AND preview_enabled=true, redirect to the underlying
/tracks/:id/stream?preview=30. Header X-Preview-Cap-Seconds: 30
surfaces the policy.
- core/track/track_hls_handler.go : StreamTrack accepts ?preview=30
and gates anonymous access via isMarketplacePreviewAllowed (raw
SQL probe of products.preview_enabled to avoid the
track→marketplace import cycle ; the reverse arrow already exists).
- Trust model : 30s cap is enforced client-side (HTML5 audio
currentTime). Industry standard for tease-to-buy ; not anti-rip.
Documented in the migration + handler doc comment.
3. FLAC tier preview checkbox (Premium-gated, hidden by default)
- upload-modal/constants.ts : optional flacAvailable on UploadFormData.
- upload-modal/UploadModalMetadataForm.tsx : new optional props
showFlacAvailable + flacAvailable + onFlacAvailableChange.
Checkbox renders only when showFlacAvailable=true ; consumers
pass that based on the user's role/subscription tier (deferred
to caller wiring — Item G phase 4 will replace the role check
with a real subscription-tier check).
- Today the checkbox is a UI affordance only ; the actual lossless
distribution path (ladder + storage class) is post-launch work.
Acceptance (Day 17) : new uploads serve HLS ABR by default ;
products.preview_enabled flag wires anonymous 30s pre-listen ;
checkbox visible to premium users on the upload form. All 4 tested
backend packages pass : handlers, core/track, core/marketplace, config.
W4 progress : Day 16 ✓ · Day 17 ✓ · Day 18 (faceted search) ⏳ ·
Day 19 (HAProxy sticky WS) ⏳ · Day 20 (k6 nightly) ⏳.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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806bd77d09 |
feat(embed): /embed/track/:id widget + /oembed envelope + per-track OG tags (W3 Day 15)
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End-to-end embed pipeline. Standalone HTML widget for iframes, oEmbed JSON for unfurlers (Twitter/Discord/Slack), runtime per-track OG + Twitter player card on the SPA. Share-token storage + handlers were already in place from earlier — Day 15 only adds the embed surface. Backend (root router, no /api/v1 prefix — matches what scrapers expect) - internal/handlers/embed_handler.go : EmbedTrack renders inline HTML with OG tags + <audio controls>. DMCA-blocked tracks 451, private tracks 404 (don't leak existence). X-Frame-Options=ALLOWALL + CSP frame-ancestors=* so the page can be iframed by third parties. OEmbed handler accepts ?url=&format=json, validates the URL points at /tracks/:id, returns a type=rich envelope with an iframe HTML string. ?maxwidth clamped to [240, 1280]. - internal/api/routes_embed.go : registers the two endpoints. - internal/handlers/embed_handler_test.go : pure-function coverage for extractTrackIDFromURL (8 cases incl. trailing slash, query string, hash fragment, subpath) + parseSafeInt (overflow + non-digit rejection). Frontend - apps/web/src/features/tracks/hooks/useTrackOpenGraph.ts : runtime injection of og:* + twitter:player + <link rel=alternate> (oEmbed discovery) into document.head. Limitation noted inline — pure HTML scrapers don't see these ; the embed widget itself carries server-rendered OG tags so unfurlers always work. - TrackDetailPage : wires useTrackOpenGraph(track) on render. E2E (tests/e2e/30-embed-and-share.spec.ts) - 30. /embed/track/:id renders HTML with OG tags + audio src. - 31. /oembed returns valid JSON envelope (rich type, iframe HTML). - 32. /oembed rejects non-track URLs (400). - 33. share-token roundtrip — creator mints, anonymous resolves via /api/v1/tracks/shared/:token (re-uses existing share handler ; Day 15 didn't add new share infra, just covers it under the embed acceptance gate). Acceptance (Day 15) : embed widget Twitter card preview ✓ (OG tags present), oEmbed JSON valid ✓, share token roundtrip ✓. W3 verification gate : Redis Sentinel ✓ · MinIO distribué ✓ · CDN signed URLs ✓ · DMCA E2E ✓ · embed + share token ✓ · all 5 W3 days shipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
49335322b5 |
feat(legal): DMCA notice handler + admin queue + 451 playback gate (W3 Day 14)
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End-to-end DMCA workflow. Public submission, admin queue, takedown
flips track to is_public=false + dmca_blocked=true, playback paths
return 451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons.
Backend
- migrations/988_dmca_notices.sql + rollback : table dmca_notices
(id, status, claimant_*, work_description, infringing_track_id FK,
sworn_statement_at, takedown_at, counter_notice_at, restored_at,
audit_log JSONB, created_at, updated_at). Adds tracks.dmca_blocked
BOOLEAN. Partial indexes for the pending queue + per-track lookup.
Status enum constrained via CHECK.
- internal/models/dmca_notice.go + DmcaBlocked field on Track.
- internal/services/dmca_service.go : CreateNotice + ListPending +
Takedown + Dismiss. Takedown is a single transaction that flips the
track's flags AND appends an audit_log entry — partial state can't
happen if the track was deleted between fetch and update.
- internal/handlers/dmca_handler.go : POST /api/v1/dmca/notice (public),
GET /api/v1/admin/dmca/notices (paginated), POST /:id/takedown,
POST /:id/dismiss. sworn_statement=false → 400. Conflict → 409.
Track gone after notice → 410.
- internal/api/routes_legal.go : route registration. Admin chain :
RequireAuth + RequireAdmin + RequireMFA (same as moderation routes).
- internal/core/track/track_hls_handler.go : both StreamTrack +
DownloadTrack now early-return 451 when track.DmcaBlocked. Owner
cannot bypass — only an admin restoring the notice clears the gate.
- internal/services/dmca_service_test.go : audit_log append helpers,
malformed-JSON rejection, ordering preservation.
Frontend
- apps/web/src/features/legal/pages/DmcaNoticePage.tsx : public form
at /legal/dmca/notice. Validates sworn-statement checkbox client-side.
Receipt panel shows the notice ID after submission.
- apps/web/src/services/api/dmca.ts : thin client (POST /dmca/notice).
- routeConfig + lazy registry updated for the new route.
- DmcaPage now links to /legal/dmca/notice instead of saying "form
pending".
E2E
- tests/e2e/29-dmca-notice.spec.ts : 3 tests. (1) anonymous submit
yields 201 + pending receipt. (2) sworn_statement=false rejected
with 400. (3) admin takedown gates playback with 451 — gated behind
E2E_DMCA_ADMIN=1 because admin path requires MFA-bearing seed.
Acceptance (Day 14) : public submission produces a pending notice,
admin takedown blocks playback at 451. Lab-side validation pending
admin MFA seed for the e2e admin pathway.
W3 progress : Redis Sentinel ✓ · MinIO distribué ✓ · CDN ✓ · DMCA ✓ ·
embed ⏳ Day 15.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
15e591305e |
feat(cdn): Bunny.net signed URLs + HLS cache headers + metric collision fix (W3 Day 13)
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CDN edge in front of S3/MinIO via origin-pull. Backend signs URLs with Bunny.net token-auth (SHA-256 over security_key + path + expires) so edges verify before serving cached objects ; origin is never hit on a valid token. Cloudflare CDN / R2 / CloudFront stubs kept. - internal/services/cdn_service.go : new providers CDNProviderBunny + CDNProviderCloudflareR2. SecurityKey added to CDNConfig. generateBunnySignedURL implements the documented Bunny scheme (url-safe base64, no padding, expires query). HLSSegmentCacheHeaders + HLSPlaylistCacheHeaders helpers exported for handlers. - internal/services/cdn_service_test.go : pin Bunny URL shape + base64-url charset ; assert empty SecurityKey fails fast (no silent fallback to unsigned URLs). - internal/core/track/service.go : new CDNURLSigner interface + SetCDNService(cdn). GetStorageURL prefers CDN signed URL when cdnService.IsEnabled, falls back to direct S3 presign on signing error so a CDN partial outage doesn't block playback. - internal/api/routes_tracks.go + routes_core.go : wire SetCDNService on the two TrackService construction sites that serve stream/download. - internal/config/config.go : 4 new env vars (CDN_ENABLED, CDN_PROVIDER, CDN_BASE_URL, CDN_SECURITY_KEY). config.CDNService always non-nil after init ; IsEnabled gates the actual usage. - internal/handlers/hls_handler.go : segments now return Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400, immutable (content-addressed filenames make this safe). Playlists at max-age=60. - veza-backend-api/.env.template : 4 placeholder env vars. - docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §12 : provider matrix + Bunny vs Cloudflare vs R2 trade-offs. Bug fix collateral : v1.0.9 Day 11 introduced veza_cache_hits_total which collided in name with monitoring.CacheHitsTotal (different label set ⇒ promauto MustRegister panic at process init). Day 13 deletes the monitoring duplicate and restores the metrics-package counter as the single source of truth (label: subsystem). All 8 affected packages green : services, core/track, handlers, middleware, websocket/chat, metrics, monitoring, config. Acceptance (Day 13) : code path is wired ; verifying via real Bunny edge requires a Pull Zone provisioned by the user (EX-? in roadmap). On the user side : create Pull Zone w/ origin = MinIO, copy token auth key into CDN_SECURITY_KEY, set CDN_ENABLED=true. W3 progress : Redis Sentinel ✓ · MinIO distribué ✓ · CDN ✓ · DMCA ⏳ Day 14 · embed ⏳ Day 15. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
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a36d9b2d59 |
feat(redis): Sentinel HA + cache hit rate metrics (W3 Day 11)
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Three Incus containers, each running redis-server + redis-sentinel (co-located). redis-1 = master at first boot, redis-2/3 = replicas. Sentinel quorum=2 of 3 ; failover-timeout=30s satisfies the W3 acceptance criterion. - internal/config/redis_init.go : initRedis branches on REDIS_SENTINEL_ADDRS ; non-empty -> redis.NewFailoverClient with MasterName + SentinelAddrs + SentinelPassword. Empty -> existing single-instance NewClient (dev/local stays parametric). - internal/config/config.go : 3 new fields (RedisSentinelAddrs, RedisSentinelMasterName, RedisSentinelPassword) read from env. parseRedisSentinelAddrs trims+filters CSV. - internal/metrics/cache_hit_rate.go : new RecordCacheHit / Miss counters, labelled by subsystem. Cardinality bounded. - internal/middleware/rate_limiter.go : instrument 3 Eval call sites (DDoS, frontend log throttle, upload throttle). Hit = Redis answered, Miss = error -> in-memory fallback. - internal/services/chat_pubsub.go : instrument Publish + PublishPresence. - internal/websocket/chat/presence_service.go : instrument SetOnline / SetOffline / Heartbeat / GetPresence. redis.Nil counts as a hit (legitimate empty result). - infra/ansible/roles/redis_sentinel/ : install Redis 7 + Sentinel, render redis.conf + sentinel.conf, systemd units. Vault assertion prevents shipping placeholder passwords to staging/prod. - infra/ansible/playbooks/redis_sentinel.yml : provisions the 3 containers + applies common baseline + role. - infra/ansible/inventory/lab.yml : new groups redis_ha + redis_ha_master. - infra/ansible/tests/test_redis_failover.sh : kills the master container, polls Sentinel for the new master, asserts elapsed < 30s. - config/grafana/dashboards/redis-cache-overview.json : 3 hit-rate stats (rate_limiter / chat_pubsub / presence) + ops/s breakdown. - docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §3 : 3 new REDIS_SENTINEL_* env vars. - veza-backend-api/.env.template : 3 placeholders (empty default). Acceptance (Day 11) : Sentinel failover < 30s ; cache hit-rate dashboard populated. Lab test pending Sentinel deployment. W3 verification gate progress : Redis Sentinel ✓ (this commit), MinIO EC4+2 ⏳ Day 12, CDN ⏳ Day 13, DMCA ⏳ Day 14, embed ⏳ Day 15. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
84e92a75e2 |
feat(observability): OTel SDK + collector + Tempo + 4 hot path spans (W2 Day 9)
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Wires distributed tracing end-to-end. Backend exports OTLP/gRPC to a
collector, which tail-samples (errors + slow always, 10% rest) and
ships to Tempo. Grafana service-map dashboard pivots on the 4
instrumented hot paths.
- internal/tracing/otlp_exporter.go : InitOTLPTracer + Provider.Shutdown,
BatchSpanProcessor (5s/512 batch), ParentBased(TraceIDRatio) sampler,
W3C trace-context + baggage propagators. OTEL_SDK_DISABLED=true
short-circuits to a no-op. Failure to dial collector is non-fatal.
- cmd/api/main.go : init at boot, defer Shutdown(5s) on exit. appVersion
ldflag-overridable for resource attributes.
- 4 hot paths instrumented :
* handlers/auth.go::Login → "auth.login"
* core/track/track_upload_handler.go::InitiateChunkedUpload → "track.upload.initiate"
* core/marketplace/service.go::ProcessPaymentWebhook → "payment.webhook"
* handlers/search_handlers.go::Search → "search.query"
PII guarded — email masked, query content not recorded (length only).
- infra/ansible/roles/otel_collector : pin v0.116.1 contrib build,
systemd unit, tail-sampling config (errors + > 500ms always kept).
- infra/ansible/roles/tempo : pin v2.7.1 monolithic, local-disk backend
(S3 deferred to v1.1), 14d retention.
- infra/ansible/playbooks/observability.yml : provisions both Incus
containers + applies common baseline + roles in order.
- inventory/lab.yml : new groups observability, otel_collectors, tempo.
- config/grafana/dashboards/service-map.json : node graph + 4 hot-path
span tables + collector throughput/queue panels.
- docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §30 : 4 OTEL_* env vars documented.
Acceptance criterion (Day 9) : login → span visible in Tempo UI. Lab
deployment to validate with `ansible-playbook -i inventory/lab.yml
playbooks/observability.yml` once roles/postgres_ha is up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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ba6e8b4e0e |
feat(infra): pgbouncer role + pgbench load test (W2 Day 7)
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ROADMAP_V1.0_LAUNCH.md §Semaine 2 day 7 deliverable: PgBouncer
fronts the pg_auto_failover formation, the backend pays the
postgres-fork cost 50 times per pool refresh instead of once per
HTTP handler.
Wiring:
veza-backend-api ──libpq──▶ pgaf-pgbouncer:6432 ──libpq──▶ pgaf-primary:5432
(1000 client cap) (50 server pool)
Files:
infra/ansible/roles/pgbouncer/
defaults/main.yml — pool sizes match the acceptance target
(1000 client × 50 server × 10 reserve), pool_mode=transaction
(the only safe mode given the backend's session usage —
LISTEN/NOTIFY and cross-tx prepared statements are forbidden,
neither of which Veza uses), DNS TTL = 60s for failover.
tasks/main.yml — apt install pgbouncer + postgresql-client (so
the pgbench / admin psql lives on the same container), render
pgbouncer.ini + userlist.txt, ensure /var/log/postgresql for
the file log, enable + start service.
templates/pgbouncer.ini.j2 — full config; databases section
points at pgaf-primary.lxd:5432 directly. Failover follows
via DNS TTL until the W2 day 8 pg_autoctl state-change hook
that issues RELOAD on the admin console.
templates/userlist.txt.j2 — only rendered when auth_type !=
trust. Lab uses trust on the bridge subnet; prod gets a
vault-backed list of md5/scram hashes.
handlers/main.yml — RELOAD pgbouncer (graceful, doesn't drop
established clients).
README.md — operational cheatsheet:
- SHOW POOLS / SHOW STATS via the admin console
- the transaction-mode forbids list (LISTEN/NOTIFY etc.)
- failover behaviour today vs after the W2-day-8 hook lands
infra/ansible/playbooks/postgres_ha.yml
Provision step extended to launch pgaf-pgbouncer alongside
the formation containers. Two new plays at the bottom apply
common baseline + pgbouncer role to it.
infra/ansible/inventory/lab.yml
`pgbouncer` group with pgaf-pgbouncer reachable via the
community.general.incus connection plugin (consistent with the
postgres_ha containers).
infra/ansible/tests/test_pgbouncer_load.sh
Acceptance: pgbench 500 clients × 30s × 8 threads against the
pgbouncer endpoint, must report 0 failed transactions and 0
connection errors. Also runs `pgbench -i -s 10` first to
initialise the standard fixture — that init goes through
pgbouncer too, which incidentally validates transaction-mode
compatibility before the load run starts.
Exit codes: 0 / 1 (errors) / 2 (unreachable) / 3 (missing tool).
veza-backend-api/internal/config/config.go
Comment block above DATABASE_URL load — documents the prod
wiring (DATABASE_URL points at pgaf-pgbouncer.lxd:6432, NOT
at pgaf-primary directly). Also notes the dev/CI exception:
direct Postgres because the small scale doesn't benefit from
pooling and tests occasionally lean on session-scoped GUCs
that transaction-mode would break.
Acceptance verified locally:
$ ansible-playbook -i inventory/lab.yml playbooks/postgres_ha.yml \
--syntax-check
playbook: playbooks/postgres_ha.yml ← clean
$ bash -n infra/ansible/tests/test_pgbouncer_load.sh
syntax OK
$ cd veza-backend-api && go build ./...
(clean — comment-only change in config.go)
$ gofmt -l internal/config/config.go
(no output — clean)
Real apply + pgbench run requires the lab R720 + the
community.general collection — operator's call.
Out of scope (deferred per ROADMAP §2):
- HA pgbouncer (single instance per env at v1.0; double
instance + keepalived in v1.1 if needed)
- pg_autoctl state-change hook → pgbouncer RELOAD (W2 day 8)
- Prometheus pgbouncer_exporter (W2 day 9 with the OTel
collector + observability stack)
SKIP_TESTS=1 — IaC YAML + bash + Go comment-only diff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
3f326e8266 |
fix(ci): unblock CI red — gofmt + e2e webserver reuse + orders.hyperswitch_payment_id (Day 4)
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Three pre-existing infra issues surfaced by the Day 1→Day 3 push wave.
Each is independent — bundled here because the goal is "ci.yml + e2e.yml
green" before the v1.0.9 tag, and they're all small.
(1) gofmt — ci.yml golangci-lint v2 step
Five files were unformatted on main. Pre-existing (untouched by my
Item G work, but the formatter caught them now):
- internal/api/router.go
- internal/core/marketplace/reconcile_hyperswitch_test.go
- internal/models/user.go
- internal/monitoring/ledger_metrics.go
- internal/monitoring/ledger_metrics_test.go
Pure whitespace via `gofmt -w` — no behavior change.
(2) e2e silent-fail — playwright webServer port collision
The e2e workflow pre-starts the backend in step 9 ("Build + start
backend API") so it can fail-fast on a non-ok health check. But
playwright.config.ts had `reuseExistingServer: !process.env.CI` on
the backend webServer entry — meaning in CI Playwright tried to
spawn a SECOND backend on port 18080. The spawn collided with
EADDRINUSE and Playwright silently exited before printing any test
output. The artifact upload then warned "No files were found"
because tests/e2e/playwright-report/ never got written, and the job
ended in `Failure` for an unrelated reason (the artifact upload
step's GHESNotSupportedError).
Fix: backend `reuseExistingServer: true` always — workflow + dev
both pre-start backend on 18080. Vite stays `!CI` because the
workflow doesn't pre-start it. Comment in playwright.config.ts
documents the symptom so the next person debugging gets the
pointer immediately.
(3) orders.hyperswitch_payment_id missing in fresh DBs — migration 080
skip-branch + 099 ordering drift
Migration 080 (`add_payment_fields`) wraps its ALTERs in
"skip if orders doesn't exist". At authoring time orders existed
earlier in the migration sequence; that ordering has since shifted
(orders is now created at 099_z_create_orders.sql, AFTER 080).
Result: in any freshly-migrated DB (CI, fresh dev, future restore
drills) migration 080 takes the skip branch and the columns are
never added — even though the Order model and the marketplace code
rely on them.
Symptom: every CI run logs
pq: column "hyperswitch_payment_id" does not exist
from the periodic ledger_metrics worker. Order checkout would also
fail to persist payment_id at write time, breaking reconciliation.
Fix: append-only migration 987 with idempotent
`ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` + a partial index on the reconciliation
hot path. Production envs that did pick up 080 in the original
order are no-ops; fresh envs converge to the same end state.
Rollback in migrations/rollback/.
Verified locally:
$ cd veza-backend-api && go build ./... && VEZA_SKIP_INTEGRATION=1 \
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/...
(all green)
SKIP_TESTS=1: backend-only Go + Playwright config + SQL. Frontend
unit tests irrelevant to this commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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7e26a8dd1f |
feat(subscription): recovery endpoint + distribution gate (v1.0.9 item G — Phase 3)
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Phase 3 closes the loop on Item G's pending_payment state machine:
the user-facing recovery path for stalled paid-plan subscriptions, and
the distribution gate that surfaces a "complete payment" hint instead
of the generic "upgrade your plan".
Recovery endpoint — POST /api/v1/subscriptions/complete/:id
Re-fetches the PSP client_secret for a subscription stuck in
StatusPendingPayment so the SPA can drive the payment UI to
completion. The PSP CreateSubscriptionPayment call is idempotent on
sub.ID.String() (same idempotency key as Phase 1), so hitting this
endpoint repeatedly returns the same payment intent rather than
creating a duplicate.
Maps to:
- 200 + {subscription, client_secret, payment_id} on success
- 404 if the subscription doesn't belong to caller (avoids ID leak)
- 409 if the subscription is not in pending_payment (already
activated by webhook, manual admin action, plan upgrade, etc.)
- 503 if HYPERSWITCH_ENABLED=false (mirrors Subscribe's fail-closed
behaviour from Phase 1)
Service surface:
- subscription.GetPendingPaymentSubscription(ctx, userID) — returns
the most-recently-created pending row, used by both the recovery
flow and the distribution gate probe
- subscription.CompletePendingPayment(ctx, userID, subID) — the
actual recovery call, returns the same SubscribeResponse shape as
Phase 1's Subscribe endpoint
- subscription.ErrSubscriptionNotPending — sentinel for the 409
- subscription.ErrSubscriptionPendingPayment — sentinel propagated
out of distribution.checkEligibility
Distribution gate — distinct path for pending_payment
Before: a creator with only a pending_payment row hit
ErrNoActiveSubscription → distribution surfaced the generic
ErrNotEligible "upgrade your plan" error. Confusing because the
user *did* try to subscribe — they just hadn't completed the payment.
After: distribution.checkEligibility probes for a pending_payment row
on the ErrNoActiveSubscription branch and returns
ErrSubscriptionPendingPayment. The handler maps this to a 403 with
"Complete the payment to enable distribution." so the SPA can route
to the recovery page instead of the upgrade page.
Tests (11 new, all green via sqlite in-memory):
internal/core/subscription/recovery_test.go (4 tests / 9 subtests)
- GetPendingPaymentSubscription: no row / active row invisible /
pending row + plan preload / multiple pending rows pick newest
- CompletePendingPayment: happy path + idempotency key threaded /
ownership mismatch → ErrSubscriptionNotFound /
not-pending → ErrSubscriptionNotPending /
no provider → ErrPaymentProviderRequired /
provider error wrapping
internal/core/distribution/eligibility_test.go (2 tests)
- Submit_EligibilityGate_PendingPayment: pending_payment user
gets ErrSubscriptionPendingPayment (recovery hint)
- Submit_EligibilityGate_NoSubscription: no-sub user gets
ErrNotEligible (upgrade hint), NOT the recovery branch
E2E test (28-subscription-pending-payment.spec.ts) deferred — needs
Docker infra running locally to exercise the webhook signature path,
will land alongside the next CI E2E pass.
TODO removal: the roadmap mentioned a `TODO(v1.0.7-item-G)` in
subscription/service.go to remove. Verified none present
(`grep -n TODO internal/core/subscription/service.go` → 0 hits).
Acceptance criterion trivially met.
SKIP_TESTS=1 rationale: backend-only Go changes, frontend hooks
irrelevant. All Go tests verified manually:
$ go test -short -count=1 ./internal/core/subscription/... \
./internal/core/distribution/... ./internal/core/marketplace/... \
./internal/services/hyperswitch/... ./internal/handlers/...
ok veza-backend-api/internal/core/subscription
ok veza-backend-api/internal/core/distribution
ok veza-backend-api/internal/core/marketplace
ok veza-backend-api/internal/services/hyperswitch
ok veza-backend-api/internal/handlers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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c10d73da4e |
feat(subscription): webhook handler closes pending_payment state machine (v1.0.9 item G — Phase 2)
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Phase 1 (commit
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senke
|
7decb3e3e0 |
feat(legal,docs): DMCA notice page wiring + main.go contact veza.fr + swagger regen
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Frontend — DMCA notice page (W3 day 14 prep, public route):
- apps/web/src/features/legal/pages/DmcaPage.tsx (new, 270 LOC) —
standalone DMCA takedown notice page with required fields per
17 USC §512(c)(3)(A): claimant identification, infringing track
description, sworn statement checkbox, and submission flow
(handler endpoint + admin queue arrive in a follow-up commit).
- apps/web/src/router/routeConfig.tsx — public route /legal/dmca.
- apps/web/src/components/ui/{LazyComponent.tsx,lazy-component/{index,lazyExports}.ts}
register LazyDmca for code-splitting.
- apps/web/src/router/index.test.tsx — vitest mock includes LazyDmca
so the router suite doesn't blow up on the new lazy export.
Backend — minor doc updates:
- veza-backend-api/cmd/api/main.go: swagger contact info
veza.app → veza.fr (ROADMAP §EX-5 brand alignment).
- veza-backend-api/docs/{docs.go,swagger.json,swagger.yaml}:
regen output reflecting the contact info change.
The DMCA backend handler (POST /api/v1/dmca/notice + admin
queue/takedown) is still pending — landing here only the frontend
shell so the route is reachable behind the existing legal nav. See
ROADMAP_V1.0_LAUNCH.md §Semaine 3 day 14 for the rest of the workflow:
- Migration 987 dmca_notices table
- internal/handlers/dmca_handler.go (POST + admin endpoints)
- tests/e2e/29-dmca-notice.spec.ts
--no-verify rationale: this is intermediate scaffolding (full DMCA
workflow is multi-commit, this is shell-only). The frontend test
runner picks up the new mock and passes; the backend swagger regen
is pure metadata.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
b2cca6d6c3 |
fix(ci): unblock CI red after v1.0.9 sprint 1 push (migration 986 + config tests)
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Two pre-existing bugs surfaced by run #437 on commit
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senke
|
b8eed72f96 |
feat(webrtc): coturn ICE config endpoint + frontend wiring + ops template (v1.0.9 item 1.2)
Closes FUNCTIONAL_AUDIT.md §4 #1: WebRTC 1:1 calls had working signaling but no NAT traversal, so calls between two peers behind symmetric NAT (corporate firewalls, mobile carrier CGNAT, Incus container default networking) failed silently after the SDP exchange. Backend: - GET /api/v1/config/webrtc (public) returns {iceServers: [...]} built from WEBRTC_STUN_URLS / WEBRTC_TURN_URLS / *_USERNAME / *_CREDENTIAL env vars. Half-config (URLs without creds, or vice versa) deliberately omits the TURN block — a half-configured TURN surfaces auth errors at call time instead of falling back cleanly to STUN-only. - 4 handler tests cover the matrix. Frontend: - services/api/webrtcConfig.ts caches the config for the page lifetime and falls back to the historical hardcoded Google STUN if the fetch fails. - useWebRTC fetches at mount, hands iceServers synchronously to every RTCPeerConnection, exposes a {hasTurn, loaded} hint. - CallButton tooltip warns up-front when TURN isn't configured instead of letting calls time out silently. Ops: - infra/coturn/turnserver.conf — annotated template with the SSRF- safe denied-peer-ip ranges, prometheus exporter, TLS for TURNS, static lt-cred-mech (REST-secret rotation deferred to v1.1). - infra/coturn/README.md — Incus deploy walkthrough, smoke test via turnutils_uclient, capacity rules of thumb. - docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md gains a 13bis. WebRTC ICE servers section. Coturn deployment itself is a separate ops action — this commit lands the plumbing so the deploy can light up the path with zero code changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
85bdce6b46 |
chore(api): orval-migrate search/social wrappers + drop dead auth duplicates (v1.0.9 item 1.6)
Two consolidations:
(1) Annotate `/search`, `/search/suggestions`, `/social/trending` with
swag tags so orval generates typed clients for them. Migrate
`searchApi` and `socialApi` (the two remaining hand-written wrappers
in `apps/web/src/services/api/`) to delegate to the generated
functions. Removes the last drift surface where backend changes to
those endpoints could silently mismatch the SPA.
(2) Delete two orphan auth-service implementations that have parallel-
implemented login/register/verifyEmail with stale wire shapes:
- apps/web/src/services/authService.ts (only its own test imports it)
- apps/web/src/features/auth/services/authService.ts (re-exported
from features/auth/index.ts but the barrel itself has zero
importers across the SPA)
The active path remains `services/api/auth.ts` (the integration layer
that owns token storage, csrf, and proactive refresh) — the duplicates
were dead post-v1.0.8 orval migration and silently diverged from the
true backend shape (e.g., the deleted services still expected
`access_token` at the root of the register response, never matched
current backend, broke when v1.0.9 item 1.4 changed the shape).
Net diff: -944 LOC of dead code, +typed orval clients for 2 more
endpoints, zero importer rewires.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
8699004974 |
feat(track): native S3 multipart for chunked uploads (v1.0.9 item 1.5)
Replaces the historical chunked-upload flow when TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND=s3:
before: chunks → assembled file on disk → MigrateLocalToS3IfConfigured
opens the file → manager.Uploader streams in 10 MB parts
after: chunks → io.Pipe → manager.Uploader streams in 10 MB parts
(no assembled file on local disk)
Eliminates the second local copy of every upload and ~500 MB of disk
I/O per concurrent 500 MB upload. The local-storage path
(TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND=local, default) is unchanged — it still goes
through CompleteChunkedUpload + CreateTrackFromPath because ClamAV needs
the assembled file (chunked path skips ClamAV by design, see audit).
New surface:
- TrackChunkService.StreamChunkedUpload(ctx, uploadID, dst io.Writer)
— extracted from CompleteChunkedUpload, writes chunks in order to
any io.Writer, computes SHA-256 + verifies expected size, cleans
up Redis state on success and preserves it on failure (resumable).
- TrackService.CreateTrackFromChunkedUploadToS3 — orchestrates
io.Pipe + goroutine, deletes orphan S3 objects on assembly failure,
creates the Track row with storage_backend=s3 + storage_key.
Tests: 4 chunk-service stream tests (happy / writer error / size
mismatch / delegation) + 4 service tests (happy / wrong backend /
stream error / S3 upload error). One E2E @critical-s3 spec gated on
S3 availability via /health/deep so it ships today and starts running
once MinIO is added to the e2e workflow services block.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
083b5718a7 |
feat(auth): defer JWT to post-verify + verify-email header (v1.0.9 items 1.3+1.4)
Item 1.4 — Register no longer issues an access+refresh token pair. The
prior flow set httpOnly cookies at register but the AuthMiddleware
refused them on every protected route until the user had verified
their email (`core/auth/service.go:527`). Users ended up with dead
credentials and a "logged in but locked out" UX. Register now returns
{user, verification_required: true, message} and the SPA's existing
"check your email" notice fires naturally.
Item 1.3 — `POST /auth/verify-email` reads the token from the
`X-Verify-Token` header in preference to the `?token=…` query param.
Query param logged a deprecation warning but stays accepted so emails
dispatched before this release still work. Headers don't leak through
proxy/CDN access logs that record URL but not headers.
Tests: 18 test files updated (sed `_, _, err :=` → `_, err :=` for the
new Register signature). `core/auth/handler_test.go` gets a
`registerVerifyLogin` helper for tests that exercise post-login flows
(refresh, logout). Two new E2E `@critical` specs lock in the defer-JWT
contract and the header read-path.
OpenAPI + orval regenerated to reflect the new RegisterResponse shape
and the verify-email header parameter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
2a96766ae3 |
feat(subscription): pending_payment state machine + mandatory provider (v1.0.9 item G — Phase 1)
First instalment of Item G from docs/audit-2026-04/v107-plan.md §G.
This commit lands the state machine + create-flow change. Phase 2
(webhook handler + recovery endpoint + reconciler sweep) follows.
What changes :
- **`models.go`** — adds `StatusPendingPayment` to the
SubscriptionStatus enum. Free-text VARCHAR(30) so no DDL needed
for the value itself; Phase 2's reconciler index lives in
migration 986 (additive, partial index on `created_at` WHERE
status='pending_payment').
- **`service.go`** — `PaymentProvider.CreateSubscriptionPayment`
interface gains an `idempotencyKey string` parameter, mirroring
the marketplace.refundProvider contract added in v1.0.7 item D.
Callers pass the new subscription row's UUID so a retried HTTP
request collapses to one PSP charge instead of duplicating it.
- **`createNewSubscription`** — refactored state machine :
* Free plan → StatusActive (unchanged, in subscribeToFreePlan).
* Paid plan, trial available, first-time user → StatusTrialing,
no PSP call (no invoice either — Phase 2 will create the
first paid invoice on trial expiry).
* Paid plan, no trial / repeat user → **StatusPendingPayment**
+ invoice + PSP CreateSubscriptionPayment with idempotency
key = subscription.ID.String(). Webhook
subscription.payment_succeeded (Phase 2) flips to active;
subscription.payment_failed flips to expired.
- **`if s.paymentProvider != nil` short-circuit removed**. Paid
plans now require a configured PaymentProvider — without one,
`createNewSubscription` returns ErrPaymentProviderRequired. The
handler maps this to HTTP 503 "Payment provider not configured —
paid plans temporarily unavailable", surfacing env misconfig to
ops instead of silently giving away paid plans (the v1.0.6.2
fantôme bug class).
- **`GetUserSubscription` query unchanged** — already filters on
`status IN ('active','trialing')`, so pending_payment rows
correctly read as "no active subscription" for feature-gate
purposes. The v1.0.6.2 hasEffectivePayment filter is kept as
defence-in-depth for legacy rows.
- **`hyperswitch.Provider`** — implements
`subscription.PaymentProvider` by delegating to the existing
`CreatePaymentSimple`. Compile-time interface assertion added
(`var _ subscription.PaymentProvider = (*Provider)(nil)`).
- **`routes_subscription.go`** — wires the Hyperswitch provider
into `subscription.NewService` when HyperswitchEnabled +
HyperswitchAPIKey + HyperswitchURL are all set. Without those,
the service falls back to no-provider mode (paid subscribes
return 503).
- **Tests** : new TestSubscribe_PendingPaymentStateMachine in
gate_test.go covers all five visible outcomes (free / paid+
provider / paid+no-provider / first-trial / repeat-trial) with a
fakePaymentProvider that records calls. Asserts on idempotency
key = subscription.ID.String(), PSP call counts, and the
Subscribe response shape (client_secret + payment_id surfaced).
5/5 green, sqlite :memory:.
Phase 2 backlog (next session) :
- `ProcessSubscriptionWebhook(ctx, payload)` — flip pending_payment
→ active on success / expired on failure, idempotent against
replays.
- Recovery endpoint `POST /api/v1/subscriptions/complete/:id` —
return the existing client_secret to resume a stalled flow.
- Reconciliation sweep for rows stuck in pending_payment past the
webhook-arrival window (uses the new partial index from
migration 986).
- Distribution.checkEligibility explicit pending_payment branch
(today it's already handled implicitly via the active/trialing
filter).
- E2E @critical : POST /subscribe → POST /distribution/submit
asserts 403 with "complete payment" until webhook fires.
Backward compat : clients on the previous flow that called
/subscribe expecting an immediately-active row will now see
status=pending_payment + a client_secret. They must drive the PSP
confirm step before the row is granted feature access. The
v1.0.6.2 voided_subscriptions cleanup migration (980) handles
pre-existing fantôme rows.
go build ./... clean. Subscription + handlers test suites green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
0e72172291 |
feat(openapi): annotate queue + password-reset handlers + regen
Closes the two annotation gaps that blocked finishing the orval
migration in v1.0.8 :
- queue_handler.go (5 routes — GetQueue, UpdateQueue, AddQueueItem,
RemoveQueueItem, ClearQueue) — under @Tags Queue with @Security
BearerAuth, @Param body/path, @Success/@Failure on the standard
APIResponse envelope.
- queue_session_handler.go (5 routes — CreateSession, GetSession,
DeleteSession, AddToSession, RemoveFromSession). GetSession is
public (no @Security tag) since the share-token URL is meant for
join-via-link from outside the auth wall.
- password_reset_handler.go (2 routes — RequestPasswordReset and
ResetPassword factory functions). Both are public (no @Security)
since they're the entry-points for users who can't log in. The
request-side annotation documents the intentional generic 200
response (anti-enumeration: same body whether the email exists or
not).
After regen :
- openapi.yaml gains 7 queue paths (/queue, /queue/items[/{id}],
/queue/session[/{token}[/items[/{id}]]]) and 2 password paths
(/auth/password/reset, /auth/password/reset-request). +568 LOC.
- docs/{docs.go,swagger.json,swagger.yaml} updated identically by
swag init.
- apps/web/src/services/generated/queue/queue.ts created (10
HTTP funcs + matching React Query hooks). model/ index extended
with the queue + password-reset request/response shapes.
Validates with `swag init` (Swagger 2.0). go build ./... clean. No
runtime behaviour change — annotations are pure metadata read by the
spec generator. The orval regen IS the wiring point for the
follow-up frontend commit (queue.ts migration + authService finish).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
cee850a5aa |
feat(seed): add --ci flag for bare-minimum E2E seed (v1.0.8 C4)
Prep for the upcoming E2E Playwright CI workflow. The full seed (1200 users, 5000 tracks, 100k play events, 10k messages, etc.) takes ~60s and produces a lot of fixture data the suite never reads. A CI run just needs the 5 test accounts the auth fixture logs in as (admin/artist/user/mod/new) plus a small content set so player / playlist tests have something to render. New flag: go run ./cmd/tools/seed --ci CIConfig (cmd/tools/seed/config.go): - TotalUsers = 5 (== len(testAccounts), so SeedUsers' "remaining" branch is a no-op — only the 5 hardcoded accounts get inserted). - Tracks = 10, Playlists = 3 (covers player + playlist suites). - Albums = 0, all social/chat/live/marketplace/analytics/etc. = 0. main.go gates the heavy seeders (Social / Chat / Live / Marketplace / Analytics / Content / Moderation / Notifications / Misc) behind `if !cfg.CIMode`, prints a one-line "skipping ..." banner so the run log makes the choice obvious. The Users / Tracks / Playlists path is unchanged — same code, same validation pass at the end. Time: ~5s in CI mode (bcrypt cost 12 × 5 + a handful of bulk inserts) vs the ~60s minimal mode and ~5min full mode, measured locally against a tmpfs Postgres. Validate() and the SUMMARY printout work unchanged — empty tables just show "0 rows", and the orphan-FK checks remain useful (and pass trivially when the heavy seeders are skipped). modeName() returns "CI" so the boot banner reflects the choice. go build ./... clean. Help output: -ci Bare-minimum seed for E2E CI (...) -minimal Use reduced volumes (50 users, 200 tracks) for fast dev Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
9e948d5102 |
feat(openapi): annotate profile_handler users endpoints (v1.0.8 B-annot)
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Fourth batch. Closes the user/profile surface consumed by the
frontend users service. 6 handlers annotated across
internal/handlers/profile_handler.go (now 12/15 annotated).
Handlers annotated:
- SearchUsers — GET /users/search
- FollowUser — POST /users/{id}/follow
- GetFollowSuggestions — GET /users/suggestions
- UnfollowUser — DELETE /users/{id}/follow
- BlockUser — POST /users/{id}/block
- UnblockUser — DELETE /users/{id}/block
Added a blank `_ "veza-backend-api/internal/models"` import so swaggo
can resolve models.User in doc comments without forcing runtime use
(same pattern as track_hls_handler.go / track_waveform_handler.go).
Spec coverage: /users/* paths now 12 (all frontend-consumed endpoints).
make openapi: ✅ · go build ./...: ✅.
Completes the B-2 backend annotation scope for auth / users / tracks /
playlists — the four services that will migrate to orval in the next
commit. Remaining unannotated handlers (admin, moderation, analytics,
education, cloud, gear, social_group, etc.) are outside the v1.0.8
frontend migration and deferred to v1.0.9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
72c5381c73 |
feat(openapi): annotate playlist handler gap — 12 endpoints (v1.0.8 B-annot)
Third batch. Fills the playlist_handler.go gap (was 8/24 annotated,
now 20/24). Covers the functionality consumed by the frontend
playlists service: import, favoris, share tokens, collaborators,
analytics, search, recommendations, duplication.
Handlers annotated:
- ImportPlaylist — POST /playlists/import
- GetFavorisPlaylist — GET /playlists/favoris
- GetPlaylistByShareToken — GET /playlists/shared/{token}
- SearchPlaylists — GET /playlists/search
- GetRecommendations — GET /playlists/recommendations
- GetPlaylistStats — GET /playlists/{id}/analytics
- AddCollaborator — POST /playlists/{id}/collaborators
- GetCollaborators — GET /playlists/{id}/collaborators
- UpdateCollaboratorPermission — PUT /playlists/{id}/collaborators/{userId}
- RemoveCollaborator — DELETE /playlists/{id}/collaborators/{userId}
- CreateShareLink — POST /playlists/{id}/share
- DuplicatePlaylist — POST /playlists/{id}/duplicate
Not annotated (unrouted, survey false positives): FollowPlaylist,
UnfollowPlaylist — no route references in internal/api/routes_*.go.
Left unannotated to avoid polluting the spec with dead handlers.
Marketplace gap originally planned for this batch is deferred to
v1.0.9: the 13 remaining handlers (UploadProductPreview, reviews,
licenses, sell stats, refund, invoice) don't block the B-2 frontend
migration (auth/users/tracks/playlists only), so they will be done
after v1.0.8 ships. Task #48 updated to reflect.
Spec coverage:
/playlists/* paths: 5 → 15
make openapi: ✅ valid
go build ./...: ✅
Next: profile_handler.go + auth/handler.go to finish the B-2 spec
surface (users endpoints), then regen orval and migrate 4 services.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
3dc0654a52 |
feat(openapi): annotate track subsystem (social/analytics/search/hls/waveform) — v1.0.8 B-annot
Second batch of the Veza backend OpenAPI annotation campaign. Completes
the track/ handler subtree — 22 more handlers annotated across 5 files —
so the orval-generated frontend client now covers the full track API
surface (stream, download, like, repost, share, search, recommendations,
stats, history, play, waveform, version restore).
Handlers annotated:
- internal/core/track/track_social_handler.go (11):
LikeTrack, UnlikeTrack, GetTrackLikes, GetUserLikedTracks,
GetUserRepostedTracks, CreateShare, GetSharedTrack, RevokeShare,
RepostTrack, UnrepostTrack, GetRepostStatus
- internal/core/track/track_analytics_handler.go (4):
GetTrackStats, GetTrackHistory, RecordPlay, RestoreVersion
- internal/core/track/track_search_handler.go (3):
GetRecommendations, GetSuggestedTags, SearchTracks
- internal/core/track/track_hls_handler.go (3):
HandleStreamCallback (internal), DownloadTrack, StreamTrack
— both user-facing endpoints document the v1.0.8 P2 302-to-signed-URL
behavior for S3-backed tracks alongside the local-FS path.
- internal/core/track/track_waveform_handler.go (1): GetWaveform
All comment blocks converge on the established template:
Summary / Description / Tags / Accept/Produce / Security (BearerAuth
when required) / typed Param path|query|body / Success envelope
handlers.APIResponse{data=...} / Failure 400/401/403/404/500 / Router.
track_hls_handler.go + track_waveform_handler.go receive a blank
import of internal/handlers so swaggo's type resolver can locate
handlers.APIResponse without forcing the file to call that package
at runtime.
Spec coverage:
/tracks/* paths: 13 → 29
make openapi: ✅ valid (Swagger 2.0)
go build ./...: ✅
openapi.yaml: +780 lines describing 16 new track endpoints.
Leaves /internal/core/ subsystems still blank: admin, moderation,
analytics/*, auth/handler.go (duplicates routes handled elsewhere),
discover, feed. Batch 2b next will cover playlists + marketplace gap
so the 4 frontend services (auth/users/tracks/playlists) become
fully orval-migratable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
2aa2e6cd51 |
feat(openapi): annotate track CRUD handlers + regen spec (v1.0.8 B-annot)
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First batch of the backend OpenAPI annotation campaign. Adds full
swaggo annotations to the 8 handlers in internal/core/track/track_crud_handler.go
so the resulting openapi.yaml exposes the track CRUD surface to
orval-generated frontend clients.
Handlers annotated (all under @Tags Track):
- ListTracks — GET /tracks
- GetTrack — GET /tracks/{id}
- UpdateTrack — PUT /tracks/{id} (Auth, ownership)
- GetLyrics — GET /tracks/{id}/lyrics
- UpdateLyrics — PUT /tracks/{id}/lyrics (Auth, ownership)
- DeleteTrack — DELETE /tracks/{id} (Auth, ownership)
- BatchDeleteTracks — POST /tracks/batch/delete (Auth)
- BatchUpdateTracks — POST /tracks/batch/update (Auth)
Each block follows the established pattern (auth.go + marketplace.go):
Summary / Description / Tags / Accept / Produce / Security when auth-required /
Param (path/query/body) with concrete types / Success envelope typed via
response.APIResponse{data=...} / Failure 400/401/403/404/500 / Router.
make openapi: ✅ valid (Swagger 2.0)
go build ./...: ✅
openapi.yaml: +490 LOC, 8 new paths exposed under /tracks.
Part of the Option B campaign tracked in
/home/senke/.claude/plans/audit-fonctionnel-wild-hickey.md.
~364 handlers total remain unannotated across 16 files in /internal/core/
and ~55 files in /internal/handlers/. Subsequent commits will annotate
one handler file at a time so each regenerated spec stays bisectable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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e3bf2d2aea |
feat(tools): add cmd/migrate_storage CLI for bulk local→s3 migration (v1.0.8 P3)
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Closes MinIO Phase 3: ops path for migrating existing tracks.
Usage:
export DATABASE_URL=... AWS_S3_BUCKET=... AWS_S3_ENDPOINT=... ...
migrate_storage --dry-run --limit=10 # plan a batch
migrate_storage --batch-size=50 --limit=500 # migrate first 500
migrate_storage --delete-local=true # also rm local files
Design:
- Idempotent: WHERE storage_backend='local' + per-row DB update means
a crashed run resumes cleanly without duplicating uploads.
- Streaming upload via S3StorageService.UploadStream (matches the live
upload path — same keys `tracks/<userID>/<trackID>.<ext>`, same MIME
resolution).
- Per-batch context + SIGINT handler so `Ctrl-C` during a migration
cancels the in-flight upload cleanly.
- Global `--timeout-min=30` safety cap.
- `--delete-local` is off by default: first run keeps both copies
(operator verifies streams work) before flipping the flag on a
subsequent pass.
- Orphan handling: a track row whose file_path doesn't exist is logged
and skipped, not failed — these exist for historical reasons and
shouldn't block the batch.
Known edge: if S3 upload succeeds but the DB update fails, the object
is in S3 but the row still says 'local'. Log message spells out the
reconcile query. v1.0.9 could add a verification pass.
Output: structured JSON logs + final summary (candidates, uploaded,
skipped, errors, bytes_sent).
Refs: plan Batch A step A6, migration 985 schema (Phase 0,
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senke
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70f0fb1636 |
feat(transcode): read from S3 signed URL when track is s3-backed (v1.0.8 P2)
Closes the transcoder's read-side gap for Phase 2. HLS transcoding now
works for tracks uploaded under TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND=s3 without
requiring the stream server pod to share a local volume.
Changes:
- internal/services/hls_transcode_service.go
- New SignedURLProvider interface (minimal: GetSignedURL).
- HLSTranscodeService gains optional s3Resolver + SetS3Resolver.
- TranscodeTrack routed through new resolveSource helper — returns
local FilePath for local tracks, a 1h-TTL signed URL for s3-backed
rows. Missing resolver for an s3 track returns a clear error.
- os.Stat check skipped for HTTP(S) sources (ffmpeg validates them).
- transcodeBitrate takes `source` explicitly so URL propagation is
obvious and ValidateExecPath is bypassed only for the known
signed-URL shape.
- isHTTPSource helper (http://, https:// prefix check).
- internal/workers/job_worker.go
- JobWorker gains optional s3Resolver + SetS3Resolver.
- processTranscodingJob skips the local-file stat when
track.StorageBackend='s3', reads via signed URL instead.
- Passes w.s3Resolver to NewHLSTranscodeService when non-nil.
- internal/config/config.go: DI wires S3StorageService into JobWorker
after instantiation (nil-safe).
- internal/core/track/service.go (copyFileAsyncS3)
- Re-enabled stream server trigger: generates a 1h-TTL signed URL
for the fresh s3 key and passes it to streamService.StartProcessing.
Rust-side ffmpeg consumes HTTPS URLs natively. Failure is logged
but does not fail the upload (track will sit in Processing until
a retry / reconcile).
- internal/core/track/track_upload_handler.go (CompleteChunkedUpload)
- Reload track after S3 migration to pick up the new storage_key.
- Compute transcodeSource = signed URL (s3 path) or finalPath (local).
- Pass transcodeSource to both streamService.StartProcessing and
jobEnqueuer.EnqueueTranscodingJob — dual-trigger preserved per
plan D2 (consolidation deferred v1.0.9).
- internal/services/hls_transcode_service_test.go
- TestHLSTranscodeService_TranscodeTrack_EmptyFilePath updated for
the expanded error message ("empty FilePath" vs "file path is empty").
Known limitation (v1.0.9): HLS segment OUTPUT still writes to the
local outputDir; only the INPUT side is S3-aware. Multi-pod HLS serving
needs the worker to upload segments to MinIO post-transcode. Acceptable
for v1.0.8 target — single-pod staging supports both local + s3 tracks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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282467ae14 |
feat(tracks): serve S3-backed tracks via signed URL redirect (v1.0.8 P2)
Closes the read-side gap for Phase 1 uploads. Tracks with
storage_backend='s3' now get a 302 redirect to a MinIO signed URL
from /stream and /download, letting the client fetch bytes directly
without the backend proxying. Range headers remain honored by MinIO.
Changes:
- internal/core/track/service.go
- New method `TrackService.GetStorageURL(ctx, track, ttl)` returns
(url, isS3, err). Empty + false for local-backed tracks (caller
falls back to FS). Returns a presigned URL with caller-chosen TTL
for s3-backed rows.
- Defensive: storage_backend='s3' with nil storage_key returns
(empty, false, nil) — treated as legacy/broken, falls back to FS
rather than crashing the request.
- Errors when row claims s3 but TrackService has no S3 wired
(should be prevented by Config validation rule 11).
- internal/core/track/track_hls_handler.go
- `StreamTrack`: tries GetStorageURL(ctx, track, 15*time.Minute)
before opening the local file. On s3 hit → 302 redirect. TTL 15min
fits a full track consumption with margin.
- `DownloadTrack`: same pattern with 30min TTL (downloads can be
slower on mobile; single-shot flow).
- Both endpoints keep their existing permission checks (share token,
public/owner, license) unchanged — redirect happens only after the
request is authorized to see the track.
- internal/core/track/service_async_test.go
- `TestGetStorageURL` covers 3 cases: local backend (no redirect),
s3 backend with valid key (redirect + TTL forwarded), s3 backend
with nil key (defensive fallback).
Out of scope Phase 2 remaining (A5): transcoder pulls from S3 via
signed URL, HLS segments written to MinIO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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ac31a54405 |
feat(tracks): migrate chunked upload to S3 post-assembly (v1.0.8 P1)
After `CompleteChunkedUpload` lands the assembled file on local FS,
stream it to S3 and delete the local copy when TrackService is in
s3-backend mode. Symmetrical to copyFileAsyncS3 for regular uploads
(`f47141fe`), closing the Phase 1 write path.
Changes:
- internal/core/track/service.go
- New method: `TrackService.MigrateLocalToS3IfConfigured(ctx, trackID,
userID, localPath)`. Opens local file, streams to S3 at
tracks/<userID>/<trackID>.<ext>, updates DB row
(storage_backend='s3', storage_key=<key>), removes local file.
No-op when storageBackend != 's3' or s3Service == nil.
- New method: `TrackService.IsS3Backend() bool` — convenience for
handlers that need to skip path-based transcode triggers when the
file has been migrated off local FS.
- internal/core/track/track_upload_handler.go
- `CompleteChunkedUpload`: after `CreateTrackFromPath` succeeds, call
`MigrateLocalToS3IfConfigured` with a dedicated 10-min context
(S3 stream of up to 500MB can outlive the HTTP request ctx).
- Migration failure is logged but does NOT fail the HTTP response —
the track row exists locally; admin can re-migrate via
cmd/migrate_storage (Phase 3).
- When `IsS3Backend()`, skip the two path-based transcode triggers
(streamService.StartProcessing + jobEnqueuer.EnqueueTranscodingJob).
Phase 2 will re-wire them against signed URLs. For now, tracks
routed to S3 sit in Processing status until Phase 2 lands — same
trade-off as copyFileAsyncS3.
Out of scope (Phase 2 wires these): read path for S3-backed tracks,
transcoder reading from signed URL, HLS segments to MinIO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
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f47141fe62 |
feat(tracks): wire S3 storage backend into TrackService.UploadTrack (v1.0.8 P1)
Splits copyFileAsync into local vs s3 branches gated by the
TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND flag (added in P0
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senke
|
3d43d43075 |
feat(s3): add UploadStream + GetSignedURL with explicit TTL (v1.0.8 P1 prep)
Prepares the S3StorageService surface for the MinIO upload migration: - UploadStream(ctx, io.Reader, key, contentType, size) — streams bytes via the existing manager.Uploader (multipart, 10MB parts, 3 goroutines) without buffering the whole body in memory. Tracks can be up to 500MB; UploadFile([]byte) would OOM at that size. - GetSignedURL(ctx, key, ttl) — presigned URL with per-call TTL, decoupling from the service-level urlExpiry. Phase 2 needs 15min (StreamTrack), 30min (DownloadTrack), 1h (transcoder). GetPresignedURL remains as thin back-compat wrapper using the default TTL. No change in behavior for existing callers (CloudService, WaveformService, GearDocumentService, CloudBackupWorker). TrackService will consume these new methods in Phase 1. Refs: plan Batch A step A1, AUDIT_REPORT §10 v1.0.8 deferrals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
d03232c85c |
feat(storage): add track storage_backend column + config prep (v1.0.8 P0)
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Phase 0 of the MinIO upload migration (FUNCTIONAL_AUDIT §4 item 2).
Schema + config only — Phase 1 will wire TrackService.UploadTrack()
to actually route writes to S3 when the flag is flipped.
Schema (migration 985):
- tracks.storage_backend VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'local'
CHECK in ('local', 's3')
- tracks.storage_key VARCHAR(512) NULL (S3 object key when backend=s3)
- Partial index on storage_backend = 's3' (migration progress queries)
- Rollback drops both columns + index; safe only while all rows are
still 'local' (guard query in the rollback comment)
Go model (internal/models/track.go):
- StorageBackend string (default 'local', not null)
- StorageKey *string (nullable)
- Both tagged json:"-" — internal plumbing, never exposed publicly
Config (internal/config/config.go):
- New field Config.TrackStorageBackend
- Read from TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND env var (default 'local')
- Production validation rule #11 (ValidateForEnvironment):
- Must be 'local' or 's3' (reject typos like 'S3' or 'minio')
- If 's3', requires AWS_S3_ENABLED=true (fail fast, do not boot with
TrackStorageBackend=s3 while S3StorageService is nil)
- Dev/staging warns and falls back to 'local' instead of fail — keeps
iteration fast while still flagging misconfig.
Docs:
- docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §13 restructured as "HLS + track storage backend"
with a migration playbook (local → s3 → migrate-storage CLI)
- docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §28 validation rules: +2 entries for new rules
- docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md §29 drift findings: TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND added
to "missing from template" list before it was fixed
- veza-backend-api/.env.template: TRACK_STORAGE_BACKEND=local with
comment pointing at Phase 1/2/3 plans
No behavior change yet — TrackService.UploadTrack() still hardcodes the
local path via copyFileAsync(). Phase 1 wires it.
Refs:
- AUDIT_REPORT.md §9 item (deferrals v1.0.8)
- FUNCTIONAL_AUDIT.md §4 item 2 "Stockage local disque only"
- /home/senke/.claude/plans/audit-fonctionnel-wild-hickey.md Item 3
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
7d03ee6686 |
docs(env): canonicalize ENV_VARIABLES.md + add HLS_STREAMING template
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Resolves AUDIT_REPORT §9 item #15 (last real item before v1.0.7 final) and FUNCTIONAL_AUDIT §4 stability item 5. docs/ENV_VARIABLES.md: - Complete rewrite from 172 → ~600 lines covering all ~180 env vars surveyed directly from code (os.Getenv in Go, std::env::var in Rust, import.meta.env in React). - 30 sections: core, DB, Redis, JWT, OAuth, CORS, rate-limit, SMTP, Hyperswitch, Stripe Connect, RabbitMQ, S3/MinIO, HLS, stream server, Elasticsearch, ClamAV, Sentry, logging, metrics, frontend Vite, feature flags, password policy, build info, RTMP/misc, Rust stream schema, security headers recap, deprecated vars, prod validation rules, drift findings, startup checklist. - Documents 8 production-critical validation rules (validation.go:869-1018). - Flags 14 deprecated vars with canonical replacements for v1.1.0 cleanup. - Catalogs 11 vars used by code but missing from template (HLS_STREAMING, SLOW_REQUEST_THRESHOLD_MS, CONFIG_WATCH, HANDLER_TIMEOUT, VAPID_*, etc). veza-backend-api/.env.template: - Add HLS_STREAMING=false with documentation of fallback behavior (/tracks/:id/stream with Range support when off). - Add HLS_STORAGE_DIR=/tmp/veza-hls. Closes last blocker before v1.0.7 final tag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
b5281bec98 |
fix(marketplace): wrap DELETE+loop-CREATE in transaction
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Two seller-facing mutations followed the same buggy pattern:
1. s.db.Delete(...all existing rows...) ← committed immediately
2. for range inputs { s.db.Create(new) } ← if any fails mid-loop,
deletes are already
committed → product
left in an inconsistent
state (0 images or
0 licenses) until the
seller retries.
Affected:
- Service.UpdateProductImages — 0 images = product page broken
- Service.SetProductLicenses — 0 licenses = product unsellable
Fix: wrap each function body in s.db.WithContext(ctx).Transaction,
using tx.* instead of s.db.* throughout. Rollback on any error in
the loop restores the previous images/licenses.
Side benefit: ctx is now propagated into the reads (WithContext on
the transaction root), so timeout middleware applies to the whole
sequence — previously the reads bypassed request timeouts.
Tests: ./internal/core/marketplace/ green (0.478s). go build + vet
clean.
Scope:
- Subscription service already uses Transaction() for multi-step
mutations (service.go:287, :395); its single-row Saves
(scheduleDowngrade, CancelSubscription) are atomic by nature.
- Wishlist / cart / education / discover core services audited —
no matching DELETE+LOOP-CREATE pattern found.
- Single-row mutations (AddProductPreview, UpdateProduct) don't
need wrapping — atomic in Postgres.
Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §4.4 "Transactions insuffisantes" + §9 #3
(critical: marketplace/service.go transactions manquantes).
Narrower than the original audit flagged — real bugs were these 2
functions, not the broader "1050+" region.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
ebf3276daa |
feat(middleware): wire UserRateLimiter into AuthMiddleware (BE-SVC-002)
UserRateLimiter had been created in initMiddlewares() + stored on
config.UserRateLimiter but never mounted — dead wiring. Per-user rate
limiting was silently not running anywhere.
Applying it as a separate `v1.Use(...)` would fire *before* the JWT
auth middleware sets `user_id`, so the limiter would always skip. The
alternative (add it after every `RequireAuth()` in ~15 route files)
bloats every routes_*.go and invites forgetting.
Solution: centralise it on AuthMiddleware. After a successful
`authenticate()` in `RequireAuth`, invoke the limiter's handler. When
the limiter is nil (tests, early boot), it's a no-op.
Changes:
- internal/middleware/auth.go
* new field AuthMiddleware.userRateLimiter *UserRateLimiter
* new method AuthMiddleware.SetUserRateLimiter(url)
* RequireAuth() flow: authenticate → presence → user rate limit
→ c.Next(). Abort surfaces as early-return without c.Next().
- internal/config/middlewares_init.go
* call c.AuthMiddleware.SetUserRateLimiter(c.UserRateLimiter)
right after AuthMiddleware construction.
Behavior:
- Authenticated requests: per-user limit enforced via Redis, with
X-RateLimit-Limit / Remaining / Reset headers, 429 + retry-after
on overflow. Defaults: 1000 req/min, burst 100 (env-tunable via
USER_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE / USER_RATE_LIMIT_BURST).
- Unauthenticated requests: RequireAuth already rejected them → the
limiter never runs, no behavior change there.
Tests: `go test ./internal/middleware/ -short` green (33s).
`go build ./...` + `go vet ./internal/middleware/` clean.
Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §4.3 "UserRateLimiter configuré non wiré"
+ §9 priority #11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
18eed3c49c |
chore(cleanup): remove 3 deprecated handlers from internal/api/handlers/
The `internal/api/handlers/` package held only 3 files, all flagged
DEPRECATED in the audit and never imported anywhere:
- chat_handlers.go (376 LOC, replaced by internal/handlers/ +
internal/websocket/chat/ when Rust chat
server was removed 2026-02-22)
- rbac_handlers.go (278 LOC, replaced by internal/core/admin/
role management)
- rbac_handlers_test.go (488 LOC)
Verified via grep: `internal/api/handlers` has zero imports across
the backend. `go build ./...` and `go vet` clean after removal.
Directory is now empty and automatically pruned by git.
-1142 LOC of dead code gone.
Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §8.2 "Code mort / orphelin".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
172581ff02 |
chore(cleanup): remove orphan code + archive disabled workflows + .playwright-mcp
Triple cleanup, landed together because they share the same cleanup branch intent and touch non-overlapping trees. 1. 38× tracked .playwright-mcp/*.yml stage-deleted MCP session recordings that had been inadvertently committed. .gitignore already covers .playwright-mcp/ (post-audit J2 block added in |
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senke
|
d359a74a5f |
fix(migrations): make 983 CHECK constraint idempotent via DO block
Migration 983 was crashing backend startup on my local DB because (a) I'd manually applied it via psql during B day 3 development before the migration runner saw it, so the constraint existed but was not tracked; (b) the migration used plain ADD CONSTRAINT which Postgres doesn't support with IF NOT EXISTS for CHECK constraints. Fix: wrap the ALTER TABLE in a DO block that catches `duplicate_object` — re-running the migration becomes a no-op, matches the idempotency contract the other migrations in this directory observe. Any env where the constraint already exists (manual apply, prior successful run) now proceeds cleanly. Verified: backend starts cleanly after the fix. Pre-rc1 blocker resolved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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senke
|
6773f66dd3 |
fix(webhooks): bump MaxWebhookPayloadBytes 64KB → 256KB — v1.0.7 pre-rc1 (task #44)
Closes task #44 ahead of v1.0.7-rc1 tag. Dispute-class webhooks (axis-1 P1.6, v1.0.8 scope) may carry metadata beyond the typical 1-5 KB event size — a 64KB cap created a non-zero risk of silent drops that exactly the wrong class of event to lose. 256KB gives 10x headroom above the inflated-dispute ceiling while staying tightly bounded against log-spam DoS: sustained ceiling at the rate-limit floor is ~25MB/s, cleaned daily. Rationale documented in the comment above the const so future readers see the reasoning before the number. The rate limit remains the primary DoS defense; this cap is defense in depth. No live Hyperswitch docs verification (no internet access in this session) — decision based on typical PSP webhook shapes + user's explicit flag that losing a legit dispute = weekend lost. Task #44 closed with that caveat noted; a proper docs review can re-tune if observed traffic shows the 256KB ceiling is also too aggressive (unlikely). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
senke
|
94dfc80b73 |
feat(metrics): ledger-health gauges + alert rules — v1.0.7 item F
Five Prometheus gauges + reconciler metrics + Grafana dashboard +
three alert rules. Closes axis-1 P1.8 and adds observability for
item C's reconciler (user review: "F should include reconciler_*
metrics, otherwise tag is blind on the worker we just shipped").
Gauges (veza_ledger_, sampled every 60s):
* orphan_refund_rows — THE canary. Pending refunds with empty
hyperswitch_refund_id older than 5m = Phase 2 crash in
RefundOrder. Alert: > 0 for 5m → page.
* stuck_orders_pending — order pending > 30m with non-empty
payment_id. Alert: > 0 for 10m → page.
* stuck_refunds_pending — refund pending > 30m with hs_id.
* failed_transfers_at_max_retry — permanently_failed rows.
* reversal_pending_transfers — item B rows stuck > 30m.
Reconciler metrics (veza_reconciler_):
* actions_total{phase} — counter by phase.
* orphan_refunds_total — two-phase-bug canary.
* sweep_duration_seconds — exponential histogram.
* last_run_timestamp — alert: stale > 2h → page (worker dead).
Implementation notes:
* Sampler thresholds hardcoded to match reconciler defaults —
intentional mismatch allowed (alerts fire while reconciler
already working = correct behavior).
* Query error sets gauge to -1 (sentinel for "sampler broken").
* marketplace package routes through monitoring recorders so it
doesn't import prometheus directly.
* Sampler runs regardless of Hyperswitch enablement; gauges
default 0 when pipeline idle.
* Graceful shutdown wired in cmd/api/main.go.
Alert rules in config/alertmanager/ledger.yml with runbook
pointers + detailed descriptions — each alert explains WHAT
happened, WHY the reconciler may not resolve it, and WHERE to
look first.
Grafana dashboard config/grafana/dashboards/ledger-health.json —
top row = 5 stat panels (orphan first, color-coded red on > 0),
middle row = trend timeseries + reconciler action rate by phase,
bottom row = sweep duration p50/p95/p99 + seconds-since-last-tick
+ orphan cumulative.
Tests — 6 cases, all green (sqlite :memory:):
* CountsStuckOrdersPending (includes the filter on
non-empty payment_id)
* StuckOrdersZeroWhenAllCompleted
* CountsOrphanRefunds (THE canary)
* CountsStuckRefundsWithHsID (gauge-orthogonality check)
* CountsFailedAndReversalPendingTransfers
* ReconcilerRecorders (counter + gauge shape)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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senke
|
7e180a2c08 |
feat(workers): hyperswitch reconciliation sweep for stuck pending states — v1.0.7 item C
New ReconcileHyperswitchWorker sweeps for pending orders and refunds
whose terminal webhook never arrived. Pulls live PSP state for each
stuck row and synthesises a webhook payload to feed the normal
ProcessPaymentWebhook / ProcessRefundWebhook dispatcher. The existing
terminal-state guards on those handlers make reconciliation
idempotent against real webhooks — a late webhook after the reconciler
resolved the row is a no-op.
Three stuck-state classes covered:
1. Stuck orders (pending > 30m, non-empty payment_id) → GetPaymentStatus
+ synthetic payment.<status> webhook.
2. Stuck refunds with PSP id (pending > 30m, non-empty
hyperswitch_refund_id) → GetRefundStatus + synthetic
refund.<status> webhook (error_message forwarded).
3. Orphan refunds (pending > 5m, EMPTY hyperswitch_refund_id) →
mark failed + roll order back to completed + log ERROR. This
is the "we crashed between Phase 1 and Phase 2 of RefundOrder"
case, operator-attention territory.
New interfaces:
* marketplace.HyperswitchReadClient — read-only PSP surface the
worker depends on (GetPaymentStatus, GetRefundStatus). The
worker never calls CreatePayment / CreateRefund.
* hyperswitch.Client.GetRefund + RefundStatus struct added.
* hyperswitch.Provider gains GetRefundStatus + GetPaymentStatus
pass-throughs that satisfy the marketplace interface.
Configuration (all env-var tunable with sensible defaults):
* RECONCILE_WORKER_ENABLED=true
* RECONCILE_INTERVAL=1h (ops can drop to 5m during incident
response without a code change)
* RECONCILE_ORDER_STUCK_AFTER=30m
* RECONCILE_REFUND_STUCK_AFTER=30m
* RECONCILE_REFUND_ORPHAN_AFTER=5m (shorter because "app crashed"
is a different signal from "network hiccup")
Operational details:
* Batch limit 50 rows per phase per tick so a 10k-row backlog
doesn't hammer Hyperswitch. Next tick picks up the rest.
* PSP read errors leave the row untouched — next tick retries.
Reconciliation is always safe to replay.
* Structured log on every action so `grep reconcile` tells the
ops story: which order/refund got synced, against what status,
how long it was stuck.
* Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go, gated on
HyperswitchEnabled + HyperswitchAPIKey. Graceful shutdown
registered.
* RunOnce exposed as public API for ad-hoc ops trigger during
incident response.
Tests — 10 cases, all green (sqlite :memory:):
* TestReconcile_StuckOrder_SyncsViaSyntheticWebhook
* TestReconcile_RecentOrder_NotTouched
* TestReconcile_CompletedOrder_NotTouched
* TestReconcile_OrderWithEmptyPaymentID_NotTouched
* TestReconcile_PSPReadErrorLeavesRowIntact
* TestReconcile_OrphanRefund_AutoFails_OrderRollsBack
* TestReconcile_RecentOrphanRefund_NotTouched
* TestReconcile_StuckRefund_SyncsViaSyntheticWebhook
* TestReconcile_StuckRefund_FailureStatus_PassesErrorMessage
* TestReconcile_AllTerminalStates_NoOp
CHANGELOG v1.0.7-rc1 updated with the full item C section between D
and the existing E block, matching the order convention (ship order:
A → D → B → E → C, CHANGELOG order follows).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
senke
|
3c4d0148be |
feat(webhooks): persist raw hyperswitch payloads to audit log — v1.0.7 item E
Every POST /webhooks/hyperswitch delivery now writes a row to
`hyperswitch_webhook_log` regardless of signature-valid or
processing outcome. Captures both legitimate deliveries and attack
probes — a forensics query now has the actual bytes to read, not
just a "webhook rejected" log line. Disputes (axis-1 P1.6) ride
along: the log captures dispute.* events alongside payment and
refund events, ready for when disputes get a handler.
Table shape (migration 984):
* payload TEXT — readable in psql, invalid UTF-8 replaced with
empty (forensics value is in headers + ip + timing for those
attacks, not the binary body).
* signature_valid BOOLEAN + partial index for "show me attack
attempts" being instantaneous.
* processing_result TEXT — 'ok' / 'error: <msg>' /
'signature_invalid' / 'skipped'. Matches the P1.5 action
semantic exactly.
* source_ip, user_agent, request_id — forensics essentials.
request_id is captured from Hyperswitch's X-Request-Id header
when present, else a server-side UUID so every row correlates
to VEZA's structured logs.
* event_type — best-effort extract from the JSON payload, NULL
on malformed input.
Hardening:
* 64KB body cap via io.LimitReader rejects oversize with 413
before any INSERT — prevents log-spam DoS.
* Single INSERT per delivery with final state; no two-phase
update race on signature-failure path. signature_invalid and
processing-error rows both land.
* DB persistence failures are logged but swallowed — the
endpoint's contract is to ack Hyperswitch, not perfect audit.
Retention sweep:
* CleanupHyperswitchWebhookLog in internal/jobs, daily tick,
batched DELETE (10k rows + 100ms pause) so a large backlog
doesn't lock the table.
* HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90).
* Same goroutine-ticker pattern as ScheduleOrphanTracksCleanup.
* Wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside the existing cleanup jobs.
Tests: 5 in webhook_log_test.go (persistence, request_id auto-gen,
invalid-JSON leaves event_type empty, invalid-signature capture,
extractEventType 5 sub-cases) + 4 in cleanup_hyperswitch_webhook_
log_test.go (deletes-older-than, noop, default-on-zero,
context-cancel). Migration 984 applied cleanly to local Postgres;
all indexes present.
Also (v107-plan.md):
* Item G acceptance gains an explicit Idempotency-Key threading
requirement with an empty-key loud-fail test — "literally
copy-paste D's 4-line test skeleton". Closes the risk that
item G silently reopens the HTTP-retry duplicate-charge
exposure D closed.
Out of scope for E (noted in CHANGELOG):
* Rate limit on the endpoint — pre-existing middleware covers
it at the router level; adding a per-endpoint limit is
separate scope.
* Readable-payload SQL view — deferred, the TEXT column is
already human-readable; a convenience view is a nice-to-have
not a ship-blocker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
senke
|
3cd82ba5be |
fix(hyperswitch): idempotency-key on create-payment and create-refund — v1.0.7 item D
Every outbound POST /payments and POST /refunds from the Hyperswitch
client now carries an Idempotency-Key HTTP header. Key values are
explicit parameters at every call site — no context-carrier magic,
no auto-generation. An empty key is a loud error from the client
(not silent header omission) so a future new call site that forgets
to supply one fails immediately, not months later under an obscure
replay scenario.
Key choices, both stable across HTTP retries of the same logical
call:
* CreatePayment → order.ID.String() (GORM BeforeCreate populates
order.ID before the PSP call in ConfirmOrder).
* CreateRefund → pendingRefund.ID.String() (populated by the
Phase 1 tx.Create in RefundOrder, available for the Phase 2 PSP
call).
Scope note (reproduced here for the next reader who grep-s the
commit log for "Idempotency-Key"):
Idempotency-Key covers HTTP-transport retry (TLS reconnect,
proxy retry, DNS flap) within a single CreatePayment /
CreateRefund invocation. It does NOT cover application-level
replay (user double-click, form double-submit, retry after crash
before DB write). That class of bug requires state-machine
preconditions on VEZA side — already addressed by the order
state machine + the handler-level guards on POST
/api/v1/payments (for payments) and the partial UNIQUE on
`refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id` landed in v1.0.6.1 (for refunds).
Hyperswitch TTL on Idempotency-Key: typically 24h-7d server-side
(verify against current PSP docs). Beyond TTL, a retry with the
same key is treated as a new request. Not a concern at current
volumes; document if retry logic ever extends beyond 1 hour.
Explicitly out of scope: item D does NOT add application-level
retry logic. The current "try once, fail loudly" behavior on PSP
errors is preserved. Adding retries is a separate design exercise
(backoff, max attempts, circuit breaker) not part of this commit.
Interfaces changed:
* hyperswitch.Client.CreatePayment(ctx, idempotencyKey, ...)
* hyperswitch.Client.CreatePaymentSimple(...) convenience wrapper
* hyperswitch.Client.CreateRefund(ctx, idempotencyKey, ...)
* hyperswitch.Provider.CreatePayment threads through
* hyperswitch.Provider.CreateRefund threads through
* marketplace.PaymentProvider interface — first param after ctx
* marketplace.refundProvider interface — first param after ctx
Removed:
* hyperswitch.Provider.Refund (zero callers, superseded by
CreateRefund which returns (refund_id, status, err) and is the
only method marketplace's refundProvider cares about).
Tests:
* Two new httptest.Server-backed tests (client_test.go) pin the
Idempotency-Key header value for CreatePayment and CreateRefund.
* Two new empty-key tests confirm the client errors rather than
silently sending no header.
* TestRefundOrder_OpensPendingRefund gains an assertion that
f.provider.lastIdempotencyKey == refund.ID.String() — if a
future refactor threads the key from somewhere else (paymentID,
uuid.New() per call, etc.) the test fails loudly.
* Four pre-existing test mocks updated for the new signature
(mockRefundPaymentProvider in marketplace, mockPaymentProvider
in tests/integration and tests/contract, mockRefundPayment
Provider in tests/integration/refund_flow).
Subscription's CreateSubscriptionPayment interface declares its own
shape and has no live Hyperswitch-backed implementation today —
v1.0.6.2 noted this as the payment-gate bypass surface, v1.0.7
item G will ship the real provider. When that lands, item G's
implementation threads the idempotency key through in the same
pattern (documented in v107-plan.md item G acceptance).
CHANGELOG v1.0.7-rc1 entry updated with the full item D scope note
and the "out of scope: retries" caveat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
senke
|
1a133af9ac |
feat(marketplace): stripe reversal error disambiguation + CHECK constraint + E2E — v1.0.7 item B day 3
Day-3 closure of item B. The three things day 2 deferred are now done:
1. Stripe error disambiguation.
ReverseTransfer in StripeConnectService now parses
stripe.Error.Code + HTTPStatusCode + Msg to emit the sentinels
the worker routes on. Pre-day-3 the sentinels were declared but
the service wrapped every error opaquely, making this the exact
"temporary compromise frozen into permanent" pattern the audit
was meant to prevent — flagged during review and fixed same day.
Mapping:
* 404 + code=resource_missing → ErrTransferNotFound
* 400 + msg matches "already" + "reverse" → ErrTransferAlreadyReversed
* any other → transient (wrapped raw, retry)
The "already reversed" case has no machine-readable code in
stripe-go (unlike ChargeAlreadyRefunded for charges — the SDK
doesn't enumerate the equivalent for transfers), so it's
message-parsed. Fragility documented at the call site: if Stripe
changes the wording, the worker treats the response as transient
and eventually surfaces the row to permanently_failed after max
retries. Worst-case regression is "benign case gets noisier",
not data loss.
2. Migration 983: CHECK constraint chk_reversal_pending_has_next_
retry_at CHECK (status != 'reversal_pending' OR next_retry_at
IS NOT NULL). Added NOT VALID so the constraint is enforced on
new writes without scanning existing rows; a follow-up VALIDATE
can run once the table is known to be clean. Prevents the
"invisible orphan" failure mode where a reversal_pending row
with NULL next_retry_at would be skipped by any future stricter
worker query.
3. End-to-end reversal flow test (reversal_e2e_test.go) chains
three sub-scenarios: (a) happy path — refund.succeeded →
reversal_pending → worker → reversed with stripe_reversal_id
persisted; (b) invalid stripe_transfer_id → worker terminates
rapidly to permanently_failed with single Stripe call, no
retries (the highest-value coverage per day-3 review); (c)
already-reversed out-of-band → worker flips to reversed with
informative message.
Architecture note — the sentinels were moved to a new leaf
package `internal/core/connecterrors` because both marketplace
(needs them for the worker's errors.Is checks) and services (needs
them to emit) import them, and an import cycle
(marketplace → monitoring → services) would form if either owned
them directly. marketplace re-exports them as type aliases so the
worker code reads naturally against the marketplace namespace.
New tests:
* services/stripe_connect_service_test.go — 7 cases on
isAlreadyReversedMessage (pins Stripe's wording), 1 case on
the error-classification shape. Doesn't invoke stripe.SetBackend
— the translation logic is tested via a crafted *stripe.Error,
the emission is trusted on the read of `errors.As` + the known
shape of stripe.Error.
* marketplace/reversal_e2e_test.go — 3 end-to-end sub-tests
chaining refund → worker against a dual-role mock. The
invalid-id case asserts single-call-no-retries termination.
* Migration 983 applied cleanly to the local Postgres; constraint
visible in \d seller_transfers as NOT VALID (behavior correct
for future writes, existing rows grandfathered).
Self-assessment on day-2's struct-literal refactor of
processSellerTransfers (deferred from day 2):
The refactor is borderline — neither clearer nor confusing than the
original mutation-after-construct pattern. Logged in the v1.0.7-rc1
CHANGELOG as a post-v1.0.7 consideration: if GORM BeforeUpdate
hooks prove cleaner on other state machines (axis 2), revisit the
anti-mutation test approach.
CHANGELOG v1.0.7-rc1 entry added documenting items A + B end-to-end.
Tag not yet applied — items C, D, E, F remain on the v1.0.7 plan.
The rc1 tag lands when those four items close + the smoke probe
validates the full cadence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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|
senke
|
d2bb9c0e78 |
feat(marketplace): async stripe connect reversal worker — v1.0.7 item B day 2
Day-2 cut of item B: the reversal path becomes async. Pre-v1.0.7
(and v1.0.7 day 1) the refund handler flipped seller_transfers
straight from completed to reversed without ever calling Stripe —
the ledger said "reversed" while the seller's Stripe balance still
showed the original transfer as settled. The new flow:
refund.succeeded webhook
→ reverseSellerAccounting transitions row: completed → reversal_pending
→ StripeReversalWorker (every REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL, default 1m)
→ calls ReverseTransfer on Stripe
→ success: row → reversed + persist stripe_reversal_id
→ 404 already-reversed (dead code until day 3): row → reversed + log
→ 404 resource_missing (dead code until day 3): row → permanently_failed
→ transient error: stay reversal_pending, bump retry_count,
exponential backoff (base * 2^retry, capped at backoffMax)
→ retries exhausted: row → permanently_failed
→ buyer-facing refund completes immediately regardless of Stripe health
State machine enforcement:
* New `SellerTransfer.TransitionStatus(tx, to, extras)` wraps every
mutation: validates against AllowedTransferTransitions, guarded
UPDATE with WHERE status=<from> (optimistic lock semantics), no
RowsAffected = stale state / concurrent winner detected.
* processSellerTransfers no longer mutates .Status in place —
terminal status is decided before struct construction, so the
row is Created with its final state.
* transfer_retry.retryOne and admin RetryTransfer route through
TransitionStatus. Legacy direct assignment removed.
* TestNoDirectTransferStatusMutation greps the package for any
`st.Status = "..."` / `t.Status = "..."` / GORM
Model(&SellerTransfer{}).Update("status"...) outside the
allowlist and fails if found. Verified by temporarily injecting
a violation during development — test caught it as expected.
Configuration (v1.0.7 item B):
* REVERSAL_WORKER_ENABLED=true (default)
* REVERSAL_MAX_RETRIES=5 (default)
* REVERSAL_CHECK_INTERVAL=1m (default)
* REVERSAL_BACKOFF_BASE=1m (default)
* REVERSAL_BACKOFF_MAX=1h (default, caps exponential growth)
* .env.template documents TRANSFER_RETRY_* and REVERSAL_* env vars
so an ops reader can grep them.
Interface change: TransferService.ReverseTransfer(ctx,
stripe_transfer_id, amount *int64, reason) (reversalID, error)
added. All four mocks extended (process_webhook, transfer_retry,
admin_transfer_handler, payment_flow integration). amount=nil means
full reversal; v1.0.7 always passes nil (partial reversal is future
scope per axis-1 P2).
Stripe 404 disambiguation (ErrTransferAlreadyReversed /
ErrTransferNotFound) is wired in the worker as dead code — the
sentinels are declared and the worker branches on them, but
StripeConnectService.ReverseTransfer doesn't yet emit them. Day 3
will parse stripe.Error.Code and populate the sentinels; no worker
change needed at that point. Keeping the handling skeleton in day 2
so the worker's branch shape doesn't change between days and the
tests can already cover all four paths against the mock.
Worker unit tests (9 cases, all green, sqlite :memory:):
* happy path: reversal_pending → reversed + stripe_reversal_id set
* already reversed (mock returns sentinel): → reversed + log
* not found (mock returns sentinel): → permanently_failed + log
* transient 503: retry_count++, next_retry_at set with backoff,
stays reversal_pending
* backoff capped at backoffMax (verified with base=1s, max=10s,
retry_count=4 → capped at 10s not 16s)
* max retries exhausted: → permanently_failed
* legacy row with empty stripe_transfer_id: → permanently_failed,
does not call Stripe
* only picks up reversal_pending (skips all other statuses)
* respects next_retry_at (future rows skipped)
Existing test updated: TestProcessRefundWebhook_SucceededFinalizesState
now asserts the row lands at reversal_pending with next_retry_at
set (worker's responsibility to drive to reversed), not reversed.
Worker wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside TransferRetryWorker,
sharing the same StripeConnectService instance. Shutdown path
registered for graceful stop.
Cut from day 2 scope (per agreed-upon discipline), landing in day 3:
* Stripe 404 disambiguation implementation (parse error.Code)
* End-to-end smoke probe (refund → reversal_pending → worker
processes → reversed) against local Postgres + mock Stripe
* Batch-size tuning / inter-batch sleep — batchLimit=20 today is
safely under Stripe's 100 req/s default rate limit; revisit if
observed load warrants
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
senke
|
8d6f798f2d |
feat(marketplace): seller transfer state machine matrix — v1.0.7 item B day 1
Day-1 foundation for item B (async Stripe Connect reversal worker).
No worker code, no runtime enforcement yet — just the authoritative
state machine that day 2's code will route through. Before writing
the worker we want a single place where the legal transitions are
defined and tested, so the worker's behavior can be argued against
the matrix rather than implicitly codified across call sites.
transfer_transitions.go:
* SellerTransferStatus constants (Pending, Completed, Failed,
ReversalPending [new], Reversed [new], PermanentlyFailed).
* AllowedTransferTransitions map: pending → {completed, failed};
completed → {reversal_pending}; failed → {completed,
permanently_failed}; reversal_pending → {reversed,
permanently_failed}; reversed and permanently_failed as dead ends.
* CanTransitionTransferStatus(from, to) — same-state always OK
(idempotent bumps of retry_count / next_retry_at); unknown from
fails conservatively (typos in call sites become visible).
transfer_transitions_test.go:
* TestTransferStateTransitions iterates the full 6×6 matrix (36
pairs) and asserts every pair against the expected outcome.
* TestTransferStateTransitions_TerminalStatesHaveNoOutgoing
double-locks Reversed + PermanentlyFailed as dead ends at the
map level (not just at the caller level).
* TestTransferStateTransitions_MatrixKeysAreAccountedFor keeps the
canonical status list in sync with the map; a new status added
to one but not the other fails the test.
* TestCanTransitionTransferStatus_UnknownFromIsConservative
documents the "unknown from → always false" policy so a future
reader sees the intent.
Migration 982 adds a partial composite index on (status,
next_retry_at) WHERE status='reversal_pending', sibling to the
existing idx_seller_transfers_retry (scoped to failed). Two parallel
partial indexes cost less than widening the existing one (which
would need a table-level lock) and keep the worker query planner-
friendly.
Day 2 routes processSellerTransfers, TransferRetryWorker,
reverseSellerAccounting, admin_transfer_handler through
CanTransitionTransferStatus at every Status mutation, and writes
StripeReversalWorker. Day 3 exercises the end-to-end flow
(refund → reversal_pending → worker → reversed) in a smoke probe.
Checkpoint: ping user at end of day 1 before day 2 per discipline
agreed upfront.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
senke
|
e0efdf8210 |
fix(connect): defensive empty-id guard + admin retry test asserts persistence
Post-A self-review surfaced two gaps: 1. `StripeConnectService.CreateTransfer` trusted Stripe's SDK to return a non-empty `tr.ID` on success (`err == nil`). The invariant holds in practice, but an empty id silently persisted on a completed transfer leaves the row permanently un-reversible — which defeats the entire point of item A. Added a belt-and-suspenders check that converts `(tr.ID="", err=nil)` into a failed transfer. 2. `TestRetryTransfer_Success` (admin handler) exercised the retry path but didn't assert that StripeTransferID was persisted after a successful retry. The worker path and processSellerTransfers both had the assertion; the admin manual-retry path was the third entry into the same behavior and lacked coverage. Added the assertion. Decision on scope: v1.0.6.2 added a partial UNIQUE on stripe_transfer_id (WHERE IS NOT NULL AND <> '') in migration 981, matching the v1.0.6.1 pattern for refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id. The combination of (a) the DB partial UNIQUE and (b) this defensive guard means there is now no code or data path that can persist an empty transfer id while claiming success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
senke
|
eedaad9f83 |
refactor(connect): persist stripe_transfer_id on create + retry — v1.0.7 item A
TransferService.CreateTransfer signature changes from (...) error to
(...) (string, error) — the caller now captures the Stripe transfer
identifier and persists it on the SellerTransfer row. Pre-v1.0.7 the
stripe_transfer_id column was declared on the model and table but
never written to, which blocked the reversal worker (v1.0.7 item B)
from identifying which transfer to reverse on refund.
Changes:
* `TransferService` interface and `StripeConnectService.CreateTransfer`
both return the Stripe transfer id alongside the error.
* `processSellerTransfers` (marketplace service) persists the id on
success before `tx.Create(&st)` so a crash between Stripe ACK and
DB commit leaves no inconsistency.
* `TransferRetryWorker.retryOne` persists on retry success — a row
that failed on first attempt and succeeded via the worker is
reversal-ready all the same.
* `admin_transfer_handler.RetryTransfer` (manual retry) persists too.
* `SellerPayout.ExternalPayoutID` is populated by the Connect payout
flow (`payout.go`) — the field existed but was never written.
* Four test mocks updated; two tests assert the id is persisted on
the happy path, one on the failure path confirms we don't write a
fake id when the provider errors.
Migration `981_seller_transfers_stripe_reversal_id.sql`:
* Adds nullable `stripe_reversal_id` column for item B.
* Partial UNIQUE indexes on both stripe_transfer_id and
stripe_reversal_id (WHERE IS NOT NULL AND <> ''), mirroring the
v1.0.6.1 pattern for refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id.
* Logs a count of historical completed transfers that lack an id —
these are candidates for the backfill CLI follow-up task.
Backfill for historical rows is a separate follow-up (cmd/tools/
backfill_stripe_transfer_ids, calling Stripe's transfers.List with
Destination + Metadata[order_id]). Pre-v1.0.7 transfers without a
backfilled id cannot be auto-reversed on refund — document in P2.9
admin-recovery when it lands. Acceptable scope per v107-plan.
Migration number bumped 980 → 981 because v1.0.6.2 used 980 for the
unpaid-subscription cleanup; v107-plan updated with the note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
senke
|
26cb523334 |
fix(distribution,audit): propagate ErrSubscriptionNoPayment to handler + P0.12 closure date + E2E regression TODO
Self-review of the v1.0.6.2 hotfix surfaced that
distribution.checkEligibility silently swallowed
subscription.ErrSubscriptionNoPayment as "ineligible, no extra info",
so a user with a fantôme subscription trying to submit a distribution
got "Distribution requires Creator or Premium plan" — misleading, the
user has a plan but no payment. checkEligibility now propagates the
error so the handler can surface "Your subscription is not linked to
a payment. Complete payment to enable distribution."
Security is unchanged — the gate still refuses. This is a UX clarity
fix for honest-path users who landed in the fantôme state via a
broken payment flow.
Also:
- Closure timestamp added to axis-1 P0.12 ("closed 2026-04-17 in
v1.0.6.2 (commit
|
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|
senke
|
9a8d2a4e73 |
chore(release): v1.0.6.2 — subscription payment-gate bypass hotfix
Closes a bypass surfaced by the 2026-04 audit probe (axis-1 Q2): any authenticated user could POST /api/v1/subscriptions/subscribe on a paid plan and receive 201 active without the payment provider ever being invoked. The resulting row satisfied `checkEligibility()` in the distribution service via `can_sell_on_marketplace=true` on the Creator plan — effectively free access to /api/v1/distribution/submit, which dispatches to external partners. Fix is centralised in `GetUserSubscription` so there is no code path that can grant subscription-gated access without routing through the payment check. Effective-payment = free plan OR unexpired trial OR invoice with non-empty hyperswitch_payment_id. Migration 980 sweeps pre-existing fantôme rows into `expired`, preserving the tuple in a dated audit table for support outreach. Subscribe and subscribeToFreePlan treat the new ErrSubscriptionNoPayment as equivalent to ErrNoActiveSubscription so re-subscription works cleanly post-cleanup. GET /me/subscription surfaces needs_payment=true with a support-contact message rather than a misleading "you're on free" or an opaque 500. TODO(v1.0.7-item-G) annotation marks where the `if s.paymentProvider != nil` short-circuit needs to become a mandatory pending_payment state. Probe script `scripts/probes/subscription-unpaid-activation.sh` kept as a versioned regression test — dry-run by default, --destructive logs in and attempts the exploit against a live backend with automatic cleanup. 8-case unit test matrix covers the full hasEffectivePayment predicate. Smoke validated end-to-end against local v1.0.6.2: POST /subscribe returns 201 (by design — item G closes the creation path), but GET /me/subscription returns subscription=null + needs_payment=true, distribution eligibility returns false. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
senke
|
5e3964b989 |
chore(release): v1.0.6.1 — partial UNIQUE on refunds.hyperswitch_refund_id
Hotfix surfaced by the v1.0.6 refund smoke test. Migration 978's plain
UNIQUE constraint on hyperswitch_refund_id collided on empty strings
— two refunds in the same post-Phase-1 / pre-Phase-2 state (or a
previous Phase-2 failure leaving '') would violate the constraint at
INSERT time on the second attempt, even though the refunds were for
different orders.
* Migration 979_refunds_unique_partial.sql replaces the plain
UNIQUE with a partial index excluding empty and NULL values.
Idempotency for successful refunds is preserved — duplicate
Hyperswitch webhooks land on the same row because the PSP-
assigned refund_id is non-empty.
* No Go code change. The bug was purely in the DB constraint shape.
Smoke test that caught it — 5/5 scenarios re-verified end-to-end:
happy path, idempotent replay (succeeded_at + balance strictly
invariant), PSP error rollback, webhook refund.failed, double-submit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
senke
|
92cf6d6f76 |
feat(backend,marketplace): refund reverse-charge with idempotent webhook
Fourth item of the v1.0.6 backlog, and the structuring one — the pre-
v1.0.6 RefundOrder wrote `status='refunded'` to the DB and called
Hyperswitch synchronously in the same transaction, treating the API
ack as terminal confirmation. In reality Hyperswitch returns `pending`
and only finalizes via webhook. Customers could see "refunded" in the
UI while their bank was still uncredited, and the seller balance
stayed credited even on successful refunds.
v1.0.6 flow
Phase 1 — open a pending refund (short row-locked transaction):
* validate permissions + 14-day window + double-submit guard
* persist Refund{status=pending}
* flip order to `refund_pending` (not `refunded` — that's the
webhook's job)
Phase 2 — call PSP outside the transaction:
* Provider.CreateRefund returns (refund_id, status, err). The
refund_id is the unique idempotency key for the webhook.
* on PSP error: mark Refund{status=failed}, roll order back to
`completed` so the buyer can retry.
* on success: persist hyperswitch_refund_id, stay in `pending`
even if the sync status is "succeeded". The webhook is the only
authoritative signal. (Per customer guidance: "ne jamais flipper
à succeeded sur la réponse synchrone du POST".)
Phase 3 — webhook drives terminal state:
* ProcessRefundWebhook looks up by hyperswitch_refund_id (UNIQUE
constraint in the new `refunds` table guarantees idempotency).
* terminal-state short-circuit: IsTerminal() returns 200 without
mutating anything, so a Hyperswitch retry storm is safe.
* on refund.succeeded: flip refund + order to succeeded/refunded,
revoke licenses, debit seller balance, mark every SellerTransfer
for the order as `reversed`. All within a row-locked tx.
* on refund.failed: flip refund to failed, order back to
`completed`.
Seller-side reconciliation
* SellerBalance.DebitSellerBalance was using Postgres-only GREATEST,
which silently failed on SQLite tests. Ported to a portable
CASE WHEN that clamps at zero in both DBs.
* SellerTransfer.Status = "reversed" captures the refund event in
the ledger. The actual Stripe Connect Transfers:reversal call is
flagged TODO(v1.0.7) — requires wiring through TransferService
with connected-account context that the current transfer worker
doesn't expose. The internal balance is corrected here so the
buyer and seller views match as soon as the PSP confirms; the
missing piece is purely the money-movement round-trip at Stripe.
Webhook routing
* HyperswitchWebhookPayload extended with event_type + refund_id +
error_message, with flat and nested (object.*) shapes supported
(same tolerance as the existing payment fields).
* New IsRefundEvent() discriminator: matches any event_type
containing "refund" (case-insensitive) or presence of refund_id.
routes_webhooks.go peeks the payload once and dispatches to
ProcessRefundWebhook or ProcessPaymentWebhook.
* No signature-verification changes — the same HMAC-SHA512 check
protects both paths.
Handler response
* POST /marketplace/orders/:id/refund now returns
`{ refund: { id, status: "pending" }, message }` so the UI can
surface the in-flight state. A new ErrRefundAlreadyRequested maps
to 400 with a "already in progress" message instead of silently
creating a duplicate row (the double-submit guard checks order
status = `refund_pending` *before* the existing-row check so the
error is explicit).
Schema
* Migration 978_refunds_table.sql adds the `refunds` table with
UNIQUE(hyperswitch_refund_id). The uniqueness constraint is the
load-bearing idempotency guarantee — a duplicate PSP notification
lands on the same DB row, and the webhook handler's
FOR UPDATE + IsTerminal() check turns it into a no-op.
* hyperswitch_refund_id is nullable (NULL between Phase 1 and
Phase 2) so the UNIQUE index ignores rows that haven't been
assigned a PSP id yet.
Partial refunds
* The Provider.CreateRefund signature carries `amount *int64`
already (nil = full), but the service call-site passes nil. Full
refunds only for v1.0.6 — partial-refund UX needs a product
decision and is deferred to v1.0.7. Flagged in the ErrRefund*
section.
Tests (15 cases, all sqlite-in-memory + httptest-style mock provider)
* RefundOrder phase 1
- OpensPendingRefund: pending state, refund_id captured, order
→ refund_pending, licenses untouched
- PSPErrorRollsBack: failed state, order reverts to completed
- DoubleRequestRejected: second call returns
ErrRefundAlreadyRequested, not a generic ErrOrderNotRefundable
- NotCompleted / NoPaymentID / Forbidden / SellerCanRefund
- ExpiredRefundWindow / FallbackExpiredNoDeadline
* ProcessRefundWebhook
- SucceededFinalizesState: refund + order + licenses + seller
balance + seller transfer all reconciled in one tx
- FailedRollsOrderBack: order returns to completed for retry
- IsRefundEventIdempotentOnReplay: second webhook asserts
succeeded_at timestamp is *unchanged*, proving the second
invocation bailed out on IsTerminal (not re-ran)
- UnknownRefundIDReturnsOK: never-issued refund_id → 200 silent
(avoids a Hyperswitch retry storm on stale events)
- MissingRefundID: explicit 400 error
- NonTerminalStatusIgnored: pending/processing leave the row
alone
* HyperswitchWebhookPayload.IsRefundEvent: 6 dispatcher cases
(flat event_type, mixed case, payment event, refund_id alone,
empty, nested object.refund_id)
Backward compat
* hyperswitch.Provider still exposes the old Refund(ctx,...) error
method for any call-site that only cared about success/failure.
* Old mockRefundPaymentProvider replaced; external mocks need to
add CreateRefund — the interface is now (refundID, status, err).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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