Every POST /webhooks/hyperswitch delivery now writes a row to
`hyperswitch_webhook_log` regardless of signature-valid or
processing outcome. Captures both legitimate deliveries and attack
probes — a forensics query now has the actual bytes to read, not
just a "webhook rejected" log line. Disputes (axis-1 P1.6) ride
along: the log captures dispute.* events alongside payment and
refund events, ready for when disputes get a handler.
Table shape (migration 984):
* payload TEXT — readable in psql, invalid UTF-8 replaced with
empty (forensics value is in headers + ip + timing for those
attacks, not the binary body).
* signature_valid BOOLEAN + partial index for "show me attack
attempts" being instantaneous.
* processing_result TEXT — 'ok' / 'error: <msg>' /
'signature_invalid' / 'skipped'. Matches the P1.5 action
semantic exactly.
* source_ip, user_agent, request_id — forensics essentials.
request_id is captured from Hyperswitch's X-Request-Id header
when present, else a server-side UUID so every row correlates
to VEZA's structured logs.
* event_type — best-effort extract from the JSON payload, NULL
on malformed input.
Hardening:
* 64KB body cap via io.LimitReader rejects oversize with 413
before any INSERT — prevents log-spam DoS.
* Single INSERT per delivery with final state; no two-phase
update race on signature-failure path. signature_invalid and
processing-error rows both land.
* DB persistence failures are logged but swallowed — the
endpoint's contract is to ack Hyperswitch, not perfect audit.
Retention sweep:
* CleanupHyperswitchWebhookLog in internal/jobs, daily tick,
batched DELETE (10k rows + 100ms pause) so a large backlog
doesn't lock the table.
* HYPERSWITCH_WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90).
* Same goroutine-ticker pattern as ScheduleOrphanTracksCleanup.
* Wired in cmd/api/main.go alongside the existing cleanup jobs.
Tests: 5 in webhook_log_test.go (persistence, request_id auto-gen,
invalid-JSON leaves event_type empty, invalid-signature capture,
extractEventType 5 sub-cases) + 4 in cleanup_hyperswitch_webhook_
log_test.go (deletes-older-than, noop, default-on-zero,
context-cancel). Migration 984 applied cleanly to local Postgres;
all indexes present.
Also (v107-plan.md):
* Item G acceptance gains an explicit Idempotency-Key threading
requirement with an empty-key loud-fail test — "literally
copy-paste D's 4-line test skeleton". Closes the risk that
item G silently reopens the HTTP-retry duplicate-charge
exposure D closed.
Out of scope for E (noted in CHANGELOG):
* Rate limit on the endpoint — pre-existing middleware covers
it at the router level; adding a per-endpoint limit is
separate scope.
* Readable-payload SQL view — deferred, the TEXT column is
already human-readable; a convenience view is a nice-to-have
not a ship-blocker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
124 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
124 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package hyperswitch
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
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"gorm.io/gorm"
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)
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func setupWebhookLogDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
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t.Helper()
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db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(":memory:"), &gorm.Config{})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&WebhookLog{}))
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return db
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}
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func TestLogWebhook_PersistsMinimalFields(t *testing.T) {
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db := setupWebhookLogDB(t)
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row := &WebhookLog{
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Payload: `{"event_type":"payment.succeeded","payment_id":"pay_1"}`,
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SignatureValid: true,
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SignatureHeader: "deadbeef",
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ProcessingResult: "ok",
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SourceIP: "203.0.113.7",
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UserAgent: "Hyperswitch/1.0",
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RequestID: "req_abc",
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}
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require.NoError(t, LogWebhook(context.Background(), db, row))
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var persisted WebhookLog
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require.NoError(t, db.First(&persisted, row.ID).Error)
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assert.Equal(t, row.Payload, persisted.Payload)
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assert.True(t, persisted.SignatureValid)
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assert.Equal(t, "ok", persisted.ProcessingResult)
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assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", persisted.SourceIP)
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assert.Equal(t, "Hyperswitch/1.0", persisted.UserAgent)
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assert.Equal(t, "req_abc", persisted.RequestID)
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// event_type is extracted from the payload on insert — the caller
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// didn't populate it, LogWebhook did.
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assert.Equal(t, "payment.succeeded", persisted.EventType)
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// received_at auto-populated
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assert.False(t, persisted.ReceivedAt.IsZero())
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// Explicit non-nil ID
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assert.NotEqual(t, uuid.Nil, persisted.ID)
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}
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func TestLogWebhook_FillsMissingRequestID(t *testing.T) {
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db := setupWebhookLogDB(t)
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row := &WebhookLog{
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Payload: `{}`,
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SignatureValid: false,
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ProcessingResult: "signature_invalid",
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// RequestID left empty — LogWebhook must generate one.
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}
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require.NoError(t, LogWebhook(context.Background(), db, row))
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assert.NotEmpty(t, row.RequestID)
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_, err := uuid.Parse(row.RequestID)
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assert.NoError(t, err, "generated request_id must be a valid UUID")
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}
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func TestLogWebhook_InvalidJSONLeavesEventTypeEmpty(t *testing.T) {
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db := setupWebhookLogDB(t)
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row := &WebhookLog{
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Payload: `not json at all`,
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SignatureValid: false,
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ProcessingResult: "signature_invalid",
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RequestID: "req_probe",
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}
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require.NoError(t, LogWebhook(context.Background(), db, row))
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var persisted WebhookLog
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require.NoError(t, db.First(&persisted, row.ID).Error)
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// Attack probes / malformed payloads: event_type stays empty, no
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// insert failure — the row exists for forensics regardless.
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assert.Empty(t, persisted.EventType)
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assert.Equal(t, "not json at all", persisted.Payload)
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}
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func TestLogWebhook_CapturesInvalidSignatureRows(t *testing.T) {
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db := setupWebhookLogDB(t)
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// The point of the log: even rejected deliveries persist. Drive
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// the insert the way the handler would on a signature failure.
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row := &WebhookLog{
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Payload: `{"fake":"payload"}`,
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SignatureValid: false,
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SignatureHeader: "invalid-sig",
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ProcessingResult: "signature_invalid",
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SourceIP: "198.51.100.42",
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RequestID: "req_attack",
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}
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require.NoError(t, LogWebhook(context.Background(), db, row))
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var count int64
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require.NoError(t, db.Model(&WebhookLog{}).
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Where("signature_valid = ? AND source_ip = ?", false, "198.51.100.42").
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Count(&count).Error)
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assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count,
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"forensics query on signature_invalid rows must find the attack attempt")
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}
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func TestExtractEventType_Variants(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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payload string
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want string
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}{
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{"valid event", `{"event_type":"refund.succeeded"}`, "refund.succeeded"},
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{"extra fields", `{"payment_id":"x","event_type":"payment.processing","amount":500}`, "payment.processing"},
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{"missing field", `{"payment_id":"x"}`, ""},
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{"empty payload", "", ""},
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{"not json", `<xml><event>foo</event></xml>`, ""},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Equal(t, tc.want, extractEventType(tc.payload))
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})
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}
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}
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