veza/docs/archive/v0-history/RETROSPECTIVE_V0803.md
senke 0e7097ed1b chore(cleanup): J1 — purge 220MB debris, archive session docs (complete)
First-attempt commit 3a5c6e184 only captured the .gitignore change; the
pre-commit hook silently dropped the 343 staged moves/deletes during
lint-staged's "no matching task" path. This commit re-applies the intended
J1 content on top of bec75f143 (which was pushed in parallel).

Uses --no-verify because:
- J1 only touches .md/.json/.log/.png/binaries — zero code that would
  benefit from lint-staged, typecheck, or vitest
- The hook demonstrated it corrupts pure-rename commits in this repo
- Explicitly authorized by user for this one commit

Changes (343 total: 169 deletions + 174 renames):

Binaries purged (~167 MB):
- veza-backend-api/{server,modern-server,encrypt_oauth_tokens,seed,seed-v2}

Generated reports purged:
- 9 apps/web/lint_report*.json (~32 MB)
- 8 apps/web/tsc_*.{log,txt} + ts_*.log (TS error snapshots)
- 3 apps/web/storybook_*.json (1375+ stored errors)
- apps/web/{build_errors*,build_output,final_errors}.txt
- 70 veza-backend-api/coverage*.out + coverage_groups/ (~4 MB)
- 3 veza-backend-api/internal/handlers/*.bak

Root cleanup:
- 54 audit-*.png (visual regression baselines, ~11 MB)
- 9 stale MVP-era scripts (Jan 27, hardcoded v0.101):
  start_{iteration,mvp,recovery}.sh,
  test_{mvp_endpoints,protected_endpoints,user_journey}.sh,
  validate_v0101.sh, verify_logs_setup.sh, gen_hash.py

Session docs archived (not deleted — preserved under docs/archive/):
- 78 apps/web/*.md     → docs/archive/frontend-sessions-2026/
- 43 veza-backend-api/*.md → docs/archive/backend-sessions-2026/
- 53 docs/{RETROSPECTIVE_V,SMOKE_TEST_V,PLAN_V0_,V0_*_RELEASE_SCOPE,
          AUDIT_,PLAN_ACTION_AUDIT,REMEDIATION_PROGRESS}*.md
                        → docs/archive/v0-history/

README.md and CONTRIBUTING.md preserved in apps/web/ and veza-backend-api/.

Note: The .gitignore rules preventing recurrence were already pushed in
3a5c6e184 and remain in place — this commit does not modify .gitignore.

Refs: AUDIT_REPORT.md §11
2026-04-14 17:12:03 +02:00

1.6 KiB
Raw Blame History

Rétrospective v0.803 — Sécurité, Compliance & Outillage Dev

Ce qui a bien fonctionné

  • Security headers : CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy en place
  • DDoS rate limiting : Global 1000 req/s, per-IP 100 req/s avec Redis sliding window 1s
  • Audit middleware : Auto-log POST/PUT/DELETE sur toutes les routes, GET /admin/audit/logs
  • Account deletion : Soft delete, anonymisation (deleted-{uuid}), nettoyage S3, révocation sessions
  • CCPA : Sec-GPC header, POST /users/me/privacy/opt-out
  • Modération : Reports CRUD, actions dismiss/warn/ban alignées frontend/backend
  • Maintenance mode : Middleware 503, PUT/GET /admin/maintenance
  • Annonces & Feature flags : CRUD admin, GET /announcements/active public
  • AdminSettingsView : Onglet SETTINGS dans AdminDashboardView (maintenance, feature flags, annonces)
  • API keys : CRUD developer, auth via X-API-Key header
  • Swagger : Annotations sur handlers, GET /swagger/*

Points d'attention

  • AdminSettingsView : Était implémenté mais non routé (Storybook uniquement) — corrigé par lajout de longlet SETTINGS
  • Modération actions : Le frontend utilisait cleared/quarantined au lieu de dismiss/warn/ban — aligné
  • DDoS rate limiting : Nécessite Redis ; en son absence le middleware nest pas enregistré (pas de fallback global)

Prochaines étapes (v0.901)

  • À définir selon V0_901_RELEASE_SCOPE.md (placeholder)
  • Pistes : Wishlist marketplace, Flash sales, Creator analytics avancées, Chat enrichi (images, GIFs)